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Abstract
Making high quality and reliable software systems remains a difficult problem. One approach to address
this problem is automated verification which attempts to demonstrate algorithmically that a software sys-
tem meets its specification. However, verification of software systems is not easy: such systems are often
modeled using abstractions of infinite structures such as unbounded integers, infinite memory for allocation,
unbounded space for call stack, unrestricted queue sizes and so on. It can be shown that for most classes of
such systems, the verification problem is actually undecidable (there exists no algorithm which will always
give the correct answer for arbitrary inputs). In spite of this negative theoretical result, techniques have
been developed which are successful on some practical examples although they are not guaranteed to always
work. This dissertation is in a similar spirit and develops a new paradigm for automated verification of
large or infinite state systems. We observe that even if the state space of a system is infinite, for practi-
cal examples, the set of reachable states (or other fixpoints needed for verification) is often expressible in
a simple representation. Based on this observation, we propose an entirely new approach to verification:
the idea is to use techniques from computational learning theory to identify the reachable states (or other
fixpoints) and then verify the property of interest. To use learning techniques, we solve key problems of
either getting positive and negative examples for the fixpoint of interest or of answering membership and
equivalence queries for this fixpoint. We show that learning-based verification is a powerful approach: as
long as one has suitable algorithms which can learn the fixpoints needed and decision procedures for some
common set-theoretic operations, one can guarantee that the verification procedure will either find a bug or
prove that the system is correct. In particular, we have seen that for a large number of practical systems,
the class of regular languages is rich enough to express these fixpoints, allowing us to automatically verify
such systems using learning algorithms for regular sets.
We show how the learning-based verification paradigm can be applied to a number of systems and for
different kinds of specifications. First, we use learning to verify safety properties of finite state machines
communicating over unbounded first-in-first-out channels. We assume that the reachable set of states is
regular and use two different learning algorithms: one called RPNI which is based on learning from sample
iii
executions of the system, and the other derived from Angluin’s L* algorithm which asks membership and
equivalence queries. Next, we show how the learning approach can be used to verify safety properties of
integer systems, parameterized systems and other systems in which states can be encoded as strings. We
then extend the learning based approach to liveness properties and show how to use learning to verify
omega-regular properties as well as CTL properties with fairness constraints.
We have implemented the above techniques in a tool called Lever. We analyze various examples using
the tool and show how Lever successfully verifies their properties. The running time is also comparable to
other tools available. Moreover, since we can prove that our method will terminate whenever the target set
that we are computing is regular, this is a substantial improvement over other tools which can guarantee
completeness only under very specific conditions. We also present a detailed case study of a module in the
Linux kernel called read-copy-update and successfully verify some interesting properties using our learning
based method.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software programs are often buggy. This is painfully obvious in almost all computer systems that we use
daily; with almost predictable frequency, security holes are discovered, programs do not behave as expected
and operating systems crash. Some well-known disasters such as Ariane 5 explosion, Patriot-Scud failure,
loss of Mars Climate Orbiter and Pentium division bug, have all been attributed to very simple programming
errors (see [76] for a web site discussing some of these bugs). A NIST study [122] in 2002 estimated that
software errors cost $59.5 billion annually in the United States alone.
Traditionally, the most common method of finding bugs has been testing [80]. However, it is recognized
that as systems get more and more complex, exhaustively testing all possible scenarios is impossible. This
is even more true of concurrent systems where bugs may be revealed only under some uncommon scenarios.
To catch some classes of errors, it has been found that it is useful to do formal inspections [36] where a group
of software developers review the source code line by line. Tools are also available that can do a conservative
static analysis [62] of the code to look for common errors such as dangling pointers and unfreed memory.
Some other methods that have also been used, include simulation of the software system to watch for any
catastrophic problems and runtime verification [68, 69] where the system is instrumented to emit events
which are then monitored against some specification.
There is a set of techniques loosely referred to as formal methods which attempts to establish the cor-
rectness of programs with mathematical rigor. The first step in the exercise of formal methods is to create a
model of the software system which can be subjected to mathematical analysis. The next step is to formulate
a precise mathematical statement of the specification that the software model is supposed to satisfy. This
is by no means trivial; too often the requirements or specifications for a given piece of software are vague
and even conflicting. For a complex system, documenting the specification precisely is a major undertaking.
The final step in formal methods is to create a methodology for establishing whether the model meets its
specification. Note that the intent of formal methods is not to completely replace other methods but to add
powerful techniques to the developer’s arsenal to make software systems more reliable.
One approach used in formal methods is that of theorem proving. In this, the meaning of various
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constructs is expressed through axioms and inference rules in a proof system. To show that the program
meets the specification, a proof is developed, in which starting from the axioms, each step logically derives
from the previous one and ultimately leads to a statement showing the program’s validity. This usually needs
considerable human guidance and ingenuity but can be potentially used for models with large or even infinite
state-spaces. In contrast to theorem proving, the approach of algorithmic verification attempts to minimize
the need for human intervention and develops algorithms for automatically verifying correctness. An example
of algorithmic verification is model checking: given a model of the software system and a specification of the
desired property, a program automatically checks if the specification is satisfied. However, in many cases,
model checking suffers from the state-space explosion problem, meaning that the effort required to check a
model grows exponentially with the size of the model. Because software systems often include abstractions
of unbounded data variables; unbounded process creation and memory allocation; and unbounded recursion,
models of such systems have an infinite number of states. For infinite space models, it can actually be
shown that the model checking problem is generally undecidable,1 meaning that there is no algorithm that
can solve the problem for all models and specifications. Even if the state space is not infinite, non-trivial
programs typically have sufficiently large state-spaces to make their analysis infeasible through exhaustive
exploration of all states.
In this dissertation, we propose a new paradigm for verification of infinite or large state-space systems.
Our idea relies on the following insight. We know that verification of systems usually entails computing
either the set of states reachable from the initial states or certain fixpoints associated with logical formulas.
For many practical systems, even though the set of reachable states (or the fixpoints) is infinite, it is often
highly structured and is expressible in a simple representation, for example as regular sets. There is a rich
body of work referred to as computational learning theory which, among other things, deals with learning
concepts such as regular sets and other languages. If we can provide the information needed to learn the
reachable states or the fixpoints, then we can hope to compute these directly and thus solve the verification
problem. This is the main question we address in this dissertation. Our central thesis is that techniques
from computational learning theory can indeed be used effectively for verifying several classes of infinite state
systems and various kinds of properties. In subsequent chapters, we develop the details of this learning-to-
verify approach and demonstrate that this is an attractive technique for analyzing practical systems. We
show how to solve the key problems needed for using learning techniques: either getting positive and negative
examples of the fixpoint of interest or answering membership and equivalence queries for this fixpoint. To
our knowledge, this is the first systematic attempt to view verification as a learning problem, although some
1Infinite state systems for which some problems are decidable include well-structured transition systems; see [56] for some
general results.
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Figure 1.1: Learning rectangles in two dimensional space
ideas from learning have been used in the past for verification.
To set the context in which we use learning theory, we now briefly describe our learning framework.
1.1 Learning Theory
Learning theory deals with the process of hypothesizing a general rule from observations. For example,
consider a problem where we are told to find a rectangular region in two dimensional space with its edges
aligned to the axes. We are given some points labeled as positive examples (meaning these points are inside
the unknown target rectangle) and others as negative examples (meaning these points are outside the target
rectangle). The learning task, then, is to identify a rectangle which is compatible with these points. This is
graphically illustrated in Figure 1.1.
The fundamental problem addressed by learning algorithms is to efficiently find the hypothesis from
among a class of concepts which best explains the given observations. In order to evaluate efficiency,
researchers have proposed various frameworks under which learning algorithms operate. In our context, we
are interested in two such frameworks: passive learning and active learning.
In the passive learning framework, the learner is simply given examples included in the target concept
(positive examples) and examples not included in the target concept (negative examples). The requirement
imposed on the learner is that as it is given successively larger sequences of positive and negative examples,
at some point, it stops changing the hypothesis it produces and this hypothesis must match the target
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concept. The framework of active learning gives the learner more flexibility. The learner has access to
a knowledgeable teacher (student-teacher framework [12]) which provides answers to membership queries
(whether a given example belongs to a given concept) and equivalence queries (whether a given hypothesis
matches the concept). In case the answer to the equivalence query is in the negative, the teacher must also
return one counterexample where the hypothesis differed from the target. Based on these queries, the learner
makes hypotheses and eventually converges on the target concept.
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in learning the set of reachable states (or other fixpoints) of
the system. For the class of concepts used for learning, we choose regular languages. This is based on the
practical success enjoyed by regular languages for representing sets of states in verification and our experience
that a number of systems regular sets are expressive enough for our verification procedure.
We now briefly give intuition on how learning techniques can be used to verify different kinds of properties.
1.2 Learning to Verify Safety Properties
One of the most crucial properties that systems must satisfy are the class of safety properties. Informally,
safety properties specify that nothing “bad” happens; some examples of safety properties are: “The temper-
ature regulated by a thermostat will never exceed 85 degrees,” “There can never be more than one process
using a critical resource,” and “No user without valid credentials will be able to access the bank account.”
It is well known that verification of safety properties can be reduced to checking if any unsafe states are
reachable from the initial states of the system. The traditional method used in model checking for computing
the reachable states is to start with the initial states and iteratively apply the transition relation. At each
step, the newly discovered states are added and the process is repeated until no more new reachable states
are found. The resulting set is usually referred to as the fixpoint (a precise mathematical definition can be
found in Chapter 2). However, for infinite state systems (or even systems with finite but large number of
states), this process may never terminate or may take too long to terminate. In our verification technique,
we view the identification of the reachable states as a learning problem. Let us now look at the challenges
involved in learning the set of reachable states. If we consider using the passive learning framework, we need
positive and negative examples of reachable states. We can easily find positive examples by executing some
sample sequences of transitions; however, in general, we cannot get examples of unreachable states. If we
use the active learning framework, then we need a way to answer membership and equivalence queries from
the learner. Again, in general, we do not have a way of answering whether a given state is reachable or not.
For the equivalence query, we do have a partial answer: if the hypothesis presented by the learner is not a
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fixpoint under the transition relation, then clearly it is not the correct reachable region; but the converse
does not hold. Further, when the hypothesis is not a fixpoint (and hence not equivalent to the target), we do
not have an immediate way of returning a counterexample to the learner as required by the active learning
framework.
The key idea that resolves the challenges discussed in the previous paragraph is that instead of learning
just the set of reachable states, we also learn system executions witnessing the reachability of these states.
More precisely, we learn a set of state-witness pairs such that a pair (s, w) is in the target concept if and only
if the state s is shown to be reachable by the witness w. This provides us an easy way to get negative examples
(in addition to the positive examples): any pair (s, w) in which w fails to demonstrate the reachability of
s is a negative example. Moreover, now we can answer a membership query for (s, w) by simply checking
whether w is a valid witness for the reachability of s. Equivalence query still has only a partial answer
using the fixpoint check, but carrying witnesses with the states allows us to return a counterexample to the
learner if the hypothesis is not a fixpoint (details are in Chapter 5). We can also show that even the partial
answer to the equivalence query is enough for verification. If the learning algorithm outputs a set that is
closed under the transition relation of the system and does not reach any of the unsafe states, then clearly
the system can deemed to be correct. On the other hand, if the hypothesis output by the learner intersects
with the unsafe states, we also obtain a witness claiming to lead to an unsafe state. If the witness is valid,
then clearly we have found a violation of the safety property and we are done. On the other hand, an
invalid witness (along with the state it claimed to reach) can be used by the learner to refine the hypothesis.
This process is repeated until either a valid counterexample is found or the system shown to be correct.
Our main observation is that this learning based approach is a complete verification method for systems
whose reachable set falls in the concept class that we are learning. In other words, for such systems we will
eventually either find a buggy execution that violates the safety property, or will successfully prove that no
unsafe state is reachable.
We demonstrate the application of learning based verification to systems in which states can be repre-
sented using strings. We assume there exists a way to add a witness such that the state-witness pair can
also be represented as a string. Based on the practical success enjoyed by regular model checking [25], we
assume that the set of state-witness pairs such that the states are reachable from the initial states is regular.
This allows us to use relatively efficient algorithms that have been developed for learning regular sets. First,
we analyze a class of systems called FIFO automata which have unbounded message queues with delivery
guaranteed to be in FIFO (first in first out) order. We develop a novel annotation scheme to encode the set of
valid state-witness pairs. We use two different learning algorithms: a passive learning algorithm called RPNI
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(Regular Positive and Negative Inference) and an active learning algorithm derived from the L* algorithm
given by Angluin in [12]. We also consider systems expressed in a framework called regular model checking
and show how learning can be used to verify safety properties of such systems.
1.3 Learning to Verify Liveness properties
In contrast to safety properties which specify that “nothing bad happens,” there is another set of properties
called liveness properties which assert (informally speaking) that “something good eventually happens.”
Such properties are obviously very important; a system which does nothing is always safe, but for it do
something useful, it typically must guarantee some liveness properties. Let us now see, how the learning
approach can be applied to liveness properties as well.
For expressing general temporal properties which include both liveness and safety properties, there are
two popular kinds of specification logics, namely: linear temporal logic, and branching time logic. For
linear time properties, a convenient representation for the specification is the class of ω-regular properties
which use automata over infinite words. It is well known that ω-regular properties can also express fairness
constraints that are often needed for verifying liveness properties. Similar to traditional automata theory
based verification of ω-regular specifications, we construct a representation of the intersection of the possible
behaviors of the system and the set of undesirable behaviors. If this intersection is not empty then we have
demonstrated that the system can exhibit some undesirable behavior. On the other hand, if the intersection
is empty then we have successfully verified the system. The traditional way to perform this emptiness check
is via a nested depth first search of an automata over infinite word or the computation of the fixpoint of
a µ-calculus formula (details are in Chapter 7). However, both of the above approaches are not amenable
to the learning technique. Therefore, we develop a new fixpoint based characterization for such properties.
We show that this fixpoint is unique and develop membership and equivalence oracles that can be used for
learning it. We again use regular sets for representing the elements of the fixpoint and use a variant of
Angluin’s L* as the learning algorithm. We show that our verification procedure is always sound and more
interestingly, it is also complete under the assumption of regularity of the fixpoint.
To verify branching time properties, we use a logic called Computational Tree Logic (CTL). Since CTL
itself cannot express fairness which is crucial for liveness properties, we allow fairness constraints to be
specified in the model that represents the system. The first challenge to develop a learning based model
checking algorithm for CTL is that CTL properties express nested fixpoints. We overcome this challenge
by developing a new characterization of CTL properties in terms of functions that have unique fixpoints.
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The next challenge is to adequately take into account the fairness constraints that might be associated with
the system being verified. In the case of finite state systems, this is handled using the observation that it is
sufficient to only consider fair computations that are ultimately periodic and looping, i.e., computations that
repeatedly execute a sequence of steps that loop to a state. However, this observation does not extend to
infinite state systems. In order to soundly verify an infinite state system with respect to fairness constraints,
we need to also consider fair computations that are truly infinite, and are not looping. We generalize ideas
that we developed for the verification of ω-regular properties (discussed in the previous paragraph) to account
for fairness. We again instantiate our technique to systems in which states are encoded as strings and use
a regular inference algorithm to learn the CTL fixpoints. We prove that if the fixpoints have a regular
representation, our procedure will always terminate with the correct answer.
1.4 Discussion
The learning-based verification paradigm enjoys several benefits. First, our verification procedure is accom-
panied by a precise statement of when the method is guaranteed to work: if the set being computed for
verification can be represented using the symbolic representation used by the learner, the method is guaran-
teed to either prove the system to be correct, or produce a counter-example demonstrating its violation. Of
course, for some inputs, the fixpoint may not be representable by the class of concepts being learned; in this
case our verification procedure may not halt. However, we have seen that for a large number of practical
systems, even the simple class of regular languages is rich enough, allowing us to automatically verify such
systems using learning algorithms for regular sets. The second major benefit of the learning based approach
is that the running time of the algorithm does not depend on the time it takes to converge to the fixpoint,
but rather on the size of the symbolic representation of the fixpoint set. If the fixpoint set being computed
has a succinct representation, then the learning algorithm will converge to it very quickly. Finally, because
intermediate approximations to the fixpoint are never computed, it avoids the space overhead of storing
fixpoint approximations that may have a large symbolic representation.
1.5 Implementation
The techniques presented in this dissertation have been implemented in a tool called Lever. The tool
is written in Java and C++ and is freely available for download from [91]. We have used this tool to
analyze a number of examples which include some common FIFO automata such as alternating bit protocol,
sliding window protocol, cache coherence protocols such as Dragon, Firefly, Illinois, MESI, MOESI, Berkeley,
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Futurebus and Synapse; mutual exclusion protocols such as peterson, lamport, ticket and bakery; broadcast
protocols such as consistency, and producer-consumer; petri nets such as lastinfirstserved protocol, Esparza-
Finkel-Mayr Counter Machine, RTP and manufacturing; and counter machines such as lift and barber. We
analyze safety properties as well as some branching time and liveness properties. We report on the running
times for the examples analyzed by our tool and provide comparison with some other tools that are available.
The overall comparison of the performance of the various tools is mixed, with each tool taking less time in
some examples but more in other examples (see Chapter 9 for details). However, as noted before, since we
can prove that our method will terminate whenever the target set that we are computing is regular, we can
provide more general completeness guarantees than other tools. As a case study, we also analyze the Linux
implementation of read-copy-update mechanism which is a scalable solution for reader-writer synchronization
for multiple CPUs. We model this module as an integer system and use Lever to prove some interesting
properties of this system.
1.6 Outline
In Chapter 2, we present some background and preliminaries which are used later. In Chapter 3, we survey
the related work in verification. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the application of the learning based approach
to verification of safety properties for FIFO automata. In Chapter 6, we show how learning can be used to
verify safety of systems expressed in the regular model checking framework. Next, we move on the analysis of
liveness properties, first using ω-regular specifications in Chapter 7 and then using CTL along with fairness
constraints (Chapter 8). Chapter 9 discusses the implementation and results of analyzing the examples and
we conclude with plans for future work in Chapter 10.
Parts of Chapter 4 were published in [128], parts of Chapter 5 in [127], parts of Chapter 7 in [129] and
parts of Chapter 8 in [130].
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we review some background material that will be used in the rest of the thesis. We start with
a discussion of mathematical models used for programs and describe specification methods for expressing
the properties of such models. We review some techniques for algorithmic verification of systems and discuss
some popular classes of infinite state systems. Finally, we describe the learning framework and algorithms
that we later use for verification.
2.1 Mathematical Models for Programs and Systems
Before a program or system can be subjected to formal verification, we have to model it as a mathematical
structure. It is important that any such model captures the essence of the verification problem but at
the same time does not dwell too much on syntactical and other minor details of the program as written
in some specific programming language. A popular way to represent programs is using an event-action
framework, for example, as described in [31]. In this representation, a program is a finite set of control
and data variables with given initial values and has a finite set of events. Each event e has an enabling
condition enabled (e) which constraints the states in which the transition can be taken and an action(e)
specifying how the variables are transformed by the transition. Among the events whose enabling conditions
are satisfied, any particular one can be chosen non-deterministically and the control and data variables
modified as specified by the associated action. The data variables can be used to encode different memory
structures found commonly in programs such as integer variables, call stack, message queues and so on.
Event-action based languages have been used in the literature to express concurrent programs including
abstractions of multi threaded Java programs, parameterized systems, petri nets, communication protocols,
counter systems, broadcast protocols and cache coherence protocols [10, 54].
Example 1. A simplified example program written in this language is shown in Figure 2.1. In this example,
there is a producer who adds items to a buffer b while two consumers consume these items from b. The
variable o records the total number of items produced while i1 and i2 record the number of items consumed
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Data Variables: b, o, i1, i2: integer
Control Variables: pc : {q0}
Initial Conditions: b = o = i1 = i2 = 0, pc = q0
Events:
1. enabled: true,
action: b′ = b + 1, o′ = o + 1
2. enabled: b > 0,
action: b′ = b− 1, i′1 = i1 + 1
3. enabled: b > 0,
action: b′ = b− 1, i′2 = i2 + 1
Figure 2.1: A event-action program for a simple buffer problem
by each of the two consumers respectively. The domain of the variables o, i1 and i2 is the set of natural
numbers. In the action clause, the new value of a variable is given by a primed version of that variable (for
brevity, only the variables that are changed are shown). Note that this program has an infinite number of
reachable states.
2.1.1 Kripke Structures
While event-action based languages are rich enough to model and define the semantics of programs, they
need to be enhanced in order to perform verification. In particular, states of the system need to be annotated
with logical propositions that describe properties that are relevant for verification. For example, a state in
which two processes are incorrectly accessing a critical resource simultaneously may be labeled bad while
other states may be labeled good. Such a model of the software system where states are annotated with
atomic propositions is formally called a Kripke structure, and is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A Kripke structure is a quintuple (S, AP, R, I,L) where S is a set of (possibly infinite) states,
AP is a finite set of atomic propositions, R ⊆ S × S is a (total) transition relation, I ⊆ S is a set of initial
states and L : S → 2AP is function that assigns to each state the set of propositions that are true in that
state.
In this dissertation, we restrict ourselves to Kripke structures that are finitely branching, i.e., if a Kripke
structure has a state s ∈ S and a relation R, the set {s′ | R(s, s′)} is finite. We will sometimes denote
(s1, s2) ∈ R by s1 → s2. A computation starting from state s is a sequence of states s0, s1, . . . such that
s0 = s, and si → si+1 for each i. Constructing the Kripke structure corresponding to an event-action
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program is straightforward, provided we are also given the labeling function L. The states S are functions
that assign to each variable of the program a value in the appropriate domain, and each event e defines a
binary relation Re ⊆ S × S to be {(s1, s2) | s1 ∈ enabled (e) and (s1, s2) ∈ action(e)}. Then, the transition
relation is simply given by R =
⋃
e∈E Re.
Kripke structures are sometimes augmented with fairness constraints that hold in the system. Formally,
a Fair Kripke structure is defined as follows.
Definition 2. A Fair Kripke structure is a tuple (S, AP, R, I,L, Φ), where (S, AP, R, I,L) is a Kripke
structure, and Φ ⊆ S is the set of fair states. A fair computation starting from s is then a computation
s0, s1, . . . starting from s that visits the fair states infinitely often, i.e., sj ∈ Φ for infinitely many j.1
2.2 Specification Languages
In order to proceed with any verification method, we have to first specify in some formal language, the
properties that the system should exhibit. A popular framework for describing specifications is temporal
logic which allows one to reason about properties like eventually or never.
2.2.1 The Computational Tree Logic CTL*
CTL* formulas describe properties of computation trees. Our treatment of CTL* is derived from [39]. If
we start from a state in the Kripke structure and start unwinding the structure into an infinite tree, the
resulting structure is called a computation tree. This tree shows all possible computation paths that can
happen starting from some state in the Kripke structure.
Formulas in the logic are built up from the atomic propositions and are composed of path quantifiers
and temporal operators. There are two path quantifiers: A (“for all computation paths”) and E (“for some
computation path”). The temporal operators are:
• X (“next time”) requires that a property holds in the second state of the path.
• F (“eventually”) asserts that a property will hold at some state on the path.
• G (“always”) specifies that a property holds at every state on the path.
• U (“until”) operator is a binary operator combining two properties. It holds if there is a state on the
path where the second property holds, and at every preceding state on the path, the first property
holds.
1Usually fairness is described by a set of constraints using the so-called generalized Bu¨chi condition. However, it is known
that a generalized Bu¨chi condition can be converted into the kind of fairness constraint described above.
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• R (“release”) is the dual of the U operator and requires that the second property holds along the path
up to and including the first state where the first property holds. However, the first property is not
required to hold eventually.
There are two types of CTL* formulas: state formulas which are true for a specific state and path formulas
which are true along a specific path. Let AP be the set of atomic propositions. Then the syntax of CTL*
formulas is given by the following rules:
• If p ∈ AP , then p is a state formula
• If f and g are state formulas, then ¬f , f ∧ g, f ∨ g are state formulas
• If f is a path formula, then Ef and Af are state formulas
• If f is a state formula, then f is also a path formula
• If f and g are path formulas, then ¬f , f ∧ g, f ∨ g, Xf , Ff , Gf ,fUg and fRg are path formulas.
The semantics of the CTL* are given with respect to a Kripke structure M = (S, AP, R, I,L). A path in
the Kripke structure is an infinite sequence of states, pi = s0, s1, . . . such that for every i ≥ 0, (si, si+1) ∈ R.
Let pii denote the suffix of pi starting at si. We use M, s |= f to denote that a state formula f holds at a
state s in M , and M, pi |= f to denote that a path formula f holds along a path pi in M . The relation |= is
defined inductively as follows (assuming f1 and f2 are state formulas and g1 and g2 are path formulas):
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M, s |= p ⇔ p ∈ L(s)
M, s |= ¬f1 ⇔ M, s 6|= f1
M, s |= f1 ∨ f2 ⇔ M, s |= f1 or M, s |= f2
M, s |= f1 ∧ f2 ⇔ M, s |= f1 and M, s |= f2
M, s |= Eg1 ⇔ there is a path pi from s such that M, pi |= g1
M, s |= Ag1 ⇔ for every path pi from s, M, pi |= g1
M, pi |= f1 ⇔ s is the first state of pi and M, s |= f1
M, pi |= ¬g1 ⇔ M, pi 6|= g1
M, pi |= g1 ∨ g2 ⇔ M, pi |= g1 or M, pi |= g2
M, pi |= g1 ∧ g2 ⇔ M, pi |= g1 and M, pi |= g2
M, pi |= Xg1 ⇔ M, pi1 |= g1
M, pi |= Fg1 ⇔ there exists a k ≥ 0 such that M, pik |= g1
M, pi |= Gg1 ⇔ for all k ≥ 0 such that M, pi
k |= g1
M, pi |= g1Ug2 ⇔ there exists a k ≥ 0 such that M, pi
k |= g2 and
for all 0 ≤ j < k, M, pij |= g1
M, pi |= g1Rg2 ⇔ for all j ≥ 0, if for every i < j M, pii 6|= g1 then M, pij |= g2
Figure 2.2 illustrates some common CTL* operators. It can be shown that operators ∨,¬, X, U and E
are sufficient to express any other CTL* formulas.
In the presence of fairness constraints, the path quantifiers are interpreted only over fair paths. So for
example, a state s satisfies EGf in the presence of fairness, if there is a fair computation starting from state
s such that f holds in all states.
2.2.2 CTL and LTL
There are two useful sublogics of CTL*. The first one is Computation Tree Logic (CTL) in which each of
the temporal operators X, F, G, U and R must be immediately preceded by a path quantifier. The other
sublogic is called linear-time logic (LTL) consists of formulas of the form Af where f is a path formula in
which the only state subformulas permitted are atomic propositions. It can be shown that both CTL and
LTL have different expressive powers and are properly included in CTL*.
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M, s0 |= EFg M, s0 |= AFg
M, s0 |= EGg M, s0 |= AGg
Figure 2.2: Some basic CTL* operators. Filled circle indicates that the state has the label g
2.2.3 ω-regular Languages
Another method for describing the set of acceptable or unacceptable behaviors of the system is by using
automata over infinite words. A popular formulation of infinite word automata is Bu¨chi automata.
Definition 3. A Bu¨chi automaton [124] M is a quintuple (S, Σ, I, δ, F ) where S is a finite set of states,
I ⊆ S is the set of initial states, δ : S×Σ→ 2S is the transition function, F ⊆ S is a set of accepting states.
For an infinite word v = v0, v1, v2, . . . ∈ Σω, the run of M on v is a sequence of states ρ = s0, s1, s2, . . .,
such that si+1 ∈ δ(si, vi) for every i. An infinite word v is accepted by M if there is some run ρ of M on v
such that some state s ∈ F appears infinitely often in ρ. The language accepted by M is the set of all words
v accepted by M . A set of infinite words L is said to be ω-regular if there is some Bu¨chi automaton which
accepts L.
It is well-known ([60]) that all LTL formulas can be translated into a Bu¨chi automaton.
2.2.4 Safety and Liveness Properties
Properties expressed in CTL* or ω-regular languages are often classified into safety and liveness properties.
Informally, safety properties assert that something “bad” never happens. Safety properties are finitely
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refutable. This means that in order to show a violation of a safety property it suffices to show a finite prefix
of some computation. A simple safety property written in CTL* is AG(p) where p is some invariant that
the system must satisfy.
In contrast to safety, liveness properties assert that something “good” eventually happens. These are
properties that are never finitely refutable, i.e., one needs an infinite computation to show that a liveness
property has been violated. An example of a liveness property written in CTL* is AG(req → AF (resp))
which asserts that in all states, if we are ever in a req state, this implies that for all paths, we will see some
resp state in future.
2.3 Model Checking
The verification or model checking problem is as follows. Given a system description in terms of a Kripke
structure (S, AP, R, I,L) (or alternatively, a fair Kripke structure (S, AP, R, I,L, Φ)) and a temporal logic
specification f , we have to check if all states s ∈ I satisfy the formula f .
We now introduce terminology about fixpoints and operators that we will find useful.
2.3.1 Fixpoints
Consider a function F : 2S 7→ 2S, from sets of states to sets of states. A fixpoint for F is a set Z ⊆ S such
that F(Z) = Z; it is the least fixpoint if it is the least, with respect to ⊆-ordering, among all the fixpoints
of F , and is denoted as µ(F). Greatest fixpoint of F is defined analogously and is denoted by ν(F). The
function F is said to be monotonic if Z1 ⊆ Z2 ⇒ F(Z1) ⊆ F(Z2). It is well-known ([121]) that if F is
monotonic, then both µ(F) and ν(F) exist. F is ∪-continuous if Z1 ⊆ Z2 ⊆ . . . ⇒ F(∪iZi) = ∪iF(Zi). It
is ∩-continuous if Z1 ⊇ Z2 ⊇ . . . ⇒ F(∩iZi) = ∩iF(Zi). Another well-known result about fixpoints is that
if F is ∪-continuous then µ(F) can be calculated by starting from the empty set and repeatedly applying
the function until the result does not change.2 Analogously, if F is ∩-continuous then the greatest fixpoint
can be computed by starting from the entire set S and repeatedly applying the function until convergence.
2.3.2 Model Checking Safety Properties
To prove safety properties, it suffices to find the set of reachable states (or its over approximation) and show
that it does not intersect with the set of “bad” states. Alternatively, one can find the set of states (or over
2Note that this procedure is guaranteed to terminate in finite number of steps only if S is finite
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approximation of such a set) that can reach “bad” states but does not include any of the initial states. If U
is the set of states labeled “bad”, then in terms of fixpoints, this reduces to checking one of the following:
1. The least fixpoint of the function Ff : 2S 7→ 2S given by Ff (Z) = I ∪{s | (s′, s) ∈ R and s′ ∈ Z} does
not intersect with U .
2. The least fixpoint of the function Fb : 2S 7→ 2S given by Fb(Z) = U ∪{s | (s, s′) ∈ R and s′ ∈ Z} does
not intersect with I .
2.3.3 CTL Model Checking
The standard algorithm [39] for CTL model proceeds by progressively computing the set of states that satisfy
the various subformulas of f (including f itself). Initially, we compute the set of states that satisfy each
of the atomic propositions in f . We know that s satisfies p iff p ∈ L(s). The algorithm then proceeds in
stages. In the ith stage, the set of states corresponding to subformulas with i − 1 nested CTL operators
are computed using the results of the computation in the previous stages. Once the states satisfying f are
found, the system is deemed to be correct if and only if this set wholly contains I , the initial set of states.
The algorithm to compute the set of states satisfying a subformula g in some stage, say i, depends on
the outermost logical operator of g. For the operators EU and EG, computing the set of states satisfying
them, involves computing the least and greatest fixpoint, respectively, of certain functions.
2.3.4 Model Checking LTL and ω-regular Specifications
LTL model checking can be done using a tableau method (See Section 4.2 in [39]). Alternatively, there is a
method to verify ω-regular specifications using automata theory. Since an LTL formula can be converted
into an ω-regular specification, this can be used to model check LTL as well. We briefly expound on the
automata-theoretic method.
We assume that we are given a ω-regular specification of the system as a Bu¨chi automaton. Bu¨chi
automata are closed under intersection and complementation and there exists a decision procedure for
checking if a Bu¨chi automaton is empty. This suggests the following method for model checking a Kripke
structure K with a finite set of states against an LTL formula L:
• Construct a Bu¨chi automata B1 from the Kripke structure K which models the system. A Kripke
structure directly corresponds to a Bu¨chi automata, where all the states are accepting.
• If the specification is given as an LTL formula L, negate L and translate the negated formula into a
Bu¨chi automata B2. If the specification is a Bu¨chi automata giving the acceptable behaviors comple-
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ment it to get a Bu¨chi automata B2. (Often the specification is itself given as the set of undesirable
behaviors of the system, in which case the complementation step is not needed.)
• Construct the automata for the intersection of B1 and B2 and check for emptiness. The system satisfies
the specification if and only if the intersection is empty.
The emptiness check for a Bu¨chi automaton is usually done by conducting a nested depth first search on
the automaton. For details, the reader is referred to [39].
2.4 Verification of Infinite State Systems
We now consider some interesting classes of infinite state systems and discuss the verification problem of
such systems. We first need to fix some basic notation about regular sets.
2.4.1 Regular Sets and Transducers
Let Σ be a finite set of symbols called the alphabet and let Σ∗ be the set of strings over Σ. A non-deterministic
finite automaton (NFA) is M = (Q, δ, Σ, q0, F ) where Q is a finite set of states, δ is the transition relation
δ ⊂ Q× Σ×Q, q0 is the start state and F is a set of final states. A deterministic finite automaton (DFA)
is a special case of an NFA in which δ is actually a function Q× Σ→ Q.
We define a function δˆ from Q× Σ∗ to Q as follows:
• δˆ(q, ) = q. Here  denotes the empty string
• for all strings w and symbol a, δˆ(q, wa) = δ(δˆ(q, w), a)
A string x is said to be accepted by the DFA M if δˆ(q0, x) = p for some p in F . The language accepted by
M is the set {x | δˆ(q0, x) is in F}. A language is a regular set if it is accepted by some DFA.
Regular languages are closed under union and complementation. It is also known that for every any NFA,
a DFA can be constructed which accepts the same language. For a detailed treatment of regular languages
the reader is referred to [75].
A transducer T is tuple (Q, δ, Σ, Ω, q0, F ) where Q is a finite set of states, δ ∈ Q×(Σ∪{})×(Ω∪{})×Q
is a transition relation, q0 is the start state and F is a set of final states. Σ and Ω are finite sets and are
called the input and the output alphabet respectively. A path from a state p0 to another state pn+1 is a
word in d1d2 . . . dn ∈ δ∗ such that there is a sequence (p0, u0, v0, p1)(p1, u1, v1, p2) . . . (pn, un, vn, pn+1) and
for all i with 0 ≤ i < n+1 it is true that (pi, ui, vi, pi+1) ∈ δ. The word u0u1 . . . un is called the input string
17
and the word v0v1 . . . vn is called the output string of the path. A path from q0 to a state in F is called a
successful path. A transducer T defines a relation RT ∈ Σ∗ × Ω∗ given by
RT = {(f, g) | f and g are input and output strings of some successful path}
For an extensive treatment of transducers, the reader is referred to [20].
2.4.2 FIFO Automata
A popular model for a variety of software systems comprises of finite state machines communicating over
unbounded FIFO (first in first out) channels (FIFO automata). Examples of such abstraction include:
networking protocols where unbounded buffers are assumed, languages like Estelle and SDL (Specification
and Description Language) in which processes have infinite queue size, distributed systems and various
actor [3] systems.
A FIFO automaton [55] is a 6-tuple (Q, q0, C, ΣM , Θ, δ) where Q is a finite set of control states, q0 ∈ Q is
the initial control state, C is a finite set of channel names, ΣM is a finite alphabet for contents of a channel,
Θ is a finite set of transitions names, and δ : Θ→ Q× ((C×{?, !}×ΣM)∪{τ})×Q is a function that assigns
a control transition to each transition name. For a transition name θ, if the associated control transition
δ(θ) is of the form (q, c?m, q′) then it denotes a receive action, if it is of the form (q, c!m, q′) it denotes a
send action, and if it is of the form (q, τ, q′) then it denotes an internal action. The channels are considered
to be perfect and messages sent by a sender are received in the order in which they were sent. The formal
operational semantics, given by a labelled transition systems, is defined below.
A FIFO automaton F = (Q, q0, C, ΣM , Θ, δ) defines a labelled transition system L = (S, Θ,→) where
• The set of states S = Q× (Σ∗M )
C ; in other words, each state of the labelled transition system consists
of a control state q and a C-indexed vector of words w denoting the channel contents.
• If δ(θ) = (q, c?m, q′) then (p, w)
θ
→ (p′, w′) iff p = q, p′ = q′ and w = w′[c 7→ m · w′[c]]
• If δ(θ) = (q, c!m, q′) then (p, w)
θ
→ (p′, w′) iff p = q, p′ = q′ and w′ = w[c 7→ m · w[c]]
• If δ(θ) = (q, τ, q′) then (p, w)
θ
→ (p′, w′) iff p = q, p′ = q′ and w′ = w.
Here w[i 7→ s] stand for the C-indexed vector which is identical to w for all channels except i, where it is
s; w[i] denotes the contents of the channel i. We say (p, w) → (p′, w′) provided there is some θ such that
(p, w)
θ
→ (p′, w′). As usual, →∗ will denote the reflexive transitive closure of →. For σ = θ1θ2 · · · θn ∈ Θ∗,
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q0
θ1(c0!0)
θ2(c0?0)
Figure 2.3: A simple FIFO automaton which sends a symbol 0 on one transition and consumes it on the
other transition
we say (p, w)
σ
→ (p′, w′) when there exist states (p1, w1) . . . (pn−1, wn−1) such that (p, w)
θ1→ (p1, w1)
θ2→
· · · (pn−1, wn−1
θn→ (p′, w′). The trace language of the FIFO automaton is
L(F ) = {σ ∈ Θ∗ | ∃s = (p, w). s0
σ
→ s}
where s0 = (q0, (, . . . , )), i.e., the initial control state with no messages in the channels.
Figure 2.3 shows a simple FIFO automaton. Some of the strings in the trace language of this automaton
are: θ1, θ1θ1, θ1θ1θ1, θ1θ2, θ1θ2θ1θ2, . . .
It is shown in [27] that FIFO automata are powerful enough to simulate a Turing machine even if they
are restricted to using one channel and an alphabet with two letters. It is an easy consequence of this result
that any non trivial property about FIFO automata is undecidable: there cannot exist an algorithm which
will halt in all cases and correctly answer whether an arbitrary FIFO automaton satisfies the given property.
This means that verifying CTL or LTL properties (and in particular safety properties) of FIFO automata
is undecidable. However, as we will show in subsequent chapters, using learning techniques we can give a
semi-algorithm for such verification (recall that a semi-algorithm is a procedure which produces a correct
answer if it terminates but is not guaranteed to do so).
2.4.3 Regular Model Checking Framework
In a series of recent papers [1, 26, 2, 25, 77, 105], a common framework has been proposed which can
represent a number of classes of infinite state systems including parameterized systems, integer systems,
systems with push down stacks and even FIFO automata. The main idea is to represent states as strings
over an alphabet and the transition relation is given by a transducer. Sometimes, the transition relation is
restricted to be length-preserving and padding symbols are added to account for any differences in length.
Using this framework, a set of states can be encoded as a regular language.
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N/N, T/T
T/N N/T
N/N, T/T
Figure 2.4: Transition relation for the token passing example
It is easy to show that the regular model checking framework is powerful enough to encode Turing
machines; therefore, verification of such systems is undecidable in general.
The Kripke structure representing a system is given by (Σ∗, AP, RT , I,L) with I as a regular set in Σ∗,
RT as the transition relation of a transducer with input and output alphabet Σ. The labeling function is
usually given implicitly by defining regular sets Ai for each atomic proposition ai ∈ AP . More precisely, L
is given by L(s) = {a1, a2, . . . ak} iff for all i ∈ 1 . . . k the string s is in Ai.
We now briefly mention the standard encodings used for some classes of systems in this method. The
details can be found in [105].
Parameterized Systems in Array Topology. For system parameterized on the number of processes
arranged in an array topology, a string c1c2c3 . . . cn of length n is used to denote the global state of a system
with n processes. The state of the i-th process is given by the letter ci. Thus, the alphabet consists of letters
which describe the local states that a particular process can be in.
An example of a system described by the regular model checking framework is the token passing protocol.
The system consists of an arbitrary but unchanging number of processes. There is a single token in the system
which can be passed by the process holding the token to the process to its left. The states of the system are
modeled by a string over the alphabet {N, T}, where the length of the string is the number of processes in
the system, the ith element is T if the ith process holds the token and the rest of the elements are N . Since
this is a parameterized system, the length of the string could be arbitrary. The initial configuration is the
set of strings TN j which denotes j + 1 processes with a single token being held by the first process. There
is a single transition in the system which is given by the transducer shown in Figure 2.4.
Integer Systems. A particularly useful class of systems expressible in the regular model checking frame-
work is that of integer systems. The system consists of a finite number of control states and variables which
can take values from the set of non-negative integers. This can also be used for representing parameterized
systems in which all processes are identical allowing the configuration to be represented by a count of the
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(0, 0)
(r − 1, r − 1)
{(i, i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ r}
Figure 2.5: NDD representing the set x = y for two integer variables x and y.
number of processes in finitely many control states.
Integer systems can be encoded in several different ways. One approach used in [105] is as follows.
Consider a system with n integer variables x1, x2, . . . , xn. Let each xi be associated with a boolean variable
bi. Take the alphabet Σ = {true, false}n and let the state of the system be represented as a word over Σ
such that bi is true at position j iff xi = j. This can encode sets constrained by equations like x1 < x2,
x1 ≥ x2 and x1 = x2 + c for any constant c.
In another approach, integer systems can be encoded using Number Decision Diagrams (NDDs) [21].
Let Z be the set of integers. First, we choose a numeration basis r which is greater than one. Any positive
integer z can be encoded as a finite word w = ap−1.ap−2 . . . a1a0 of digits belonging to {0, 1, . . . , r− 1}, such
that z = Σ0≤i<pairi. Negative values can be encoded similarly using the method of r’s complement. To
encode a vector value, each component is encoded using an identical number of digits (appending 0 digits if
needed) and the digits that share the same position are grouped together. The encoding can then be viewed
a word over the alphabet {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}n. It is shown in [21] that this encoding is powerful enough to
express any Presburger set and in particular linear relations in integers. For example, the set x = y with two
integer variables can be expressed using the NDD shown in Figure 2.5. Decision procedures are available for
the basic set operations of union, complement, projection and emptiness check.
FIFO Automata. FIFO automata can also be encoded in the regular model checking framework as follows.
Using the notation in Section 2.4.2, the alphabet taken is Σ = Q ∪ ΣM ∪ {⊥}. Here ⊥ is a filler symbol use
to represent empty slots in the channels. For a single channel FIFO automata, each state can be represented
as a word in Q⊥∗Σ∗M⊥
∗. The filler symbols allow the messages in the channel to grow or shrink as needed.
The encoding for multi-channel FIFO automata is similar with additional “marker” symbols separating the
letters for different channels.
Stack This is very similar to FIFO automata. The filler symbols are only needed at one end of the stack.
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2.5 Learning Framework
As mentioned earlier in Section 1.1, a learning algorithm is usually set in a framework which describes the
types of input data and queries available to the learner. There are two kinds of frameworks that are of
interest to us: passive learning and active learning. We now briefly recapitulate these two frameworks.
In passive learning, the learner is simply given examples included in the target concept (positive examples)
and examples not included in the target concept (negative examples). The learner is given successively larger
sequences of positive and negative examples. If the learner is able to converge on the target language after
being given a sufficiently large sample of positive and negative examples, it is said to identify the language
in the limit [63]. The sample that is needed to guarantee this identification is said to be characteristic.
In the framework of active learning [12], the learning algorithm is given access to a knowledgeable
teacher who can be queried. The teacher can be thought of as a pair of oracles: a membership oracle and an
equivalence oracle. The membership oracle provides answers to queries about whether an example belongs to
the concept being learnt or not. The equivalence oracle is an oracle which answers question about whether
a hypothesis proposed by the learning algorithm is indeed equivalent to the concept being learnt. If at
some point the learning algorithm’s hypothesis is deemed correct by the equivalence oracle then the learning
process stops. If on the other hand, the learner submits a hypothesis which is not equivalent to the target
concept, the equivalence oracle not only says no, but also provides a counter-example to demonstrate why
the hypothesis is wrong. The counter-example is either an example belonging to the hypothesis but not to
the target concept, or it is an example belonging to the target concept but not to the submitted hypothesis.
We now describe some common algorithms used for the inference of regular languages.
2.5.1 RPNI
RPNI (regular positive and negative inference) [108, 48] is a well-known algorithm for the inference of
regular languages in the passive learning framework. In this algorithm, the target concept to be learned is
a deterministic finite automata (DFA) which accepts a regular language. Our treatment of RPNI follows
[110].
For a regular language L ∈ Σ∗, the prefixes are defined as Pr(L) = {u | ∃v, uv ∈ L}. Let L/u =
{v | uv ∈ L} denote the right-quotient of L by u. The standard order of strings in Σ∗ is denoted by <, e.g.
for Σ = {a, b}, the ordering is , a, b, aa, ab, ba, bb, aaa, . . .
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Definition 4. The set of short prefixes of a language L is defined as follows:
Sp(L) = {x ∈ Pr(L) | 6 ∃u ∈ Σ∗ with L/u = L/x and u < x}
Given a canonical (minimal) DFA M for a regular language L, every state of M corresponds to an unique
element in the set Sp(L) and M has as many states as elements in |Sp(L)|.
Definition 5. The kernel N(L) is defined as follows:
N(L) = {} ∪ {xa | x ∈ Sp(L), a ∈ Σ, xa ∈ Pr(L)}
The kernel is an extension of a short prefix by a transition in the canonical DFA. Note that Sp(L) ⊆ N(L).
Thus, the set of short prefixes represent the states of the canonical DFA and kernel represents the set of
transitions of the canonical DFA.
The input to RPNI consists of a set of positive samples S+ accepted by the target DFA and a set of
negative samples S− rejected by the target DFA. Let PTA(S+) denote the prefix tree acceptor for S+ which
is a DFA containing a path from the start state to an accepting state for each string in S+ modulo the
common prefixes. The states of PTA(S+) are associated with the prefix of the strings that reach them,
starting from the initial state. Further, they are numbered according to the standard ordering imposed on
these prefixes. For example, the PTA for S+ = {b, aa, aaaa} is shown in Figure 2.6.
0
1a
2
b
3a 4a 5a
Figure 2.6: Prefix Tree Automaton for S+ = {b, aa, aaaa}
Given a DFA M and a partition pi on the set of states Q of M , we define the quotient automaton
Mpi = (Qpi, δpi, Σ, B(q0, pi), Fpi) obtained by merging states of M that belong to the same block of the
partition as follows: Qpi = {B(q, pi) | q ∈ Q} is the new set of states with one for each block B(q, pi)
of the partition, Fpi = {B(q, pi) | q ∈ F} and δpi : Qpi × Σ 7→ 2Qpi is the transition function such that
∀B(qi, pi), B(qj , pi) ∈ Qpi, ∀a ∈ Σ, B(qj , pi) ∈ δpi(B(qi, pi), a) iff qj = δ(qi, a).
RPNI performs an ordered search in PTA(S+) for possible merges of states while ensuring that after a
merge, the resulting automaton does not accept any string in S−. The algorithm is outlined in Figure 2.7.
23
algorithm RPNI
Input: S+ ∈ Σ∗, S− ∈ Σ∗
Output: a regular language L
begin
M ← PTA(S+)
for i = 2 to |M | do
for j = 1 to i− 1 do
if qi, qj not merged with smaller state then
M ′ ← merge(M, qi, qj)
M ′′ ← determinize(M ′, qj)
if compatible(M ′′, S−)
M = M ′′;exit j-loop
return language defined by M
end
algorithm determinize
Input: M, x; Output: M
begin
for any x
a
→ x1, x
a
→ x2 and x1 6= x2
M ←merge(M, x1, x2)
M ← determinize(M , smaller of x1, x2)
return M
end
Figure 2.7: RPNI algorithm
Some of the intermediate automata encountered by RPNI for an input set consisting of S+ = {b, aa, aaaa}
and S− = {, a, aaa, baa} are shown in Figure 2.8.
It has been shown in [108] that if (S+c , S
−
c ) form what is called a characteristic sample then RPNI is
guaranteed to find the correct automaton in time polynomial in the sample size. A set of examples (S+c , S
−
c )
is characteristic for the RPNI algorithm for a regular language L ∈ Σ∗ if the following conditions hold:
1. ∀x ∈ N(L) if x ∈ L then x ∈ S+c else ∃u ∈ Σ
∗ with xu ∈ S+c
2. ∀x ∈ Sp(L), ∀y ∈ N(L) if L/x 6= L/y then ∃u ∈ Σ∗ such that (xu ∈ S+c , yu ∈ S
−
c ) or (yu ∈ S
+
c , xu ∈
S−c ).
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0a
3
a
2
b
4a 5a
a) M ′ after merging states 0 and 1
0
a
2b
b) M ′′ after determinizing for the merge between states 0 and 1. M ′′ incompatible with S−; hence the
merge is rejected
0
b
1a 3a 4a 5a
c) M ′ after merging states 0 and 2. The automaton M ′′ obtained after determinizing for the merge is
the same as M ′. Since M ′′ is incompatible with S−, the merge is rejected
0
1
a
2
b
3a
5
a
a
d) M ′ after merging states 1 and 4
0
1
a
2
b
3a
a
e) M ′′ after determinizing for the merge between states 1 and 4. M ′′ compatible with S− so the merge
is accepted
Figure 2.8: Intermediate automata for a run of the RPNI algorithm
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2.5.2 Angluin’s L∗
Angluin’s L* algorithm [12] is an active learning algorithm for regular sets. This requires what is called a
Minimally Adequate Teacher which provides an oracle for membership (whether a given string belongs to a
target regular set) and equivalence queries (whether a given hypothesis matches the target regular set). In
case the teacher answers no to an equivalence query, it also provides a string in the symmetric difference
of the hypothesis and the target sets. The main idea behind Angluin’s L* algorithm is to systematically
explore strings for membership and create a DFA with minimum number of states to make a conjecture for
the target set. If the conjecture is incorrect, the string returned by the teacher is used to make corrections,
possibly after more membership queries. The algorithm maintains a prefix closed set S representing different
possible states of the target DFA, a set S.Σ for the transition function consisting of strings from S extended
with one letter of the alphabet and a suffix closed set E denoting experiments to distinguish between states.
An observation table OT can be visualized as a two-dimensionsal array with rows labelled by elements
of (S ∪ S.Σ ) and columns labeled by elements of E, with the entry for row s and column e equal to
OT (s.e). If s is an element of (S ∪ S.Σ ) then let row(s) denote the function f from E to {0, 1} defined
by f(e) = OT (s.e). An observation table is called closed provided that for each t in S.Σ there exists an s
in S such that row(t) = row(s). An observation table is called consistent provided whenever s1 and s2 are
elements of S such that row(s1) = row(s2), for all a ∈ Σ, row(s1.a) = row(s2.a). If OT is a closed, consistent
observation table, we can define a DFA M(S, E, OT ) = (Q, δ, Σ, q0, F ) as follows: Q = {row(s) | s ∈ S},
q0 = row(), F = {row(s) | s ∈ S and OT (s) = 1} and δ(row(s), a) = row(s.a). It can be shown that the
above definition is well defined for closed, consistent observation tables.
Angluin’s algorithm is guaranteed to terminate in polynomial time with the minimal DFA representing
the target set. Figure 2.9 shows the outline of the algorithm.
As an example, consider a regular set over the alphabet Σ = {0, 1} consisting of all strings in which
the number of 1’s is 3 modulo 4. The various intermediate automata and the final target automata for the
Angluin’s algorithm are shown in Figure 2.10.
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algorithm Angluin
begin
Initialise S and E to {}
Ask membership queries for  and each a ∈ Σ
Construct the initial observation table (S,E, OT )
Repeat
While (S, E, OT ) is not closed or not consistent
If (S, E,OT ) is not consistent
find s1 and s2 in S, a ∈ Σ and e ∈ E such that
row(s1) = row(s2) and OT (s1.a, e) 6= OT (s2.a, e)
add a.e to E
extend OT to (S ∪ S.Σ).E using membership queries
If (S, E,OT ) is not closed
find s1 ∈ S, a ∈ Σ such that
row(s1.a) is different from row(s) for all s ∈ S
add s1.a to E
extend OT to (S ∪ S.Σ).E using membership queries
Once (S, E, OT ) is closed and consistent, let M = M(S, E, OT )
Make the conjecture M
If Teacher replies with counter-example t
add t and all its prefixes to S
extend OT to (S ∪ S.Σ).E using membership queries
Until Teacher replies yes to the conjecture
return language defined by M
end
Figure 2.9: Angluin’s algorithm
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Initial hypothesis
Second hypothesis
1
0
21
0
31
0
0-1
1
0
Final hypothesis
0
0
11
0
21
0
3
1
1
Figure 2.10: Intermediate automata for a run of Angluin’s L* algorithm
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2.5.3 Variations of Angluin’s algorithm
A number of researchers have proposed variations of the classical Angluin’s L* algorithm. The specific
algorithm that we use to learn regular languages is due to Kearns and Vazirani [82]. The algorithm maintains
a candidate DFA for the language being learnt. This DFA is minimal- every pair of states can be distinguished
by a string that leads one to an accept state and the other to a non-accept state. Progressively, the algorithm
queries the equivalence oracle and the membership oracle, and stops when the equivalence oracle deems the
candidate DFA to be correct. In this process, the learner may discover inconsistencies with the current
DFA, which it resolves by splitting certain states. The details of the algorithm determine how the DFA
is represented, which queries are asked, and how inconsistencies when discovered are resolved by splitting
states. In what follows, we present only a brief overview of the algorithm, giving only the details that are
relevant to highlight our improvements. For a comprehensive presentation, the reader is referred to [82].
Each state of the candidate DFA is represented as a string, namely, the input string that takes the DFA
from the initial state to the given state. These strings are called access strings and the learner maintains a
set S of such access strings. In addition, the learner also maintains a set E of distinguishing strings, that
demonstrate why each string in S will correspond to a different state in the desired minimal DFA. So for
any two access strings s1and s2 there is a string d ∈ E such that exactly one out of s1.d and s2.d belongs
to the regular language being learnt. The algorithm maintains the sets S and E in a binary classification
tree where each internal node is labeled by a string in E and each leaf by a string in S. Any string d that
distinguishes between two access strings is placed at the root of the tree. All access strings s such that sd
belongs to the concept being learnt are placed in the right subtree and the rest are placed in the left subtree.
This process is repeated for each subtree until each access string is at its own leaf. The classification tree
implicitly represents the current candidate automaton in the following manner. The states correspond to
the access strings S. The transition on a symbol a from a state s can be obtained by “sifting” through the
classification tree as follows. Start from the root (say labeled d), and check whether the string s.a.d belongs
to the learnt concept or not, by asking the membership oracle. If s.a.d belongs to the concept then move to
the right child else move to the left child. Repeat this process recursively, until a leaf is reached. This is the
target state of the transition.
Observe, that the process of “sifting” can be used to determine whether two strings s1 and s2 must go to
different states in the smallest DFA for the concept: if sifting s1 and s2 result in reaching different leaves then
s1 and s2 must go to different states. This observation plays a crucial role in determining how the candidate
DFA must be refined when an inconsistency is encountered. Suppose that the equivalence oracle declares
that the proposed candidate DFA M is different from the concept DFA Mˆ as evidenced by a counterexample
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w. In our variant of the Kearns and Vazirani algorithm, we use Rivest and Schapire’s [114] idea of a binary
search to discover a distinguishing string needed to resolve the inconsistency shown by w. We now briefly
explain this idea. Since w is a counterexample, it is accepted by only one of M and Mˆ (say it is accepted by
M). Let si be the access string of the state reached in M on processing the first i symbols of w. Further,
let α(i) be a function defined as follows. We concatenate si with the remaining symbols in w after position
i and process the resulting string on Mˆ ; if the state reached in Mˆ is accepting, α(i) = true else α(i) = false .
From our previous comments, it follows that α(0) = false and α(|w|) = true. Using a kind of binary search,
we can find some j such that α(j) 6= α(j + 1). Let u be the prefix of w such that |u| = j, let b be the next
symbol in w and let v make up the rest of the symbols in w. Sifting ub in the classification tree leads us to
the access string sj+1. However, if we sift u to get access string sj , by construction of the candidate DFA,
sjb also has to sift to sj+1. Thus, two strings sj+1 and sjb go to the same state in M but the counterexample
shows that they can be distinguished in the concept DFA by the string v (since α(j) 6= α(j +1)). Therefore,
M must be refined by splitting the state corresponding to the access string sj+1 into two states: one with
the original access string sj+1 and another with access string sjb. The classification tree also needs to be
updated correspondingly by changing the leaf with sj+1 into an internal node with v as the distinguishing
string. The new node gets two leaves as children, one labeled with sjb and the other with sj+1.
To update the transitions of the candidate DFA M , a naive approach requires that for each state s and
for each a ∈ Σ, we find the target of the a-transition by sifting s.a down the classification tree. However, on
closer examination, we see that sifting is needed only for the transitions coming out of the new state labeled
sjb. We do need to update any transition incoming to the old state labeled sj+1 that was split. Consider
one such a-transition coming from some state labeled s. The destination of this transition will either remain
as the state labeled sj+1 or will be the new state labeled sjb depending on whether membership of s.a.v in
the target concept matches the membership of sj+1.v or that of sj .b.v.
Figures 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13 list the algorithm.
Proposition 1. The regular inference algorithm described above always terminates after making O(|Σ|n2 +
n log m) membership queries and O(n) equivalence queries. Here, Σ is the alphabet, n is the number of
states in the minimal automaton representing the target regular language, and m is the size of the longest
counterexample returned by the teacher.
Proof. The algorithm executes the main loop exactly n − 2 times. Therefore, the number of equivalence
queries is O(n). In the ith iteration of the main loop, the classification tree has i+1 leaves and the hypothesis
has i + 1 states. While processing Update-Tree-Hypothesis, the search for a distinguishing string needs
O(log m) membership queries. Further, Update-Hypothesis needs O(i) membership queries to update the
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Procedure Sift
Input: String s in Σ∗, classification tree CT
Output: Access string for some leaf in CT
begin
Set current node to be root of CT
While current node is not a leaf do
Let d be the distinguishing string at the current node
If isMember(sd) { isMember checks if string is in the target concept}
update current node to be the right child of current node
else
update current node to be the left child of current node
return access string of current node
end
Figure 2.11: Procedure Sift used in learning automata
transitions coming into the old state and O(|Σ|) sifting operations to find destinations of the transitions for
the new state. Each sifting operation can result in O(i) membership queries. Thus, we need O(i|Σ|+ log m)
membership queries for the call to Update-Tree-Hypothesis in the ith iteration. Since the number of iterations
is O(n), the total number of membership queries is O(|Σ|n2 + n log m).
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Procedure Update-Hypothesis
Input: Classification tree CT , hypothesis M , old access string sold,
new access string snew , new distinguishing string v
Output: DFA M updated for new hypothesis
begin
Create a new state qnew in M labeled snew
If isMember(snew) then make qnew accepting
Let qold be the state labeled sold
For each a-transition coming from some state q into qold
Let s be the access string for q
if isMember(s.a.v) = isMember(snew.v)
Change destination of transition to qnew
For each a ∈ Σ
s′ ← Sift(snew .a, CT )
Direct the the a-transition from qnew to the state labeled s
′
end
Procedure Update-Tree-Hypothesis
Input: Classification tree CT , Current hypothesis M ,
Counterexample w = a0a1 . . . a|w|−1
Output: Classification tree CT updated
begin
l = 0, h = |w|
αl = isMember(w), αh = ¬αl
do
m = b l+h2 c
prefix ← a0a1 . . . am−1
suffix ← amam+1 . . . a|w|−1
sm ← access string for state reached by processing prefix on M
αm ← isMember(sm.suffix )
if αm = αh then h← m else l ← m
while l < h− 1
sj ← access string for state reached by processing a0a1 . . . al−1 on M
sj+1 ← access string for state reached by processing a0a1 . . . ah−1 on M
v ← ahah+1 . . . a|w|−1
Replace the node labeled with sj+1 with an internal node with two leaf nodes
One leaf node is labeled with sj+1, other is labeled with sj .al
New internal node gets the distinguishing string v
Update-Hypothesis(CT , M , sj+1, sj .al, v)
end
Figure 2.12: Procedure Update-Hypothesis and Update-Tree-Hypothesis used in learning automata
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Algorithm Learn-Automaton
Input: Access to membership and equivalence oracle
Output: DFA which accepts target regular language
begin
if isMember()
Create a one state hypothesis DFA M which accepts all strings
else
Create a one state hypothesis DFA M which rejects all strings
Perform an equivalence query with M , let w be the counterexample
Initialize a classification tree CT with root labeled ,
and two leaves labeled  and w
Update-Hypothesis(CT , M , , w, )
do
Perform an equivalence query with M , let w be the counterexample
Update-Tree-Hypothesis(CT , M , w)
while equivalence query does not answer yes
end
Figure 2.13: Learning automata based on Kearns and Vazirani algorithm
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Chapter 3
Related Work
In this chapter, we review the related work in the area of verification of software systems. The discussion is
kept fairly broad and the detailed comparison of methods which can be directly contrasted to our learning-
based verification is deferred to subsequent chapters.
3.1 Verification of Finite State Systems
Algorithmic verification of finite state systems goes back to the 70’s and there is a large amount of literature
devoted to this problem. The method was pioneered independently by Clarke and Emerson [37] and Queille
and Sifakis [78] and came to be known as model checking. The initial algorithms for model checking were
given for computational tree logic (CTL) but a tableau-based algorithm for checking LTL specifications was
given a few years later by Lichtenstein and Pneuli [107]. For a thorough treatment of the verification of
finite state systems, the reader is referred to Clarke’s textbook [39].
One of the main problems faced by algorithmic verification is the state explosion that can occur as the
number of components in the system being verified increase. To mitigate this problem, sets of states are
sometimes represented symbolically in the hope of having a compact representation. For finite systems,
a popular symbolic representation is that of ordered binary decision diagrams (BDD) [28]. The symbolic
approach has enjoyed considerable success in hardware verification [79] where the state space exhibit con-
siderable regularity and allows for compact BDD based representations. There are a large number of tools
implementing this technique, two of the well known ones are: SMV [117] and NuSMV [35].
Another popular approach for verifying finite state systems is using the theory of automata on infinite
objects [124] for specifying both the specification as well as its implementation. Vardi and Wolper [131] were
the first to reformulate LTL model checking in terms of automata on infinite words. The verification of the
system is reduced to checking whether there is an intersection in the language accepted by the automata
representing the system and the language of the automata representing the “bad” behaviors. The intersection
is checked using nested depth first search and is usually constructed on the fly to avoid constructing the
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entire state space of the modeled system. A description of such an algorithm is given by Gerth et al. in [61].
Some of the tools that include this method are: SPIN [74] and the Maude LTL model checker [51].
The automata-theoretic approach has also been applied to branching time logics by Kupferman et al. [84]
using tree automata.
3.2 Verification of Infinite State Systems
The verification problem can be shown to be undecidable for most classes of infinite state systems. For a
survey on known decidability results, the reader is referred to [103]. An interesting class of systems for which
verification of safety properties turns out to be decidable is the class of well-structured transition systems [56]
which include Petri Nets, Basic Process Algebra and Lossy FIFO automata.
We now discuss some of the techniques employed for verification of general infinite state systems.
3.2.1 Deductive Methods
The technique of deductive methods involves a proof system consisting of a set of axioms which are assumed
to be self evident and a number of inference steps which allow new facts to be shown true based on existing
ones. Using this system, a person can write down a sequence of logical formulas referred to as a proof which
demonstrate that a system satisfies a given specification. Each formula in a proof is either an axiom or can
be derived from formulas earlier in the proof using some inference steps. For verification, usually the proof
is checked mechanically. Often a proof assistant is available which allows the user to concentrate on large
steps in the proof while automatically proving some of the easier steps. The main advantage of this method
is that it is possible to prove systems of any size. However, it requires a high degree of human guidance and
effort and deep understanding of both the system and the specification.
Various proof systems have been developed specifically tailored for verification needs. If the system is
expressed in rewriting logics such as Maude [41], proof rules of the underlying logic can be used to show that
system is correct [101, 40]. Manna and Pnueli [94] present various proof rules tailored for proving temporal
properties. These proof rules can also be recast into a graphical form of verification diagrams [66, 95]. Tools
available in theorem proving vary in the amount of expressiveness and human guidance they require. One
example is the theorem prover ACL2 [81] which allows a high degree of automation and has been successfully
used a number of industrial sized projects. Some other well known theorem proving tools include PVS [109],
HOL [64], Coq [18] and Isabel [111].
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3.2.2 Abstraction
A technique often employed to reduce the state space of a large or even infinite state system is to use
abstraction. The idea behind abstraction is to construct a model of the system by collecting many concrete
states into a single state. Usually, the abstract model exhibits more behaviors than the concrete one which
introduces the possibility of a spurious answer. In rewriting logic, equational abstractions [99] are uesd
to create abstract models of even infinite state systems by collapsing concrete states using equations. In
the approach of predicate abstraction [116, 46], the abstract states are states satisfying certain predicates
which are usually derived from the guards of the concrete program. There has been considerable interest in
predicate abstraction in recent years and it has been used to analyze critical safety properties of programs
written in high level languages such as C [72, 16, 33, 45]. The main idea is as follows. Given a C program
and a set of seed predicates (possibly empty), an abstraction is created by essentially considering only
boolean variables as the available data variables. These boolean variables correspond to the current set
of predicates maintained by the verifier. Each true or false value of a boolean variable corresponds to
the set of concrete states that make the corresponding predicate true or false respectively. Since the only
variables available in the abstract domain are booleans, the abstract state space is necessarily finite and
model checking tools can be applied to verify its properties. It has to be ensured that the abstract transition
system is a conservative approximation of the concrete program (meaning that it exhibits at least all the
executions of the concrete system). For this, a conservative pointer analysis is used to find any potential
aliases and a theorem prover is used to check if a transition can take place from one abstract state to another.
Model checking the abstract transition relation can either prove the property (in which case we are done) or
otherwise return a counterexample. The counterexample is symbolically executed on the concrete system to
check if it is spurious (which is possible due to the additional executions introduced due to the abstraction).
If the counterexample turns out to be valid then the program has been shown to have violated the desired
property. Otherwise, a mechanism is used which generates additional predicates from the proof that the
counterexample is invalid. These predicates are then added to the existing set of predicates and the process
repeated. Note that the process is not guaranteed to terminate.
3.2.3 Symbolic Representations for Infinite State Systems
Since the domain of the variables in infinite state systems is unbounded, the state space has to necessarily be
represented via symbolic means. Some common representations are: regular sets [25, 2], Presburger formu-
las [30], Queue Decision Diagrams and Number Decision Diagrams [21], semi-linear regular expressions [55],
constrained QDDs [24], Hilbert’s basis for integer sets [115] and constrained facts [47].
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3.2.4 Acceleration and Meta-transitions
In the approach using meta-transitions and acceleration [21, 24, 55], a sequence of transitions, referred to as
a meta-transition, is selected and the effect of its infinite iteration calculated. The idea is that by selecting
enough sequences of such transitions, the entire set of reachable states is hoped to be captured. One feature
of this approach is that the set of states computed is always equal to or an under-approximation of the actual
reachable set. Therefore, there is no possibility of a spurious result claiming that a bad state is reachable.
However, it is possible that not all sequence of transitions can be accelerated. Further, even if all sequences
of transitions can be accelerated there may not be any finite set of sequences that is able to account for all
the reachable states.
An acceleration scheme has been given by Boigelot [21] for FIFO automata using Queue Decision Dia-
grams (QDD). It is shown that for systems with one channel, any sequence of transitions can be accelerated.
More precisely, for a set of states Q, let σ(Q) denote the set of states that is obtained by taking a sequence
of transitions σ from some state in Q. Then, for any set of states Q representable by a QDD, the set of
states corresponding to σ∗(Q) can also be represented as a QDD and is effectively computable. However,
this result does not extend for systems with more than one channel. Let σ|i denote the sequence obtained
by dropping all transitions in σ that do not affect channel i. For multi-channel FIFO automata, given a
QDD representable set Q, σ∗(Q) is representable by a QDD if and only if there is at most channel i such
that σ|i is a “counting” sequence. Here, “counting” is a technical condition which compares the number
of output operations with the number of input operations on that channel. Boujjani and Habermehl [24]
extend the acceleration method using another symbolic representation called Constrained Queue Decision
Diagrams and show that any sequence of transitions can be accelerated with this representation. Finkel et
al. [55] propose Semi Linear Regular Expressions which are less expressive than both QDDs and CQDDs
but are shown to have more efficient decision procedures that are needed for verification.
For integer systems, Boigelot [21] proposed Number Decision Diagrams (NDDs) as a symbolic represen-
tation and gave conditions under which a sequence of transitions can be accelerated. Finkel and Leroux [57]
generalized this result and showed that any sequence of transitions for finite linear system can be accelerated.
Here, a finite linear system is defined as follows. First, a Presburger-linear function f is a triple (MI , v, φ)
such that M is a square matrix of integers, v is a vector of integers and φ is a Presburger formula such
that f(s) = MI .s + v for all s which satisfy φ. A finite linear system is collection of such Presburger linear
functions such that the multiplicative monoid generated by the matrices of the functions is finite. Another
important result is that for a finite linear system, the effect of accelerating all cycles of length less than or
equal to k can be computed exhaustively by considering only a polynomial (in k) number of accelerations.
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Bardin et al. [17] describe a tool called FAST which implements these accelerations along with some heuris-
tics for improved performance on some practical examples. Other tools based on acceleration are LASH [87]
and TReX [13].
Leroux and Sutre [89] define a notion of flatness to identify sufficient conditions when acceleration-based
methods will terminate (recall that the acceleration method is only a semi-algorithm). A system is called flat
if it can be decomposed into a finite number of subsystems such that each subsystem contains no nested loops
and the reachable states of the entire system is the union of the reachable states of each subsystem. It is shown
that flatness is a necessary and sufficient condition for the acceleration based methods to terminate. Further,
they show that some restricted classes of systems such as two-dimensional vector addition systems with states
are flat. However, this does not extend to higher dimensions as shown by a 3-dimension counterexample in
[89]. It can also be shown that even if the set of reachable states of a system is Presburger-definable, there
may not be any finite set of acceleration that can capture it.
3.2.5 Widening
Widening is an approach used in the framework of abstract interpretation [43] to ensure termination in
fixpoint iterations. The idea is to define a widening operator ∇ which overapproximates the iterates of
the fixpoint calculation at every step and has the property that for every increasing sequence x0, x1, . . . the
“widened” sequence given by y0, y1, . . . such that y0 = x0 and yn = yn−1∇xn is not strictly increasing. This
ensures that the widened sequence always terminates and the final set obtained is larger than the actual
least fixpoint. Clearly, if this set does not intersect the “bad” states, the system verifies the safety property.
However, the converse is not true due to potential overapproximation.
A simple widening principle in the context of regular model checking is given in [25] which is extended
in [125] for parametric systems. Bultan [30] uses a widening technique for Presburger formulas and Bartzis
et al. [19] present a widening technique for arithmetic automata.
3.2.6 Techniques used in Regular Model Checking
A popular approach for FIFO, parametric, integer and stack systems is regular model checking [25, 2]. A
regular set is used to represent the states and a transducer is used to represent the transition relation (say
R). The systems they consider are length preserving, therefore the transducer can also be seen as a finite
automaton over pairs of symbols. The problem is reduced to finding a finite transducer R+ representing
the infinite composition of the transition relation. A finite quotient of R+ is found by identifying states
that are equivalent in some way. There are two main methods used for finding equivalence. In the first
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method [25], the underlying equivalence is found using a technique called saturation which is employed while
determinizing on the fly and minimizing R+. The second method described initially by Dams et al. [44] is as
follows. A forward bisimulation and a backward bisimulation is defined on states of finite compositions of the
transducer representing the transition relation. It is shown that the forward and backward simulations can
be combined into an equivalence relation which preserves the transitive closure of the transducer. This can
be used to collapse states in intermediate approximations of R+ in the hope of capturing R+. The technique
was extended to simulations (as opposed to bisimulations) in [2]. Abdulla et al. [1] also extend the results
for checking liveness properties using a specification logic called LTL(MSO).
Another related technique for finding the transitive closure of the transition relation labeled as “iterating
transducers” is described by Boigelot et al. in [22]. In this method, finite compositions of the transducer are
compared to detect certain “increments”. These increments are then extrapolated in the hope of capturing
the transitive closure. However, it is ensured that all extrapolations are safe in the sense that it is guaranteed
that the resulting construction will not exceed the transitive closure.
3.2.7 Bisimulation Minimization
Bisimulation minimization algorithms [88, 23] partition a state space into equivalence classes such that
states in the same class are observationally equivalent. The resulting quotient graph preserves the same
CTL* (actually same µ-calculus) properties and hence can be used for verifying the temporal logic formula
of interest, instead of the original system. The main idea is as follows. One starts with a partition of the
states such that states in each block agree on the labeling of the atomic propositions and then repeatedly
splits the blocks into new ones until all states in a block agree on the next-state transition to other blocks.
The main differences in the available algorithms are in how they attempt to avoid splitting blocks which
are unreachable from a set of initial states. A related technique is to find a finite simulation quotient ([70])
which is coarser that bisimulation quotient but only preserves the universal fragment of CTL* properties.
3.2.8 Techniques using Rewrite Systems
Rewrite systems offer a convenient representation of concurrent systems and a number of different techniques
have been developed for verification of infinite state systems in this context. Monniaux [104], Takai [119] and
Genet et al. [59] use abstract interpretation techniques with tree automata. Meseguer and Thati [100, 123]
have developed narrowing techniques for reachability problems in rewrite systems. Narrowing is a method
that was originally developed for generating all solutions of an equational unification problem. Escobar et
al. [53] propose an efficient lazy narrowing strategy called natural narrowing.
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3.2.9 Verification of Hybrid Systems
Hybrid systems [7, 118, 5, 6, 71] are a class of infinite state systems in which there can be both discrete
and continuous variables. A hybrid system is typically modeled as a finite automaton augmented with some
continuous variables which follow given dynamic laws. If the invariant, initial, flow and the jump conditions of
the hybrid automaton are boolean combinations of linear inequalities, the automaton is called a linear hybrid
automaton. If all dynamic variables follow continuous trajectories with a unit value of slope, the automaton
is also called a timed automaton. Another class of hybrid systems are rectangular automata in which the
trajectories are confined to piecewise linear envelopes. It is known that some verification problems for classes
of hybrid systems can be solved algorithmically [73]. For example, the control state reachability problem
for timed and rectangular automata are decidable. For other systems, the state space is usually represented
by symbolic representations such as polyhedra [34] and ellipsoids [86] and approximations developed which
allow verification in some cases.
3.3 Use of Learning for Verification
Note that in our approach of using learning techniques for verification, we are not trying to learn an unknown
system model but rather the behavior of a system which is already fully described. This is closest in spirit
to the work of Habermehl et al. [67] who use learning for verification of systems whose transition can be
represented by a length-preserving transducer. They find all strings of a certain length that can be reached
from the initial state and use a state merging algorithm to learn the regular set representing the reachable
region. Their work generalizes the inference based method of verifying parameterized systems used by
Fribourg et al. [58]. However, the correctness of their algorithm critically depends on the length-preserving
aspect of the transition relation. Further, their learning algorithm requires collecting all samples of a given
length which can be intractable for large examples.
We now describe some other approaches where learning has been used for verification.
Peled et al. [112] give a method called “Black Box Checking” which is extended by Groce et al. [65]
as Adaptive Model Checking. Briefly, in this method, one starts with a possibly inaccurate model and
incrementally updates it using Angluin’s [12] query based learning of regular sets.
Learning techniques have been popular for automated assume-guarantee reasoning. Cobleigh et al. [42]
also use a variant of Angluin’s algorithm to learn the assumptions about the environment to aid compositional
verification. Alur et al. [9] introduce a symbolic implementation of the learning technique for compositional
verification which helps to mitigate the exponential explosion in the alphabet size with the number of
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variables in the system. Chaki et al. [38] learn deterministic tree automata with membership and equivalence
queries for applying assume-guarantee reasoning for simulation conformance.
Boigelot et al. [15] present a technique for constructing a finite state machine that simulates all observable
operations of a given reactive program. Ammons et al. [11] use learning to discover formal specifications of
the protocols that a client of an application program interface must observe. Similarly, Alur et al. [4] use
Angluin’s L* algorithm to synthesize interface specifications from Java classes. Inductive learning techniques
have been applied ([92]) for abstraction refinement in program analysis targeted towards programs which
manipulate pointers and heap-allocated data structures. Edelkamp et al. [50] consider the problem of finding
“bad” states in a model as a directed search problem and use AI heuristic search methods to attempt to
find these states. Ernst et al. [52] have developed a system called Daikon which attempts to discover likely
invariants in a program by analyzing the values taken by its variables while the program is exercised in a
test suite.
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Chapter 4
FIFO Automata Safety Using Passive
Learning
Finite state machines communicating over unbounded FIFO (first in first out) channels (FIFO automata)
are a popular model for a variety of software systems. Examples of this abstraction include: networking pro-
tocols where unbounded buffers are assumed, languages like Estelle and SDL (Specification and Description
Language) in which processes have infinite queue size, distributed systems and various actor systems.
In this chapter, we describe a method of verifying safety properties for FIFO automata using a learning
algorithm called RPNI. The focus is on passive learning, i.e., we assume that the learner is simply given
positive and negative examples of the concept being learned.
For verifying safety properties of FIFO automata (or in fact in general for any system), we are usually
given a set of states labelled “unsafe” and are required to check if any of these unsafe states can be reached
from the initial states. Thus, a generic task in the verification of safety properties is to compute a repre-
sentation for the set of reachable states. In traditional model checking methods, this is accomplished by
starting from the initial states and iteratively computing its image under the transition relation until the
resulting set stops changing (the least fixpoint is reached). However, for FIFO automata (and most other
infinite state systems), clearly, this procedure may not terminate.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the central idea in our approach is to learn the set of reachable states instead
of computing it by iteratively applying the transition relation. However, to use learning algorithm (in the
passive learning framework), we need positive and negative examples of the reachable states. As we pointed
out before, we can easily find positive examples by executing some sample sequences of transitions; but in
general, we cannot get examples of unreachable states. The solution is to not just learn the set of reachable
states, but to actually learn a set of state-witness pairs where for a pair (s, w), the witness w shows how the
state s is reachable. The witness could be anything for which checking validity is decidable. With the witness,
the problem of supplying positive examples and the negative examples is solved as follows. We simulate the
FIFO automata under consideration using either a test suite, or randomly selecting from the executable
transitions, or any other strategy which ensures a fair chance for all reachable states to be explored. As
we execute the transitions, we see examples of the reachable states and can also record information about
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the transition executions which gives us witnesses for those states (the details of the witness are discussed
later in this chapter). For negative examples, we can use any (s, w) pair such that the witness w does not
demonstrate the reachability of the state s.
With this idea of learning state-witness pairs, we can use passive learning algorithms to verify safety
properties of FIFO automata. Figure 4.1 shows the overall framework of the verification procedure. The
intuitive explanation of the procedure is as follows. We start with some system executions which give us the
initial set of positive and negative examples. These are given to a passive learning algorithm (in our case, an
algorithm derived from RPNI [108]) which then produces a candidate set of the state-witness pairs. We now
check if these states includes any of the unsafe states. If there is some unsafe state and the corresponding
witness is valid, then we have found a valid counterexample to the safety property and can stop. On the
other hand, an invalid state-witness pair can be added as an additional negative example for the learner.
If the set of state-witness pairs does not include any unsafe states, we check if the set is a fixpoint under
the transition relation. If yes, we have found some set greater than the reachable states (which is the least
fixpoint) and does not include any unsafe states. Clearly, this shows that the safety property holds for
the system. If the fixpoint test fails, then we generate more system executions and add the corresponding
positive and negative examples to the learner input.
Obtain system
traces
RPNI (learning)
witnesses/
reachable set
ValidFixpoint test
counterexampleno counterexampleno
more traces
(+ve and -ve
examples)
more negative
examples
no
yes yes
property holds fails property
Figure 4.1: Learning to verify procedure for safety properties using passive learning.
43
4.1 Verification Procedure
We now describe the learning-based verification procedure in detail.
Recall from Chapter 2 that a FIFO automaton [55] is a 6-tuple (Q, q0, C, ΣM , Θ, δ) where Q is a finite set
of control states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial control state, C is a finite set of channel names, ΣM is a finite alphabet
for contents of a channel, Θ is a finite set of transitions names, and δ : Θ→ Q×((C×{?, !}×ΣM )∪{τ})×Q
is a function that assigns a control transition to each transition name.
As mentioned before, the key idea to make the our method work is to learn the set of state-witness pairs.
Let us now consider the language which can allow us to find both reachable states and their witnesses. The
first choice that comes to mind is the language of the traces:
L(F ) = {σ ∈ Θ∗ | ∃s = (p, w). s0
σ
→ s}
Here s0 = (q0, (, . . . , )), i.e., the initial control state with no messages in the channels. Since each trace
uniquely determines the final state in the trace, L(F ) has the information about the states that can be
reached. While it is easy to compute the state s such that s0
σ
→ s for a single trace σ, it is not clear how
to obtain the set of states reached, given a set of traces. In fact, even if L(F ) is regular, there is no known
algorithm to compute the corresponding set of reachable states of the labelled transition system.1 The main
difficulty is that determining if a receive action can be executed depends non-trivially on the sequence of
actions executed before the receive. We overcome this difficulty by annotating the traces in a way that
makes it possible to compute the set of reachable states.
4.1.1 Trace Annotation for FIFO
Consider a set Θ of co-names defined as follows:
Θ = {θ | θ ∈ Θ and δ(θ) 6= τ}
In other words, for every send or receive action in our FIFO automaton, we introduce a new transition name
with a “bar”. We say s
θ
→ s′ if s
θ
→ s′; executions over sequences in (Θ ∪ Θ)∗ are defined naturally. The
intuition of putting the annotation of a “bar” on some transitions of a trace is to indicate that the message
sent or received as a result of this transition does not play a role in the channel contents of the final state.
In other words, a “barred” transition θ in an annotated trace of the system denotes either a message sent
1This can sometimes be computed for simple loops using meta-transitions.
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q0
θ1(c0!0)
θ2(c0?0)
Figure 4.2: Example FIFO automaton.
that will later be received, or the receipt of a message that was sent earlier in the trace. Thus, annotated
traces of the automaton will be obtained by marking send-receive pairs in a trace exhibited by the FIFO
automaton. Let A be the function that correctly annotates an execution to produce a string over Σ = Θ∪Θ.
Observe, that each execution is annotated uniquely, or to put it formally, A is an injective function. The
annotated trace language of the automaton F is:
AL(F ) = {A(t) | t ∈ L(F )}
This language consists of all strings in (Θ ∪Θ)∗ that denote correctly annotated traces of F . For example,
consider the FIFO automaton shown in Figure 4.2. Some of the words in AL(F ) are: θ1, θ1θ1, θ1θ1θ1, θ1θ2,
θ1θ2θ1.
4.1.2 Finding Reachable States from Annotated Traces
Since our objective is to identify the reachable region, we need a way to find the reachable states corre-
sponding to a set of annotated traces. For a channel c, consider a function hc : (Θ ∪ Θ) → Σ∗M defined as
follows:
hc(t) =


m if t ∈ Θ and δ(t) = c!m
 otherwise
Let hc also denote the unique homomorphism from (Θ∪Θ)∗ to Σ∗M that extends the above function. Given
an annotated trace ρ, the contents of channel c in the final state are clearly given by hc(ρ).
FIFO automata with one channel: Let F = (Q, q0, {c0}, ΣM , Θ, δ) be a single channel FIFO automaton,
with c0 being the only channel. As usual s0 = (q0, ) will denote the starting state of F . Given a set of
annotated traces L, let Lq ⊆ L be the set of annotated traces in L whose last transition ends in control state
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q. Now the set of states reached (by traces in L) is given by
R(L) = {(q, m) | q ∈ Q and m ∈ hc0(Lq)}
For a regular set L, it can be seen that Lq is regular, and R(L) can be computed by a simple homomorphism,
and so R(L) is regular.
Multi-channel FIFO automata: Consider a FIFO automaton F = (Q, q0, C, ΣM , Θ, δ) communicating
over channels C = {c0, c1, . . . ck}. Now the set of states reached (by traces in L) is given by
Rm(L) = {(q, (hc0(σ), hc1(σ), . . . , hck(σ)) | q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Lq}
As we will see shortly, we need a test for inclusion for the reachable states corresponding to a set of annotated
traces. In this respect, we cannot hope to work with Rm(L), since as soon as have even two channels, given
a regular L, Rm(L) can be seen to be a rational relation for which inclusion is undecidable [20]. However, if
we compute the contents of each channel independently of others, we can compute an upper approximation
of Rm(L) as follows:
R(L) =
[
q∈Q
{q} × hc0 (Lq)× hc1 (Lq) · · · hck (Lq)
It can be easily seen that R(L) is a regular language if L is regular. In general, Rm(L) ⊆ R(L), however
for many FIFO systems encountered in practice (most network protocols like Alternating Bit Protocol,
Sliding Window Protocol), this gives the exact reachable region when applied to AL(F ), i.e. Rm(AL(F )) =
R(AL(F )). We show later that this is sufficient for the applicability of our learning approach.
4.1.3 Recovering a Witness from an Unsafe State
If the reachable states corresponding to a learned set of annotated traces have a nonempty intersection
with the set of “unsafe” states, we need to extract a sequence of transitions of the system which witnesses
the reachability of some unsafe state. The motivation is that such a sequence can then be used as a
counterexample demonstrating the violation of the safety property or a negative example for the learning
algorithm.
We assume that for each control state q ∈ Q, we are given a recognizable set [20] describing the unsafe
channel configurations. Equivalently, for each q, the unsafe channel contents are given by a finite union of
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products of regular languages:
⋃
0≤i≤nq
Pq,i where Pq,i =
∏
0≤j≤k Uq(i, cj) and Uq(i, cj) is a regular language
for contents of channel cj . For each Pq,i, an unsafe state su is some (q, u0, u1, . . . uk) such that for j = 0 . . . k
we have uj ∈ Uq(i, cj). Let U denote the set of all unsafe states. Given a regular set of annotated traces,
L, recall that Lq ⊆ L represents the set of annotated traces in L whose last transition ends in control state
q. For each Pq,i, for each channel j, we can find the intersection of hcj (Lq) and Uq(i, cj) and calculate the
traces Lqi,j ⊆ Lq such that hcj (Lqi,j ) = hcj (Lq) ∩Uq(i, cj). Intuitively, this gives us annotated traces which
lead to a potential unsafe configuration for channel ci. Now, if the intersection
⋂
0≤j≤k Lqi,j is non empty, an
annotated trace t in this intersection leads to an unsafe configuration for each channel and hence an unsafe
state. By repeating this check for each state, for each Pq,i, we can find if there is any annotated trace t
which leads to an unsafe state. Let W be the function which given L and U outputs the set of annotated
traces that can reach unsafe states.
4.1.4 From Annotated Trace to System Execution
In order to convertW(L) ∈ Σ∗ into a sequence of transitions, we need a way to extract the presumed system
execution from a given annotated trace. Essentially, we want a substitution A−1 : Σ 7→ Θ∗ which “reverses”
the annotation A. This can be done simply by removing the “bars” on the annotated trace. Formally, we
can define A−1(θ) = A−1(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ. Extending A−1 to strings in the usual way, it can be seen
that that A−1(A(t)) = t.
4.1.5 Verification Algorithm
We are now ready to formally describe the learning-to-verify procedure as shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. We
first collect positive and negative examples of labels in Σ∗ as follows. A set T of sequences of transitions
that can be exhibited by the system is obtained by invoking a function GetTraces. Typically, GetTraces
might either execute a test suite or it may select transitions to execute randomly. Positive examples, S+
are simply the correct “annotations” which put bars on the send-receive pairs in the strings in T , i.e.
S+ = {A(t) | t ∈ T}. For the negative examples, we have three different sets. The first set S−1 =
{tθd | t ∈ T and θd is a disabled transition} consists of sequences of transitions extended by a disabled
transition (a transition that cannot be taken at a certain state). The second set S−2a = {σ ∈ Σ
∗ | ∃t ∈
T such that A−1(σ) = t and σ 6= A(t)} corresponds to “incorrect” annotations. Notice that since A is
injective, all annotations of a trace t ∈ T other than A(t) cannot be exhibited by the system. The third set,
S−2b, is a collection of spurious counterexamples; initially this is empty.
The positive and negative examples are given to a learning algorithm based on RPNI (see Section 2.5.1).
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algorithm learnToVerify
Input:
F : model of system,
U : recognizable set of “unsafe states”
Output: Property valid OR
path to an unsafe state
begin
S−2b = ∅
(S+, S−1 , S
−
2a) =GetTraces()
while(true)do
L = modifiedRPNI (S+, S−1 , S
−
2a ∪ S
−
2b)
if R(L) ∩ U 6= ∅
lc ∈ W(L, U)
if A−1(lc) valid execution of F
Output A−1(lc); stop
else
S−2b = S
−
2b ∪ lc
else
if R(L) is a fixpoint
Output “Property holds”; stop
else
Tnew = GetTraces()
add Tnew to (S
+, S−1 , S
−
2a)
end
algorithm modifiedRPNI
Input: S+ ∈ Σ∗, S−1 ∈ Θ
∗, S−2 ∈ Σ
∗
Output: a regular language L
begin
D ← PTA(S+)
for i = 2 to |D| do
for j = 1 to i− 1 do
if qi, qj not merged with smaller state then
D′ ← merge(D, qi, qj)
D′ ← determinize(D′, qj)
D′′ ← A−1(D′); all states in D′′ made final
if compatible(D′′, S−1 ) and compatible(D
′, S−2 )
D = D’;exit j-loop
return language defined by D
end
Figure 4.3: Learning to verify algorithm based on RPNI.
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algorithm determinize
Input: D, x; Output: D
begin
for any x
θ
→ x1, x
θ
→ x2 and x1 6= x2
D ←merge(D, x1, x2)
D ← determinize(D, smaller of x1, x2)
return D
end
Figure 4.4: Procedure determinize used in the learning algorithm.
Similar to RPNI, this algorithm first constructs a prefix tree automata (PTA) from S+. Recall from Sec-
tion 2.5.1 that the PTA is simply a collection of the strings in S+ as paths with common prefixes merged
together. Each state in the PTA is associated with the string generated by following the path to that state
from the initial state. The states are assigned numbers according to the standard ordering2 imposed by the
associated strings. The learning algorithm attempts to generalize from the positive examples by merging
states in the PTA in a specific order: for i going from 1 to the largest state in the PTA, it attempts to merge
qi with all states less than qi in ascending order. A merge may cause non-determinism which is removed
by further merges using the operation determinize which results in a finite automaton D′. Another finite
automaton D′′ is obtained from D′ by applying the substitution A−1 and making all states final. If D′′ is
compatible with the negative set S−1 (all strings in S
−
1 are rejected by D
′′) and D′ is compatible with the
negative set S−2 = S
−
2a ∪ S
−
2b, the merge is accepted. The learning algorithm is essentially the same as the
traditional RPNI algorithm except for the the use of the additional kind of negative examples corresponding
to S−1 .
Let the output of the modified RPNI algorithm be the regular language L. If R(L) intersects with the
unsafe states U , then a counterexample lc ∈ W(AL(F ), U) is obtained. By attempting to simulate the
counterexample on the system, we can check if A−1(lc) is executable. If yes, then we have found a real
counterexample and are done, otherwise lc is added to S
−
2b. If R(L) does not intersect with the unsafe states
U , then it is tested for being a fixpoint under the reachability relation by checking the following condition:
{s0} ∪ {s | ∃s
′ ∈ R(L). s′ → s} = R(L)
If it is a fixpoint, we declare that the safety property holds. Otherwise, we get more traces by invoking
the function GetTraces (successive calls to this function generate new traces) and continue the learning
2For Σ = {a, b}, the ordering is , a, b, aa, ab, ba, bb, aaa, . . .
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procedure.
4.2 Correctness of the Verification Procedure
The soundness of the procedure is straightforward. For a learned set of traces L, if R(L) has an empty
intersection with the set of unsafe states, U , and is a fixpoint under the transition relation, the safety
property holds. Any counterexample is finite and gives a supposed execution of the system leading to an
unsafe state which can then be automatically checked for validity by simulation of the system.
We can also show completeness (i.e. the procedure terminates with the correct answer) under the
condition that AL(F ) is regular. Then, given a “fair” method of generating the system traces, in the limit,
the learning paradigm will either prove that the system satisfies the property or find a valid counterexample.
By a fair method, we mean one which will eventually generate any given finite trace. There can be many
different ways of generating fair traces, one of the simplest being a breadth first traversal of all traces.
Before going through the proof, the reader may want to recall the definitions of short prefixes and kernel
given in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1.
Lemma 1. If AL(F ) is regular, then using any fair strategy for generating traces, in the limit, given a
sufficiently large sample (S+, S−1 , S
−
2 ), the modified RPNI algorithm outputs a DFA which generates AL(F ).
Proof sketch. Let D be the canonical DFA which generates AL(F ). Let Sp and N respectively denote the
set of short prefixes and kernel of AL(F ). Since the short prefixes and kernel are finite, given a fair strategy
of generating the traces, we are guaranteed to eventually get a set of positive examples, S+, whose prefixes
include all short prefixes and kernel strings. It is known from the proof of RPNI [48], that if we have such
positive examples, then the ordered merge used by RPNI outputs a DFA isomorphic to D provided that
∀x ∈ Sp, ∀y ∈ N if x and y are non-equivalent, i.e., if AL(F )/x 6= AL(F )/y, then there are enough negative
examples in S−1 and S
−
2 to prevent a merge of x and y. We show that in the limit, we are guaranteed to get
enough negative examples. Consider some x ∈ Sp and some y ∈ N such that AL(F )/x 6= AL(F )/y. First
consider the case that there is a string u such that xu ∈ AL(F ) but yu 6∈ AL(F ). Recalling that L(F ) is
the language of all allowed sequences of transitions, there are two possibilities why yu 6∈ AL(F ):
• A−1(yu) ∈ L(F ) but A(A−1(yu)) 6= yu. Intuitively, the sequence of transitions is correct but they have
a wrong “annotation”. By a fair strategy, we get negative examples S−2a corresponding to all wrong
“annotations” of valid transition sequences, hence in the limit we will have some negative example to
detect this situation.
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• A−1(yu) 6∈ L(F ). Let v be the minimal prefix of u such that A−1(xv) ∈ L(F ) but A−1(yv) 6∈ L(F ).
Since any string shorter than A−1(yv) is in L(F ), A−1(yv) is a sequence of valid transitions extended
by a disabled transition. By using a fair strategy, we will eventually get a negative example in S−1 equal
to A−1(yv). When we check for compatibility with S−1 , we set all states final in the DFA obtained
after merge. This enables the detection of the case that A−1(xv) ∈ L(F ) but A−1(yv) 6∈ L(F )
The other possibility that yu ∈ AL(F ) but xu 6∈ AL(F ) is handled in the same manner.
Theorem 1. If AL(F ) is regular and R(AL(F )) is the set of all reachable states, then the learning to verify
procedure will eventually either prove that the system satisfies the property or find a valid counterexample.
Proof sketch. Since we use a fair strategy for generating traces, by Lemma 1, if we keep generating more
traces, eventually we will learn AL(F ). In this case, R(AL(F )) would be a fix point and if the safety property
holds, the procedure does not find a counterexample and proves that the system satisfies the property. If
the safety property does not hold then the reachable states have a non empty intersection with the unsafe
states and we are guaranteed to find a valid counterexample.
The only way that the procedure may not terminate is if it keeps getting spurious counterexamples in
an infinite sequence. At any stage of the learning process, let (S+, S−1 , S
−
2a, S
−
2b) be the set of positive and
negative examples and let L be the language learned by RPNI based on these examples. As mentioned
before, RPNI constructs a prefix tree automata (PTA) which simply consist of paths leading to strings in
S+ with common prefixes merged together. L is obtained by merging states in the PTA while making sure
none of the negative examples are accepted. For a given S+, if the counterexample lc for safety property
is found to be spurious, then in the next stage RPNI is provided with (S+, S−1 , S
−
2a, S
−
2b ∪ {lc}). The new
language L′l is necessarily different than Ll since they do not agree on the acceptance of lc. Since the PTA
is finite, merging different states can generate only finitely many languages. In the extreme case, no state
in the PTA is merged; but then there cannot be any spurious counterexample since the PTA is based on
S+ which are obtained from valid executions. Hence, the procedure cannot get “stuck” getting an infinite
sequence of negative examples without any change in the traces obtained.
The running time of the algorithm is dependent on the strategy for getting the traces. For a simple
breadth-first strategy, in the worst case, the algorithm might need to explore all traces up to a depth D.
Here, D is the length of the longest path starting from the initial state in the minimal DFA representing
AL(F ) (assuming AL(F ) is regular). Thus, the running time can be exponential in the size of the DFA for
AL(F ). However, as discussed in the following section (Section 4.3), we can use some heuristics to prune
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down the number of traces needed. In practice, for a number of FIFO systems, the learning procedure is
able to converge to the correct answer in a fairly small time period which is comparable to other tools.
Note that the conditions required by Theorem 1 are merely sufficient for termination of the learning
procedure and the verification procedure can be successfully used for many systems even if AL(F ) is not
regular. In fact, an important observation is that for a number of systems with nonregular AL(F ), there
exists a regular subset L′ ⊆ AL(F ) such that the traces in L′ “cover” all the reachable states, i.e. R(L′) =
R(AL(F )). In other words, every reachable state in F is witnessed by some trace in L′. For example, the
set of annotated traces corresponding to the automaton in Figure 4.2 is not regular but the regular language
L′ = θ∗1 covers all the reachable states. Note that R(L
′) is not an approximation; we are simply content
with finding any regular set of annotated traces that can cover the reachable states. In Chapter 9, we
analyze FIFO systems which have a regular AL(F ) as well as systems for which AL(F ) is not regular but a
“covering” L′ ⊆ AL(F ) is regular. In all cases, the algorithm terminates with the correct reachable set.
4.3 Strategies for Trace Generation
For generating the annotated traces that are used for the positive and negative examples, we use the following
strategy. Starting from the initial state, we explore the system states (cross product of the control state and
channel contents) in a breadth-first manner. To limit the number of traces generated, we do not distinguish
between FIFO states if they have the same control state and same channel contents up to a position d from
the start of the channel. We start with d = 1 and keep increasing d if more traces are needed. We have seen
that this heuristic works quite well in practice to generate sufficient traces for the learning procedure.
4.4 Example Application of the Verification Procedure
In this section, we analyze in detail the application of the learning procedure to a simple producer-consumer
FIFO automaton which is shown in Figure 4.5. We have deliberately chosen a small example for ease
of illustration; in general, FIFO automata can be much more complex and non-trivial to analyze. The
transitions are labeled with a unique identifier and the associated action is shown in parentheses. For
illustration of a safety property, we add another state before the producer enters the idle-send loop. This
state has a transition to an “unsafe” state through a receive action. Thus, control state 2 with any channel
contents is deemed to be unsafe while all other states are safe.
Annotated traces of the system are generated and provided to the RPNI algorithm as the set of positive
samples. RPNI constructs the prefix tree automaton (PTA) as shown in Figure 4.6. A bar on a transition
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Figure 4.5: Simple producer consumer FIFO automaton
is indicated by a trailing apostrophe. A state of the PTA with the set of incoming edges I and the set of
outgoing edges O is labeled with the control state corresponding to the target of the transitions in I and
the source of transitions in O in the control graph.3
RPNI proceeds to merge states in the PTA in an ordered fashion, each time checking to see if the
automaton formed after the merge fails any of the negative tests. After a few merges, RPNI is able to find
a fix point for the reachable set. Since no unsafe state is included in the fix point, the system is declared to
satisfy the safety property and the algorithm terminates with the automaton for the set of annotated traces
as shown in Figure 4.7.
4.5 Comparison with Related Work
We now discuss the comparison of the learning-to-verify approach with other techniques used for verification
of infinite state systems.
Recall from Chapter 3 that in the approach using meta-transitions and acceleration [21, 24, 55], a sequence
of transitions, referred to as a meta-transition, is selected and the effect of its infinite iteration calculated.
This is complementary to our learning approach, since meta-transitions can be also be incorporated into our
learning algorithm. Another popular approach for FIFO, parametric, integer and stack systems is regular
model checking [25, 2]. A regular set is used to represent the states and a transducer is used to represent
the transition relation. The problem is reduced to finding a finite transducer representing the infinite
composition of this relation. However, there are some examples in which even if such a finite transducer
exists, the procedure may not be able to converge to it. One such example of a FIFO automaton is shown in
Figure 4.8. We used the regular model checking tool from [106] to analyze this example, but the tool failed to
3This control state is unique by construction of the automaton
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Figure 4.6: Prefix tree automaton for producer consumer. The learning algorithm will find candidate states for merging in an ordered fashion
starting from the start state. Merges will be allowed only if they do not cause any negative example to be accepted.
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Figure 4.7: Final automaton for annotated traces for producer consumer. Note that no trace reaches the
unsafe states, therefore, the safety property is verified.
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Figure 4.8: A FIFO automaton for which RMC tool fails. Here, θ4 does not change channel contents.
terminate even after two hours. A careful analysis revealed that for this example, at each step of the regular
model checking method, the intermediate transducer keeps accumulating new states in a pattern that causes
its size to grow without bound. On the other hand, our learning-based tool is able to automatically find the
reachable set in about fifty milliseconds.
An approach for computing the reachable region that is closely related to ours is widening. In this
approach, the transition relation is applied to the initial configuration some number of times and then by
comparing the sets thus obtained, the limit of the iteration is guessed. A simple widening principle in
the context of regular model checking is given in [25] which is extended in [125] for parametric systems.
Bultan [30] uses a widening technique for Presburger formulas to enable faster convergence for fixpoint.
Bartzis et al. [19] present a widening technique for arithmetic automata. At a very high level, both widening
and our approach use similar ideas. In both methods, based on certain sample points obtained using the
transitions, a guess is made for the fixpoint being searched for. One important difference between widening
and our approach is that widening (except for certain special contexts where it can be shown to be exact) is
a mechanism to prove the correctness of a system and cannot be used to prove a system to be incorrect. On
the other hand, the approach presented here allows one to both prove a system to be correct and to detect
bugs.
Another technique that has been used for verifying infinite state systems is that of bisimulation mini-
mization. However, a crucial requirement for the success of bisimulation technique is that the reachable set
of equivalence classes be finite. It is easy to construct FIFO automata which fail to satisfy this property but
are quite simple and can be analyzed using our learning framework automatically. The FIFO automaton
shown earlier in Figure 4.2 is one such example.
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Chapter 5
FIFO Automata Safety Using Active
Learning
In this chapter, we extend the learning-to-verify method for safety properties of FIFO automata with two
main new ideas. Firstly, we give a new scheme for the annotations on traces. With this annotation scheme,
many more practical FIFO systems have regular annotated trace languages, thus enlarging the class of
systems that can be provably verified by our method. Secondly and more significantly, we use the framework
of active learning (as opposed to passive learning that we used in the previous chapter). For this, we provide
a method to devise a knowledgeable teacher which can answer membership (whether a string belongs to the
target) as well as equivalence-queries (given a hypothesis, whether it matches the concept being learnt).
In the context of learning annotated traces, equivalence queries can be answered only to a limited extent.
However, we overcome our limitation to answer equivalence queries exactly and present an approach that is
still able to use the powerful query-based learning framework. We assume that the annotated traces of the
system to form a regular language and use a variant of Angluin’s L* algorithm [12] which is a well-known
algorithm for learning regular sets. Using this algorithm gives us significant benefits. First, the number of
samples we need to consider is polynomial in the size of the automaton representing the annotated traces.
Second, we are guaranteed to learn the minimal automaton that represents the annotated traces. Finally,
we can show that the running time is bounded by a polynomial in the size of the minimal automaton
representing the annotated traces and the time taken to verify if an annotated trace is valid for the FIFO
system.
5.1 Using Active Learning Framework for Verification
To use an active learning algorithm for the reachable states, we need to answer both membership and
equivalence queries for the reachable set. However, there is no way of verifying if a certain state is really
reachable or not. As before, this problem is solved by keeping a candidate witness (in terms of the transitions
of the system) to a reachable state. Using this, given a purported reachable state and its witness, we can
answer a query about its membership in the actual reachable region. Therefore, instead of learning the set
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Figure 5.1: Verification procedure for safety properties using active learning
of reachable states directly, we learn a language which allows us to identify both the reachable states and
their witnesses.
For equivalence queries, we can provide an answer in one direction. We will show that the reachable
region with its witness executions can be seen as the least fixpoint of a relation derived from the transitions.
Hence, an answer to the equivalence query can come from checking if the proposed language is a fixpoint
under this relation. If it is not a fixpoint then it is certainly not equivalent to the target; but if it is a
fixpoint, we are unable to tell if it is also the least fixed point. However, we are ultimately interested in only
checking whether a given safety property holds. If the proposed language is a fixpoint but does not intersect
with the unsafe region, the safety property clearly holds. On the other hand, if the fixpoint does intersect
with unsafe states, we can check if such an unsafe state is indeed reachable using the membership query.
If the unsafe state is reachable then we have found a valid counterexample to the safety property and are
done. Otherwise the proposed language is not the right one since it contains an invalid trace.
Figure 5.1 shows the high level view of the verification procedure. The main problems we have to address
now are:
• What is a suitable representation for the reachable states and their witnesses?
• Given a language representation, we need to answer the following questions raised in Figure 5.1:
– (Membership Query) Given a string x, is x a valid string for a reachable state and its witness?
– (Equivalence Query(I)) Is a hypothetical language L a fixpoint under the transition relation? If
not, we need a string which demonstrates that L is not a fixpoint.
– (Equivalence Query(II)) Does any string in L witness the reachability of some “unsafe” state?
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5.2 Representation of the Reachable States and their Witnesses
In the previous chapter, we presented the states and their witnesses by annotating the traces in a way that
makes it possible to compute the set of reachable states. This annotation scheme allowed us to calculate the
reachable set for any regular set of annotated traces by a simple homomorphism. However, one difficulty
we encountered is that for some practical FIFO systems, the annotated trace language is not regular; the
nonregularity often came from the fact that a receive transition has to be matched to a send which could
have happened at an arbitrary time earlier in the past. To alleviate this problem, we use a new annotation
scheme in which only the send part of the send-receive pair is kept. This gives an annotated trace language
which is regular for a much larger class of FIFO systems (although we cannot hope to be able to cover all
classes of FIFO systems since they are Turing complete). We now describe this annotation in detail.
Recall from Chapter 2 that a FIFO automaton [55] is a 6-tuple (Q, q0, C, ΣM , Θ, δ) where Q is a finite set
of control states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial control state, C is a finite set of channel names, ΣM is a finite alphabet
for contents of a channel, Θ is a finite set of transitions names, and δ : Θ→ Q×((C×{?, !}×ΣM )∪{τ})×Q
is a function that assigns a control transition to each transition name.
As before, we have a new set of barred names but this time only for the send transitions:
Θ = {θ | θ ∈ Θ and δ(θ) = ci!aj for some ci, aj}
We also define another set of names TQ = {tq | q ∈ Q} consisting of a symbol for each control state in the
FIFO.
Let the alphabet of annotated traces Σ be defined as (Θ − Θr) ∪ Θ ∪ TQ where Θr is the set of receive
transitions, Θr = {θr | δ(θr) = ci?aj for some ci,aj }.
Given a sequence of transitions l in L(F ), let Aa be a function which produces an annotated string in Σ
∗.
Aa takes each receive transition θri in l and finds the matching send transition θsi which must occur earlier
in l. Then, θri is removed and θsi replaced by θsi . Once all the receive transitions have been accounted for,
Aa appends the symbol tq ∈ TQ corresponding to the control state q which is the destination of the last
transition in l. Intuitively, for a send-receive pair which cancel each other’s effect on the channel contents,
Aa deletes the received transition and replaces the send transition with a barred symbol. As before, a barred
symbol indicates that the message sent does not play a role in the channel contents of the final state. Notice
that in the old annotation scheme both the send and the receive were replaced with a barred version; here
the receive transition is dropped altogether. The reason we still keep the send transition with a bar is, as
we will show shortly, that this allows us to decide whether any given string is a valid annotated trace. The
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Figure 5.2: Example FIFO automata
symbol tq is appended to the annotated trace to record the fact that the trace l leads to the control state q.
As an example, consider the FIFO automaton shown in Figure 5.2. For the following traces in L(F ):
θ1θ2θ3, θ1θ2θ3θ1θ2, the strings output by Aa are respectively: θ1θ3tq0 , θ1θ3θ1tq2 .
Let the language of annotated traces be ALa(F ) = {Aa(t) | t ∈ L(F )} which consists of all strings
in Σ∗ that denote correctly annotated traces of F . Recall that AL(F ) is the annotated trace language
corresponding to the old annotation scheme described earlier (in which we keep both parts of a send-receive
pair). The following proposition shows that the new annotation scheme has regular annotated trace language
for more FIFO automata than the old scheme.
Proposition 2. The set of FIFO automata for which ALa(F ) is regular is strictly larger than the set of
FIFO automata for which AL(F ) is regular.
Proof sketch. If AL(F ) is regular, let D be the DFA for it. Now create a new DFA D′ by making a copy of
D and adding one more state snew. Further, for any final state sfinal in D
′ add a transition tq from sfinal to
snew. Here, q is the target control state for all transitions incoming on sfinal (with bars ignored) and tq is
the symbol in TQ for q. Make snew the only final state in D
′. It is easy to see that D and D′ are essentially
the same except that we have explicitly added symbols for the control state that any trace accepted by D
ends with. We can now create a finite automaton for ALa(F ) by replacing all barred receives in D
′ with 
transitions. This shows that ALa(F ) is regular.
It can be shown that ALa(F ) for the automaton in Figure 5.2 is regular while AL(F ) is not. Thus, the
set of FIFO automata for which ALa(F ) is regular is strictly larger.
ALa(F ) can be seen to represent both the reachable states of the FIFO system and the annotated traces
which in some sense witness the reachability of these states. Thus, ALa(F ) is a suitable candidate for the
language to use in the verification procedure shown in Figure 5.1.
Given a string l in Σ∗, we say that l is well-formed if l ends with a symbol from TQ and there is no other
occurrence of symbols from TQ. We say that a language L is well-formed if all strings in L are well-formed.
For a well-formed string l ending in symbol tq, let T (l) denote the prefix of l without tq and let C(l) denote
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the control state q.
5.3 Answering Membership Queries
In order to answer a membership query for ALa(F ), given a string l in Σ
∗ we need to verify if l is a correct
annotation for some valid sequence of transitions l′ in L(F ). Let A−1a (l) be a function which gives the
set (possibly empty) of all sequences of transitions l′ for which Aa(l′) = l. First, if l is not well-formed,
A−1a (l) = ∅ since all valid annotations are clearly well-formed. Assuming l is well-formed, if we ignore the
bars in T (l), we get a string l′′ which could potentially be in A−1a (l) except that the transitions corresponding
to any receives are missing. We can identify the possible missing receive transitions by looking at the barred
symbols in T (l); each barred send can potentially be matched by a receive transition that operates on the
same channel and has the same letter. However, we do not know the exact positions where these receive
transitions are to be inserted in l′′. We can try all possible (finitely many) positions and simulate each
resulting transition sequence on the fly on the FIFO system. Any transition sequence which is valid on the
FIFO and gives back l on application of Aa is then a member of A−1a (l). If A
−1
a (l) 6= ∅ then l is a valid
annotated trace.
For illustration, let us consider a membership query for the string θ1θ3θ1tq2 for the FIFO automata shown
in Figure 5.2. We identify the possible missing receive transitions as two instances of θ2. Since a receive
can only occur after a send for the same channel and letter, the possible completions of the input string
with receives are {θ1θ2θ3θ2θ1, θ1θ2θ3θ1θ2, θ1θ3θ2θ2θ1, θ1θ3θ2θ1θ2, θ1θ3θ1θ2θ2}. Of these, θ1θ2θ3θ1θ2 can be
correctly simulated on the FIFO system and gives back the input string θ1θ3θ1tq2 on application of Aa.
Therefore, the answer to the membership query is yes. An example for a negative answer is θ1tq0 .
5.4 Answering Equivalence Queries
For learning ALa(F ) in the active learning framework, we need a method to verify whether a hypothesis
language of annotated traces is equivalent to ALa(F ). If not, then we also need to identify a string in the
symmetric difference of ALa(F ) and the hypothesis language to allow the learner to make progress.
Given a string l ∈ L and a transition θ in the FIFO, we can find if it is possible to extend l using θ. More
precisely, we define a function Post(l, θ) as follows. If l is well-formed, let source(θ) and target(θ) be the
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control states which are respectively the source and the target of θ.
Post(l, θ) =


∅ if l not well-formed or if C(l) 6= source(θ)
{T (l)θ ttarget(θ)} otherwise if δ(θ) = τ or δ(θ) = ci!aj
{deriv(T (l), θ) ttarget(θ)} otherwise if δ(θ) = ci?aj
deriv(T (l), θ) checks the first occurrence of a send θs in T (l) for channel ci and if the send is for the character
aj , replaces θs with θs. deriv(T (l), θ) is empty if no such θs could be found or if θs outputs a character
other than aj . Intuitively, deriv is similar to the concept of the derivative in formal language theory, except
that we look at only the channel that θ operates upon.
Let Post(l) be
⋃
θ∈Θ Post(l, θ) and Post(L) be
⋃
l∈L Post(l).
Lemma 2. Each string in ALa(F ) is either tq0 or in Post(l) for some l ∈ ALa(F )
Proof sketch. A string l′ is in ALa(F ) because it is the annotation of at least one sequence of transitions ρ
in L(F ), i.e. l′ = Aa(ρ). If ρ is the empty string then l′ = Aa() = tq0 . Otherwise, let ρ−1 be the prefix
of ρ without the last transition. Consider l = Aa(ρ−1). From the definition of Post, it is easy to see that
l′ = Post(l).
Theorem 2. Let F(L) = Post(L) ∪ {tq0} where q0 is the initial control state. F(L) is a monotone set
operator, i.e. it preserves set-inclusion. Moreover, ALa(F ) is the least fixpoint of the function F(L).
Proof sketch. Since Post(L) is simply the union of Post of all strings in L, monotonicity of F is immediate.
From the definition of Post, we can see that if l ∈ ALa(F ), it is also true that Post(l) ∈ ALa(F ). This
implies F(ALa(F )) ⊆ ALa(F ) since a string in F(ALa(F )) is either tq0 or Post(l) for some l ∈ ALa(F ). By
Lemma 2, F(ALa(F )) ⊇ ALa(F ) since any string in ALa(F ) has to be Post(l) for some other l ∈ ALa(F ).
Thus, ALa(F ) is a fixpoint for F .
To see that ALa(F ) is also the least fixpoint, by way of contradiction assume a (strictly) smaller fixpoint
L′. Applying Post to some string either increases its length by one or increases the number of barred symbols
in it. Therefore, given a finite string l, it is not possible to have an infinite chain l0, l1, l2, . . . with l = l0 such
that Post(li+1) = li Let l be some string in ALa(F ) which is not in L
′. By Lemma 2, there must be some l1
such that Post(l1) = l. Now l1 can be tq0 or be Post(l2) for some l2. Since this chain of l1, l2 . . . cannot be
infinite, it has to end in tq0 . Clearly, tq0 is in any fixpoint, hence tq0 ∈ L
′. Consider the smallest i for which
li in the chain is not in L
′. But since li−1 = Post(li), li−1 has to be in L
′ giving a contradiction. Hence,
ALa(F ) is the least fixpoint of F .
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Figure 5.3: Answering equivalence query for the case F(L)− L 6= ∅
Theorem 2 gives us a method for answering equivalence queries for ALa(F ). If L is not a fixpoint, it
cannot be equivalent to ALa(F ). In this case, we can also find a string in L⊕ ALa(F ) as required for the
learning algorithm. Here, A⊕B denotes the symmetric difference of two sets. Consider the following cases:
1. F(L) − L 6= ∅. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, let l be some string in this set. If l is tq0 then it is in
ALa(F )⊕L. Otherwise, we can check if l is a valid annotation using a membership query. If yes, then
l is in ALa(F ) ⊕ L. Otherwise, it must be true that l ∈ Post(l′) for some l′ ∈ L. If l is not valid, l′
cannot be valid since Post of a valid annotation is always valid. Hence l′ 6∈ ALa(F ) or l′ ∈ ALa(F )⊕L.
2. F(L) ( L. This case is graphically depicted in Figure 5.4. From standard fixpoint theory, since
ALa(F ) is the least fixed point under F , it must be the intersection of all prefixpoints of F (a set Z
is a prefixpoint if it shrinks under the functional F , i.e. F(Z) ⊆ Z). Now, L is clearly a prefixpoint.
Applying F to both sides of the equation F(L) ( L and using monotonicity of F , we get F(F(L)) (
F(L). Thus, F(L) is also a prefixpoint. Let l be some string in the set L−F(L). Since l is outside the
intersection of two prefixpoints, it is not is in the least fixpoint ALa(F ). Hence, l is in ALa(F )⊕ L.
3. F(L) = L. Let W(L) be the set of annotated traces in L which can reach unsafe states (We will
describe how W(L) is computed in the next section). If W(L) is empty, since L is a fixpoint, we can
abort the learning procedure and declare that the safety property holds. For the other case, if W(L)
is not empty then let l be some annotated trace in this set. We check if l is a valid annotation using
the procedure described in Section 5.3. If it is valid, we have found a valid counterexample and can
again abort the whole learning procedure since we have found an answer (in the negative) to the safety
property verification. Otherwise, l is in ALa(F )⊕ L.
A subtle point to note is that although we attempt to learn ALa(F ), because of the limitation in the
equivalence query, the final language obtained after the termination of the verification procedure may not be
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Figure 5.4: Answering equivalence query for the case F(L) ( L
ALa(F ). It might be some fixpoint which contains ALa(F ) or it might be simply some set which contains a
valid annotated trace demonstrating the reachability of some unsafe state. However, this is not a cause for
concern to us since in all cases the answer for the safety property verification is correct.
5.5 Finding Annotated Traces leading to Unsafe States
In the previous section, we referred to a set W(L) in L which can reach unsafe states. We now show how
this can be computed.
As before, we assume that for each control state q ∈ Q, we are given a recognizable set [20] describing
the unsafe channel configurations. Equivalently, for each q, the unsafe channel contents are given by a finite
union of products of regular languages:
⋃
0≤i≤nq
Pq,i where Pq,i =
∏
0≤j≤k Uq(i, cj) and Uq(i, cj) is a regular
language for contents of channel cj . For each Pq,i, an unsafe state su is some (q, u0, u1, . . . uk) such that
uj ∈ Uq(i, cj).
For a channel c, consider a function hc : Σ→ Σ∗M defined as follows:
hc(t) =


m if t ∈ Θ and δ(t) = c!m
 otherwise
Let hc also denote the unique homomorphism from Σ
∗ to Σ∗M that extends the above function.
Let Lq be the subset of an annotated trace set L consisting of all well-formed strings ending in tq , i.e.
Lq = {l | l ∈ L and C(l) = q}.
If an unsafe state su = (q, u0, u1, . . . uk) is reachable, then there must exist a sequence of transitions
lθ ∈ Θ∗ such that s0
lθ→ su, where s0 is the initial state. In lθ, if the receives and the sends which match the
receives are taken out, only the remaining transitions which are sends can contribute to the channel contents
in su. Looking at the definition of hc, it can be seen that for each channel content uj in su, uj = hcj (Aa(lθ))
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(recall that Aa converts a sequence of transitions into an annotated trace). Thus, for su to be reachable,
there must be some annotated trace l ∈ ALa(F ) such that su = (C(l), hc0(l), hc1(l), . . . , hck(l)).
Let h−1cj (Uq(i, cj)) denote the inverse homomorphism of Uq(i, cj) under hcj . Note that for each Pq,i,⋂
0≤j≤k h
−1
cj
(Uq(i, cj)) gives a set of annotated strings which can reach the unsafe channel configurations for
control state q. Intersecting this with Lq verifies if any string in L can reach these set of unsafe states. If
we perform such checks for all control states for all Pq,i, we can verify if any unsafe state is reached by L.
Thus, the set of annotated traces in L that can lead to an unsafe state is given by:
W(L) =
⋃
q∈Q
(
⋃
0≤i≤nq
(Lq ∩
⋂
0≤j≤k
h−1cj (Uq(i, cj))))
We summarize the verification algorithm in Figure 5.5.
Theorem 3. For verifying safety properties of FIFO automata, the learning to verify algorithm satisfies the
following properties:
1. If an answer is returned by algorithm, it is always correct.
2. If ALa(F ) is regular, the procedure is guaranteed to terminate.
Proof sketch. Soundness of the procedure is straightforward. We declare that the safety property holds only
when we have found a fixpoint L which does not intersect with the “unsafe” traces. Since L is a fixpoint,
it must be larger or equal to ALa(F ) which is the least fix point. If W(L) is empty then W(ALa(F )) must
also be empty implying that no execution of the system can reach an unsafe state.
If we say that the safety property does not hold and provide a path leading to an unsafe state, this
counterexample has to be valid since we always first check it against the FIFO system.
For showing completeness, assuming that ALa(F ) is regular, we can rely on the termination guarantees
of Angluin’s algorithm. The only caveat is our limited ability to answer equivalence queries. Consider a
hypothetical teacher which can answer all membership and equivalence queries for ALa(F ) correctly. For
an equivalence query, whenever our teacher says no the hypothetical teacher must also say no; however our
teacher is unable to decide when to say yes. Notice that a yes answer to an equivalence query is only given
once and marks the end of the algorithm. Imagine a session of a learner with the hypothetical teacher and
a parallel session of another learner with our limited teacher. Further, assume that in case the answer to
the equivalence query is no, the hypothetical teacher returns the same string (for the symmetric difference)
as our teacher. Both learners start off by making identical queries and proceed in lock step since both
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algorithm learner
begin
Regular inference algorithm
end
algorithm isMember
Input: Annotated trace l
Output: is l ∈ ALa(F )?
begin
if l not well-formed return no
else
find receives matching barred symbols
find possible positions for receives
simulate resulting strings on FIFO
system on the fly
if any string reaches C(l) with
correct annotation, return yes
return no
end
algorithm Equivalence Check
Input: Annotated trace set L
Output: is L = ALa(F )?
If not, then some string in L ⊕ALa(F )
begin
F(L) = Post(L) ∪ {tq0}
if ∃l ∈ (F(L) − L)
if isMember(l)
return (no, l)
else
return (no, l′ where l = Post(l′))
else if F(L) ( L
return (no, l ∈ (L−F(L)))
else if ∃l ∈ W(L)
if isMember(l)
Print (safety prop. does not hold, l); stop
else
return (no, l)
else
Print (safety prop. holds); stop
end
Figure 5.5: Learning to verify algorithm using active learning
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teachers provide the same answers. Let us say that at some point, our teacher declares that it has solved
the verification problem and aborts the learning procedure. Consider the two cases possible:
• Our teacher finds some fixpoint which does not intersect with the unsafe states. In this case, the
hypothetical teacher might still continue if the fixpoint is not the least fixpoint (ALa(F )) or say yes
if is the least fixpoint. The hypothetical teacher could not have said yes earlier, since if the learner
proposed ALa(F ), our teacher would have found it as a fixpoint which does not intersect with the
unsafe states.
• Our teacher finds a valid counterexample to the safety property. Again the hypothetical teacher could
not have said yes earlier. If ALa(F ) had been proposed by the learner, since the safety property does
not hold, some string in ALa(F ) is a valid counterexample to the safety property and our teacher
would have found it.
Thus, in all cases, our teacher will end the learning procedure sooner or at the same time as the hypothetical
teacher.
5.5.1 Complexity Analysis
As shown in Proposition 1 in Chapter 2, the learning algorithm makes O(|Σ|n2 + n logm) membership
queries and O(n) equivalence queries. Here m is the size of the longest string returned by the teacher
in a negative answer to an equivalence query and n is the size of the minimal automaton representing
ALa(F ) (assuming ALa(F ) is regular). When we answer an equivalence query for a hypothesis L, we search
for a string in L ∩ (¬Post(L)), Post(L) ∩ (¬L) and W(L). The size of Post(L) is bounded by O(|Θ|n),
hence L ∩ (¬Post(L)) and Post(L) ∩ (¬L) are at most of size O(|Θ|n2). Assuming that the unsafe states
are described by an automaton smaller than the minimal one for ALa(F ), |W(L)| is bounded by O(n2).
Therefore, the longest string that can be returned as an answer to the equivalence query is O(|Θ|n2). Hence,
m = O(|Θ|n2).
Let t(l, k) be the time taken for a membership query for a string of length l on a FIFO automata with k
receive transitions. The running time for the verification procedure is dominated by the cost of equivalence
and membership queries. Let us now consider these in turn.
1. Equivalence queries: Each equivalence query can also result in a membership query. Following the rea-
soning in the previous paragraph, the cost of one equivalence query is bounded by O(m+t(m, k)) which
can be simplified to O(t(|Θ|n2, k)). For maximum of n such queries, the total cost is O(nt(|Θ|n2, k))
67
2. Membership queries from learner: For O(|Σ|n2 + n log m) membership queries with the maximum
length of a string being O(m + n), the bound on the cost is O((|Σ|n2 + n log (|Θ|n2))t(|Θ|n2, k))
The cost of answering the membership queries from learner clearly dominates the total cost. Thus,
the running time is O((|Σ|n2 + n log (|Θ|n2))t(|Θ|n2, k)) which is a polynomial in the size of the minimal
automata for ALa(F ) and the time needed for a membership query for ALa(F ). The longest string for which
membership may need to be checked is quadratic in the size of the minimal automata.
Let us now consider t(l, k), the cost of a membership query for a string of length l. This cost depends
on the annotation scheme used. For instance, in the old annotation scheme (which keeps both parts of a
send-receive pair) this is simply O(l). For the new annotation scheme, we drop the receive part to allow more
FIFO systems to have regular annotated trace languages (making them amenable to automatic analysis).
However, this forces us to do more work for the membership query. There can be at most l receive transitions
that have to be inserted in the queried string to get a trace that can be simulated on the FIFO system. A
trivial upper bound for t(l, k) can be derived as follows. For a query string of length l, we may have to add
l more receives. The receives can be put in the l + 1 positions in (l + 1)l or O(ll) ways. For each place, the
number of choices for receives is at most equal to the minimum of k and l. Let p = min(k, l). Then, the
cost of a membership query is O(plll). The bound could possibly be improved but this is deferred for future
work.
5.6 Comparison with Verification based on Passive Learning
The verification procedure based on the active learning approach has several advantages over the one based
on passive learning. First, the number of samples we need to consider is polynomial in the size of the minimal
automaton representing the annotated traces as opposed to exponential for the passive learning approach.
Second, we are guaranteed to learn the minimal automaton that represents the annotated traces. Finally,
for the active learning case, we can bound the running time by a polynomial in the size of the minimal
automaton representing the annotated traces and the time taken to verify if an annotated trace is valid for
the FIFO system.
We observe that for most examples we analyzed, the active learning method is indeed able to analyze the
system faster. However, as discussed later in Chapter 9, for a few examples, the passive learning approach
performs better. It should also be noted that the encodings used for the traces in FIFO for passive and
active approaches are different. In particular, the encoding used in the active approach where only the send
part of a send-receive pair cannot be used for the passive approach. This is because calculating the disabled
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transitions at any step critically depends on having representatives for all transitions taken.
In some scenarios, the passive learning approach may be better. For instance, a test suite designed to
cover the reachable space of the system under execution can be used to converge to the solution quickly in
the case of the passive learning approach. On the other hand, the active learning approach is not able to
leverage on the availability of any test suite.
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Chapter 6
Verifying Safety for Systems in
Regular Model Checking Framework
In previous chapters, we looked at a learning based approach for verifying safety properties of FIFO automata.
In this chapter, we extend this to systems that are expressed in the Regular Model Checking framework.
We will focus on using the active learning framework..
Recall from Chapter 2, that in the Regular Model Checking framework, states are represented by strings
over an alphabet and the transition relation is given as a transducer. This framework has been successfully
used ([25]) for modeling parameterized systems, FIFO automata, systems with integer variables and push
down stacks. For verifying safety properties of systems expressed in this framework, we can follow the same
high level idea as described for FIFO automata in Figure 5.1. Again, instead of just learning reachable states
themselves, we learn a set of pairs of states and witnesses, where a witness shows how the corresponding state
is reachable. As the reader can recall, the key questions that we have to answer to use the learning-to-verify
approach for safety are:
• What is a suitable representation for the reachable states and their witnesses?
• Given a language representation:
– (Membership Query) For an element x, is x a valid pair of reachable state and its witness?
– (Equivalence Query(I)) Is a hypothetical language a fixpoint under the transition relation? If not,
we need a element which demonstrates that the hypothetical language is not a fixpoint.
– (Equivalence Query(II)) Does any element in the hypothetical language witness the reachability
of some “unsafe” state?
In FIFO automata, we used trace annotations to represent reachable state and their witnesses. But in
general, what should be the representation to use? The key property that the witnesses needs to satisfy
is: given a state witness pair, the teacher should be able to decide algorithmically whether the witness
demonstrates that the claimed state is reachable. For systems expressed in the Regular Model Checking
framework, there are several possibilities for the witness. In some cases, the the encoding of the states itself
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1/0
0/0,
1/1
0/1
0/1, 1/1
Figure 6.1: Transducer for the transition relation x = x + 2
provides a way for the teacher to decide if a certain state is reachable. For example, if the transition relation
of the system is length-preserving, then given a state represented by a string of length n, we can decide
membership as follows. Starting with the all initial states of length n, we repeatedly apply the transition
relation until we get a set of states which is a fixpoint. This iteration has to converge eventually since there
are only finitely many strings possible for a given length. Then, membership can be answered by checking if
the state of interest is in this fixpoint. For a general transition relation, which may not be length-preserving,
this solution does not work. However, a simple yet powerful idea is to keep as witness, the number of
transitions that are needed to be taken, starting from the initial state to the state that is claimed to be
reachable. The teacher can then decide if the state is indeed reachable by simply simulating those many
steps from the initial states.
6.1 Preliminaries
We assume that the states of the system can be encoded as strings over some finite alphabet ρ. Let S = ρ∗
represent the set of all states. We use Tr for the transducer representing the transition relation, I for the
DFA representing the set of initial states and U for the DFA representing the set of “unsafe” states.
As a running example, we will use a system with one positive integer variable x whose only transition
increments x by 2. The value of x is represented in binary (the first letter in the string is the least significant
bit). The initial state is x = 0 (represented by 0∗) and the unsafe region is x = 3 (represented by 110∗). The
transducer for the transition relation is given in Figure 6.1. A label a/b on an edge represents input symbol
a and output symbol b. An example of input and output strings related by the transducer is the pair 00 and
01 which corresponds to incrementing x from 0 to 2. Note that the transition relation is length-preserving
in this case.
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6.1.1 Computing the Image of a Regular Set under a Transducer
Given a transducer T = (QT , δT , Σ, Σ, q0T , FT ) and an NFA D = (QD , δD, Σ, q0D, FD), let L be the set of
strings such that s ∈ L if and only if D accepts some string s′ and T accepts (s′, s). It can be shown that
L is regular. An NFA (denoted by T (D)) accepting L can be constructed in a manner similar to finding
the intersection of the languages of two DFAs. More precisely, T (D) = (QD ×QT , δ, Σ, q0D × q0T , FD ×FT )
where δ is given as follows:
• ((q1, q2), a, (q
′
1, q
′
2)) ∈ δ if ∃b.(q1, b, q
′
1) ∈ δD and (q2, b, a, q
′
2) ∈ δT . Here a can also be .
• ((q1, q2), a, (q1, q′2)) ∈ δ if ∃a.(q2, , a, q
′
2) ∈ δT
Note that the NFA T (D) can have epsilon transitions but an equivalent NFA without epsilon transitions
can be obtained through standard automata operations. Further, for ease of notation, wherever there is no
chance of confusion, we let D represent both the NFA and the regular languages accepted by that NFA.
Similarly, we let T (D) represent the NFA obtained by the operation described above and the regular language
accepted by that NFA. We also let T 2(D) represent T (T (D)), T 3(D) represent T (T (T (D))) and so on for
any i.
6.2 Representation of States with Witness
6.2.1 Bounded Space
If the transition relation of the system is length-preserving (meaning that a state represented by a string
of length k can only go to another string also of length k), then a witness for the reachability of a state
is simply its length. We call this a bounded space witness. The reason that the string length suffices as a
witness is as follows. For any given length k, there can only be finitely many strings reachable from the init
states since the transition relation is length-preserving. Let all initial states of length k be denoted by I|k
and let T|k : 2
ρ∗ 7→ 2ρ
∗
denote a function defined by: T|k(Z) = I|k ∪ Tr(Z). Then, to answer if a string s of
length k is reachable, we first compute T|k(∅), T
2
|k(∅), T
3
|k(∅) . . . until for some n, we have T
n−1
|k (∅) = T
n
|k(∅).
This computation is guaranteed to terminate since there are only finitely many strings of length k. Now,
reachability of s can be decided by checking if T n|k(∅) accepts s. In our running example, if we wanted to
answer the membership query for the string 01 (x = 2), we would first take all initial states of length 2: in
our case this is just 00. Applying T|2 repeatedly gives the least fixpoint as {00, 01}. Since 01 is in this set,
we can answer the membership query in the affirmative.
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Note that for the bounded space method, since the witness is implicit in the state representation, the
target for the learning algorithm is simply the set of reachable states. We denote this set by Reachs. In our
running example, this is given by the set corresponding to the regular expression 0(0|1)∗.
6.2.2 Bounded Steps
The bounded space witness method works only if the transition relation is length preserving. For general
systems, a natural candidate for the witness is simply the number of steps needed to reach a particular
state. We denote the state-witness pair by (s, i) where s is the state and i is some number of steps in which
s is reached. Now, in general, a set Z of pairs (s, i) is a subset of ρ∗ × N, but to encode Z as a regular
set we use the alphabet Σ given by (ρ ∪ {⊥})× {0, 1}. Here ⊥ is a new “filler” symbol. An element (s, i)
is encoded as a string over Σ such that projecting the symbols on the first component gives us s (the ⊥
symbols are ignored); and projecting on the second component gives i in binary notation. Alternatively, a
unary notation for i can also be used in which case the alphabet used by the learning algorithm would be
(ρ ∪ {⊥}) × {0,⊥}. Note that for integer systems, if we use binary notation, then the symbol 0 implicitly
functions as a filler symbol for the first component also, hence it can be used in place of ⊥. In our running
examples, the alphabet for the learning algorithm would be Σ = {0, 1} × {0, 1}
Let Reacht be the set of all valid state witness pairs. This will be the target for the learning algorithm.
In our running example, the DFA for Reach t is shown in Figure 6.2. For instance, a valid state-witness pair
accepted by this DFA is the string (0, 0)(0, 1)(1, 0) which corresponds to x = 4 and number of steps of 2.
6.3 Answering Membership Queries
For the bounded space witness, answering the membership query is simply checking if a state is reachable
which has already been addressed in the previous section.
For the bounded steps method, to answer a query whether an element x = (s, i) is in Reach s, we simply
compute the set of states reached from the initial states in i steps and check if s is in this set.
Given the initial states represented by the DFA I and transducer Tr, the set of states that can be reached
in one step are given by Tr(I). Applying Tr repeatedly up to i times gives us the set of states T
i
r(I) reached
in i steps. The membership query for (s, i) is then answered by checking if this set contains s. For instance,
in our running example, to answer a query for x = 2 and number of steps of 1, we will compute T 1r (I) which
is the set {x = 2} and since x = 2 is a member of this set, we will answer the query in the affirmative.
Note that T ir(I) can be used to answer queries for all strings with witness i. Therefore, for efficiency, we
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(0,0)
3
(0,1)
(0,0),(1,1)
(0,1)
5
(1,0)
(0,0),(1,0)
(0,1),
(1,1)
(0,1),(1,1)
(0,0),
(1,0)
Figure 6.2: Valid state-witness pairs for bounded steps case for the transition relation where x is incremented
by 2.
save the calculation of T ir(I) and reuse it for answering subsequent queries.
6.4 Answering Equivalence Queries for Bounded Space Method
For the equivalence query, recall that we are given a hypothesis Z and have to answer if this is the target
set Reachs (for the bounded space case, this is just the reachable states). Further, in case the answer is in
the negative, we have to provide an example in the symmetric difference of the target and the hypothesis.
We use an idea similar to the one described in Section 5.4. For a set of states Z, let F s be a function
given by Fs(Z) = Tr(Z) ∪ I . Since the reachable states are a (least) fixpoint of F
s, if the hypothesis is
correct, then it should not change under Fs. As before, we can break the analysis down to three cases:
1. Fs(Z)− Z 6= ∅. Let l be some string in this set. If l ∈ I then it is in Reachs ⊕ Z. Otherwise, we can
check if l is a reachable state using a membership query. If yes, then l is in Reach s ⊕Z. Otherwise, it
must be true that l must be reachable from some l′ ∈ Z. If l is not valid, l′ cannot be valid. Hence
l′ 6∈ Reachs or l′ ∈ Reachs ⊕ Z.
2. Fs(Z) ( Z. From standard fixpoint theory, since Reachs is the least fixed point under Fs, it must be
the intersection of all prefixpoints of Fs. As before, we can show that, in this case, both Z and F s(Z)
are prefixpoints. Let l be some string in the set Z − F s(Z). Since l is outside the intersection of two
prefixpoints, it is not is in the least fixpoint ALa(F ). Hence, l is in Reach
s ⊕ Z.
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1/0
1/0 0/1
0/1, 1/1
0/1
Figure 6.3: Transducer for incrementing value of incoming string by 1. This can be used for keeping the
count of steps taken.
3. Fs(Z) = Z. If Z ∩ U is empty, since Z is a fixpoint, we can abort the learning procedure and declare
that the safety property holds. For the other case, if the intersection is not empty then let l be some
state in this set. We check if l is reachable using a membership query. If it is valid, we have found a
valid counterexample and can again abort the whole learning procedure since we have found an answer
(in the negative) to the safety property verification. Otherwise, l is in Reach s ⊕ Z.
6.5 Answering Equivalence Queries for Bounded Steps Method
6.5.1 Incrementing Count of Number of Steps
A generic operation we need is that of incrementing the count for the number of steps for all elements of a
set of state-witness pairs.
Definition 6. Given Z a set of strings in the alphabet of Σ, define
Inc(Z) = {(s, i) | (s, i− 1) ∈ Z}
If natural numbers are represented by strings in binary, a transducer which simply increments the value
represented by its input string is shown in Figure 6.3.1 An easy construction also exists for the case of unary
representation. This transducer can be used to create a transducer TInc for the operation Inc. Essentially,
TInc only changes the “component” for the counter i in any input string and copies the “component” for s.
6.5.2 Fixpoint Characterization for the Set of State Witness Pairs
Let T ′r be a transducer constructed from Tr such that it ignores the counter component and only changes
the state component. Further, let T be the transducer whose relation is the composition of the relations of
1For pedagogical reasons, we are visualizing a transducer as taking an input string and producing possibly different output
strings.
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6(0,0)/(0,0),
(0,1)/(0,1),
(1,0)/(1,0),
(1,1)/(1,1)
1
3(0,1)/(0,0),(1,1)/(1,0)
4
(0,0)/(0,1),
(1,0)/(1,1)
(0,0)/(1,1)
(1,1)/(0,0)
(1,0)/(0,1)
5(0,1)/(1,0)
(0,0)/(1,0),
(0,1)/(1,1)(1,0)/(0,0),
(1,1)/(0,1)
(0,0)/(0,1),
(1,0)/(1,1)
(0,1)/(0,0),
(1,1)/(1,0)
Figure 6.4: Transducer for x = x + 2 which also increments the count of steps
TInc and T
′
r (this can be obtained by an operation similar to language intersection for NFAs). Intuitively, T
takes a set of state-witness pairs Sold and finds a new set of state-witness pairs Snew such that the states in
Snew are reachable from the states in Sold in one step and the count of the number of steps is incremented
by one.
In our running example, the transducer T (the number of states has been minimized for clarity) is given
in Figure 6.4. For instance, this transducer relates the string (1, 0)(0, 1) (x = 1 and number of steps of 2)
to (1, 1)(1, 1) (x = 3 and number of steps of 3). Note that both the input (1, 0)(0, 1) and output strings
(1, 1)(1, 1) are actually invalid state-witness pairs.
For the bounded steps case, let I0 denote a DFA representing all initial states with the value of witness
as 0. I0 can be constructed from the DFA for I using a simple homomorphism defined by a function which
takes a letter a in ρ to (a, 0). We define a function F t(Z) by
F t(Z) = T (Z) ∪ I0
Proposition 3. The set of all valid state-witness pairs, Reach t is the least fixpoint of the function F t.
Proof sketch. First we show that Reach t is a fixpoint of F t. Consider some (s, i) ∈ Reach t. By definition
of a valid state-witness pair, there has to be a sequence (s0, 0), (s1, 1), . . . , (si, i) with si = s. Either i
is 0 in which case, (s, i) ∈ F t(Reacht), or (si−1, i − 1) in the above sequence is also in Reach
t (since it
too is a valid state-witness pair). In the latter case, by definition (s, i) ∈ F t(Reacht). This shows that
(s, i) ∈ Reach t → (s, i) ∈ F t(Reacht). Similarly, if (s, i) ∈ F t(Reacht) then the first possibility is that i is
0 in which case, (s, i) ∈ Reach t. If i is not zero then there must be some (s′, i − 1) such that s′ → s and
(s′, i− 1) ∈ Reach t; but again if (s′, i− 1) is a valid state-witness pair, so is (s, i) and hence (s, i) ∈ Reach t.
76
This shows that (s, i) ∈ F t(Reacht) → (s, i) ∈ Reach t. Since (s, i) ∈ F t(Reacht) ↔ (s, i) ∈ Reach t, we can
see that Reach t is a fixpoint.
To see that Reacht is also the least fixpoint, we actually show a stronger property that F t has a unique
fixpoint. Let Z and Z ′ be two fixpoints for F t. Let Z≤i be the set {(s, j) | (s, j) ∈ Z and j ≤ i}. We will
prove by induction on i that for all i, Z≤i and Z
′
≤i are equal. The base case for i = 0 is trivial since for
all fixpoints of F t, the set of states with counter value of i as 0 has to be I0. Assume that the inductive
hypothesis holds up to some j > 1. We need to show that (s, j + 1) ∈ Z≤j+1 ⇔ (s, j + 1) ∈ Z ′≤j+1. If
(s, j +1) ∈ Z then (s, j +1) ∈ F t(Z). This implies there is some (s′, j) ∈ Z or (s′, j) ∈ Z≤j such that s→ s
′.
By the inductive hypothesis, (s′, j) ∈ Z ′≤j or (s
′, j) ∈ Z ′. But then, (s, j + 1) ∈ F t(Z ′) or (s, j + 1) ∈ Z ′ or
(s, j + 1) ∈ Z ′≤j+1. Similarly, if (s, j + 1) ∈ Z
′
≤j+1 then (s, j + 1) ∈ Z≤j+1. This establishes Z≤j+1 = Z
′
≤j+1.
The above proposition allows us to answer the equivalence query for Reach t in the same manner as that
of the bounded space case. The only issue left to be resolved is for the last case in the check when we have
to determine if any state-witness pair in the hypothesis leads to an unsafe state.
State-witness pairs leading to unsafe states: Assume that we are given a DFA U = (Q, δ, Σ, q0, F )
representing the set of unsafe states. An NFA representing the set of state witness pairs which correspond
to unsafe states with all possible witnesses is given by (Q, δ′, (ρ ∪ {⊥})× {0, 1}, q0, F ) where
(q, (a, 0), q′) ∈ δ′ if q′ = δ(q, a)
(q, (a, 1), q′) ∈ δ′ if q′ = δ(q, a)
(q, (⊥, 0), q) ∈ δ′
(q, (⊥, 1), q) ∈ δ′
6.6 Verification Procedure
The overall verification procedure to check safety properties of models in the regular model checking frame-
work is outlined in Figure 6.5 for the bounded space case. The procedure for the bounded steps is similar
and is skipped. Again we assume that the target set to be learned is regular and use a variant of Angluin’s
L* algorithm for learning as described in Section 2.5.3. It is straightforward to show that the following
theorem holds.
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algorithm learner
begin
Regular inference algorithm
end
algorithm isMember
Input: s
Output: is s in fixpoint?
begin
k = length(s)
Compute least fixpoint Zi = T
n
|k(∅) for some n
such that T n−1|k (∅) = T
n
|k(∅)
{Here I is the set of initial states}
Is s ∈ Zi?
If yes return true
else return false
end
algorithm Equivalence Check
Input: Hypothesis Z ′
Output: For fixpoint Z, is Z ′ = Z?
If not, then some string in Z ′ ⊕ Z
begin
If Fs(Z ′) \ Z ′ 6= ∅ {fixpoint check}
let s ∈ Fs(Z ′) \ Z ′
Find s′ which causes s to be in Fs(Z ′)
if isMember(s)
return (no, s)
else
return (no, s′)
else if Fs(Z ′) ( Z ′
return (no, l ∈ (Z ′ \ Fs(Z ′)))
else {found fixpoint}
else if ∃s ∈ U ∩ Z ′
if isMember(s)
Print (safety prop. does not hold); stop
else
return (no, s)
else
Print (safety prop. holds); stop
end
Figure 6.5: Verifying safety properties in regular model checking framework for the bounded space case
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Theorem 4. For verifying safety properties in the regular model checking framework, the learning to verify
algorithm satisfies the following properties:
1. If an answer is returned by the algorithm, it is always correct.
2. For the bounded space case, if the set of reachable states is regular, the procedure is guaranteed to
terminate.
3. For the bounded steps case, if the set of valid state-witness pairs is regular, the procedure is guaranteed
to terminate.
6.7 Example Application of the Verification Procedure
In this section, we show the steps taken during verification of a simple example using the learning-based
verification approach. The system we analyze is depicted in Figure 6.6. In this system, there is a single
integer variable x which is initially set to 0. There is a transition from the initial control state q0 to itself
which increments x by 2 and another transition which goes to the second control state if x is equal to 1001.
The unsafe set of states is considered to be the second control state (labeled “bad”) with any value of x. It
is easy to see that the reachable states consist of non-negative even values of x in control state q0 and the
system is safe. We now show how the learning algorithm will operate on this system.
q0
x = x + 2
badif x == 1001Initially, x = 0
Figure 6.6: Example system to be analyzed using learning-based verification.
We use the bounded steps method for demonstration, therefore, we keep a counter (say n) which is
incremented with every step. For ease of exposition, we will not explicitly show the encoding for the control
state. Then, the encoding for the state-witness pairs is simply an encoding for the value of x and n. We
encode over an alphabet {0, 1}2 so that given a string s, projecting all letters in s to their first component
gives the value of x in binary with the least significant bit first and projecting onto the second component
gives the value of n. For example, x = 4 and n = 2 is encoded by the string (0, 0)(0, 1)(1, 0). Figure 6.7
shows the different iterations of the learning algorithm and the final set of state-witness pairs that is learned.
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Figure 6.7: Various steps in the verification of the example system shown in Figure 6.6. Note that the final
automaton shows that no unsafe state is reached, therefore, the safety property holds.
6.8 Comparison with Related Work
The discussion in Section 4.5 for FIFO automata is also applicable for the case of systems expressed in the
regular model checking framework. One work that is closely related to our learning method with bounded
number of steps is that of Habermehl et al. [67]. They propose a learning-based verification method using a
variant of Trakhtenbrot-Barzdin [126] algorithm. However, this requires constructing a prefix tree automata
(PTA) for all strings up to a length r where r is the so called degree of reconstructibility of the target
automaton. The size of this PTA is exponential in r. In contrast, we use an active learning algorithm which
needs only a polynomial number of membership and equivalence queries. Further, the correctness of their
algorithm critically depends on the length-preserving aspect of the transition relation whereas we can handle
non length-preserving transition relations using the bounded steps method.
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Chapter 7
Verification of ω-regular Properties
In this chapter, we extend the learning based approach to verifying general ω-regular properties. It is well
known that ω-regular properties can express all linear temporal logic specifications which include both safety
and liveness properties along with fairness constraints. We first develop a new fixpoint based characterization
for the verification of ω-regular properties. Next, we describe the verification method for general infinite
state systems and then instantiate it to systems expressible in the regular model checking framework. Using a
variant of Angluin’s L* algorithm for learning regular languages, we then develop an algorithm for verification
of ω-regular properties of such infinite state systems and prove that it is a complete verification procedure
if the fixpoint can be represented as a regular set.
7.1 Preliminaries
We use Kripke structures to model the system being verified and Bu¨chi automata for the specification. The
formal definitions of Kripke structure and Bu¨chi automaton is given in Chapter 2.
Let K be a Kripke structure (Sk, Σ, Rk, Sk0 ,L). A path starting from state s is an infinite sequence
s0, s1, s2 . . . such that s = s0 and for every i, (si, si+1) ∈ Rk. A path of a Kripke structure K is just a path
starting from some initial state s ∈ Sk0 . The set of all paths of K will be denoted by P(K). For a path
pi = s0, s1, s2, . . ., KTrace(pi) is the sequence of labels `0, `1, `2, . . . such that for every i, L(si) = `i. For a
set of paths Π, KTrace(Π) is taken to be {KTrace(pi) | pi ∈ Π}.
We will use the definition of a specific CTL∗ property (recall definition from Section 2.2.1), namely
EGFp. A state s in a Kripke structure K satisfies EGFp if and only if there exists a path pi = s0, s1, s2, . . .
starting from s such that for all i, L(sj) = p for some j ≥ i; in other words, the path encounters states
labelled p infinitely often. When s satisfies EGFp, we will say s, K |= EGFp; when K is clear from the
context we will simply write this as s |= EGFp. We will denote by [[EGFp]]K the set of all states s, such
that s, K |= EGFp.
Similar to the traditional approach used in model checking with automata theory, we assume that the
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system specification is given in terms of the bad behaviors that the implementation must not exhibit. The
bad behaviors are specified using a Bu¨chi automaton M = (Sm, Σ, Sm0 , δ, F
m). Recall that the language
accepted by M , which we denote by S(M), is the set of all words accepted by M .
For a Kripke structure K and a Bu¨chi automaton M , K is said to be correct with respect to M iff
KTrace(P(K)) ∩ S(M) = ∅. Since Bu¨chi automata are closed under complementation even if we are given
the specification as an automaton Mg specifying the good behaviors, we can complement Mg to get M which
specifies the bad behaviors.
We will reduce the problem of checking if the system satisfies the specification to the problem of checking
if the CTL∗ formula EGFp is satisfied. In order to do this, we first define the Kripke structure obtained by
taking the cross product of a Kripke structure and a Bu¨chi automaton.
Definition 7. The cross-product of a Bu¨chi automaton M = (Sm, Σ, Sm0 , δ, F
m) and a Kripke struc-
ture K = (Sk, Σ, Rk, Sk0 ,L) is the Kripke structure M × K = (S
m × Sk, {f, f˜}, R′, Sm0 × S
k
0 ,L
′). Here,
((sm1 , s
k
1), (s
m
2 , s
k
2)) ∈ R
′ if and only if (sk1 , s
k
2) ∈ R
k and sm2 ∈ δ(s
m
1 ,L(s
k
1)). A state (s
m, sk) in M ×K is
labelled by f if sm ∈ F m and by f˜ otherwise.
Lemma 3. There is a path pi = (sm0 , s
k
0)(s
m
1 , s
k
1)(s
m
2 , s
k
2) . . . in the product Kripke structure M ×K if and
only if sm0 s
m
1 s
m
2 . . . is a run in the Bu¨chi automaton M on KTrace(s
k
0s
k
1s
k
2 . . .) where s
k
0s
k
1s
k
2 . . . is a path in
K.
Proposition 4. For an automaton M , KTrace(P(K))∩S(M) = ∅ if and only if [[EGFf ]]M×K∩(S
m
0 ×S
k
0 ) =
∅ (In other words, no initial state of M ×K satisfies EGFf).
Proof. Suppose KTrace(P(K)) ∩ S(M) 6= ∅. Then there is a path pi ∈ P(K) such that KTrace(P(K))
is accepted by M . Let sm0 s
m
1 s
m
2 . . . be the accepting run in M . By Lemma 3, there is a path pi =
(sm0 , s
k
0)(s
m
1 , s
k
1)(s
m
2 , s
k
2) . . . in M ×K. But since an accepting run of a Bu¨chi automata visits an accepting
state infinitely often, then by the product construction, the path pi = (sm0 , s
k
0)(s
m
1 , s
k
1)(s
m
2 , s
k
2) . . . in M ×K
visits states labeled f infinitely often. Thus, M ×K satisfies EGFf .
If M×K satisfies EGFf then there is a path pi = (sm0 , s
k
0)(s
m
1 , s
k
1)(s
m
2 , s
k
2) . . . which infinitely often visits
states labeled f . By Lemma 3, there is a run sm0 s
m
1 s
m
2 . . . in M on KTrace(s
k
0s
k
1s
k
2 . . .). This is an accepting
run because the product construction labels a state (sm, sk) ∈M ×K as f only if sm is an accepting state.
But then M accepts KTrace(sk0s
k
1s
k
2 . . .). Hence, KTrace(P(K)) ∩ S(M) 6= ∅.
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7.2 Learning to Verify ω-regular Properties
In this section, we present a general framework to verify a system described as a Kripke structure K. We
assume that we are given a Bu¨chi automaton M that describes the set of behaviors that the system K must
not exhibit. As show by Proposition 4, we observed that the problem of checking if KTrace(P(K))∩S(M) = ∅
can be reduced to the problem of checking if an initial state of M ×K satisfies EGFf . We first characterize
[[EGFf ]] using fixpoints of a function that we define in Section 7.2.1. Next, we show that the fixpoint is
unique and has certain key properties that we need for our problem. Finally, we will show how a learning
algorithm can be used to learn the fixpoint, and therefore help verify if K satisfies M .
7.2.1 Fixpoint Characterization of EGFf
From now on, in this chapter, we assume that we are interested in checking if some initial state of a Kripke
structure K = (S, {f, f˜}, R, I,L) satisfies EGFf . Traditionally, the fixpoint characterization of EGFf is
given by νZ1.EX(µZ2.Z1 ∧ (f ∨EXZ2)) (see [49]). Notice that this formula involves nesting of the fixpoint
operators which we wish to avoid in our learning-based technique for technical reasons. Therefore, we
develop a novel characterization of EGFf that does not use nesting but adds some counters to be associated
with states. Note that the idea of associating counters with states has been used before in [85, 132] but
for different applications. We prove that the fixpoint obtained is always unique which makes it possible
to answer equivalence queries exactly. As far as we know, this is a new characterization and may be of
independent interest. We now proceed to describe this fixpoint.
Let X be a set of triples (s, i, j) such that s ∈ S and i, j ∈ N, where N denotes the set of natural numbers.
We define the function F : 2S×N×N → 2S×N×N such that F(X) = F1(X) ∪ F2(X) ∪ F3(X), where
F1(X) = {(s, 0, j) | L(s) = f and j ∈ N}
F2(X) = {(s, i, j) | L(s) = f˜ and ∃s′. s→ s′ ∃j′ < j. (s′, i, j′) ∈ X}
F3(X) = {(s, i, j) | L(s) = f and ∃s′. s→ s′ ∃j′ < j. (s′, i− 1, j′) ∈ X}
The intuition behind the definition of F is as follows. Consider a property ηi,jf such that a state s satisfies
ηi,jf if there is a path of length j such that we encounter (at least) i + 1 states that are labeled f . Formally,
s |= ηi,jf iff there is a finite path s0, s1, s2, . . . , sj from state s such that there are indices k1, k2, . . . ki+1 such
that L(sk`) = f for every 1 ≤ ` ≤ i + 1. Now the intuition behind F is that if X is a fixpoint of F and
(s, i, j) ∈ X then s |= ηi,jf .
Proposition 5. F is monotonic and ∪-continuous.
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Proof sketch. Monotonicity of F is immediate from the definition.
We first prove ∪-continuity of F . We have to show that Z0 ⊆ Z1 ⊆ Z2 ⊆ . . . implies:
∪kF(Zk) = F(∪kZk)
We prove this equality by showing containment of each set in the other one as follows:
• ∪kF(Zk) ⊆ F(∪kZk).
Clearly, for any k, Zk ⊆ ∪lZl. By monotonicity, F(Zk) ⊆ F(∪lZl). Taking union over all k, we get:
∪kF(Zk) ⊆ ∪kF(∪lZl)
i.e., ∪kF(Zk) ⊆ F(∪lZl)
i.e., ∪kF(Zk) ⊆ F(∪kZk)
• ∪kF(Zk) ⊇ F(∪kZk).
Consider some (s, i, j) ∈ F(∪kZk). From the definition of F , (s, i, j) is in at least one of F1(∪kZk),
F2(∪kZk) and F3(∪kZk). If (s, i, j) ∈ F1(∪kZk), from the definition of F1, (s, i, j) would be in F1(Zk)
for all k and hence it will be in ∪kF(Zk). If (s, i, j) ∈ F2(∪kZk) then there must be some (s′, i, l) such
that s → s′, L(s) ∈ f˜ , l < j and (s′, i, l) in ∪kZk or (s′, i, l) in some Zk. But then, (s, i, j) ∈ F2(Zk)
and hence (s, i, j) ∈ ∪kF(Zk). The last case of (s, i, j) ∈ F3(∪kZk) is handled in a similar manner.
We have demonstrated that (s, i, j) ∈ F(∪kZk) → (s, i, j) ∈ ∪kF(Zk) which shows that ∪kF(Zk) ⊇
F(∪kZk).
Since F is monotonic, it has fixpoints. In addition, we can show that F has a unique fixpoint. This is
the objective of the next few observations.
Lemma 4. Let X be a fixpoint of F . The following two facts hold about elements of X.
1. If L(s) = f˜ then ∀i ≥ 0.∀j. (s, i, j) ∈ X if and only if ∃s′. s→ s′ ∃j′ < j. (s′, i, j′) ∈ X
2. If L(s) = f then ∀i ≥ 1.∀j. (s, i, j) ∈ X if and only if ∃s′. s→ s′ ∃j′ < j. (s′, i− 1, j′) ∈ X
Proof. The results follow from the definition of the fixpoint under F . We illustrate this for one direction
of 1; the proof for other cases is similar. Suppose L(s) = f˜ and suppose (s, i, j) ∈ X . If ∃s′. s → s′ ∃j′ <
j. (s′, i, j′) ∈ X does not hold then (s, i, j) 6∈ F(X) which contradicts the fact that X is a fixpoint.
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Proposition 6. If X1 is a fixpoint of F and X2 is also a fixpoint of F then X1 ⊆ X2. Hence there is a
unique fixpoint of F .
Proof. Let (s, i, j) ∈ X1. We show that then (s, i, j) ∈ X2. The proof will proceed by induction on i and j.
Consider the base case when i = 0. We will prove the claim by induction on j. Clearly (s, 0, 0) ∈ X1 iff
L(s) = f iff (s, 0, 0) ∈ X2. Suppose the claim holds for (s, 0, j ′) for all j′ < j. Consider (s, 0, j) ∈ X1. If
L(s) = f then (s, 0, j) ∈ X2 for every j by the definition of F1. Now if L(s) = f˜ then by Lemma 4, it must
be the case that there is s′ and j′ such that s→ s′, j′ < j and (s′, 0, j′) ∈ X1. By the induction hypothesis,
we know that (s′, 0, j′) ∈ X2. Again, by Lemma 4, this means that (s, 0, j) ∈ X2.
Assume that for every i′ < i and for every j′, if (s, i′, j′) ∈ X1 then (s, i′, j′) ∈ X2. The induction step
for (s, i, j) is proved by induction on j. For the base case, when j = 0, we observe that (s, i, 0) is not a
member of any fixpoint of F (Lemma 4). The proof of the induction step is similar to the case of i = 0, and
is skipped in the interests of space.
By symmetry, X2 ⊆ X1, hence X1 = X2 giving the uniqueness of the fixpoint for F .
Henceforth, we use X to denote the unique fixpoint of F . We are now ready to state the proposition
that formally proves our intuition behind defining F .
Proposition 7. Suppose X is the fixpoint of F . Then, (s, i, j) ∈ X if and only if s |= ηi,jf
Proof. (⇒) We prove this by induction on i and j. For the base case consider i = 0. We now induct on j.
When j = 0, (s, 0, 0) ∈ X iff L(s) = f , which means that there is a path of length 0 starting from s where
we encounter one state labeled f . Now suppose j > 0. If L(s) = f then it trivially follows that there is a
path of length j > 0 starting from s where we encounter at least one state labeled f . Suppose L(s) = f˜ .
Then by Lemma 4, there is s′ and j′ < j such that s→ s′ and (s′, 0, j′) ∈ X . Then by induction hypothesis,
s′ |= η0,j
′
f which then implies that s |= η
0,j
f .
Consider i > 0. Once again we induct on j. Observe that since by Lemma 4, (s, i, 0) is not in any fixpoint
when i > 0, the claim holds vacuously. The induction step goes through in manner similar to the case of
i = 0 and the proof is therefore skipped.
(⇐) We prove the converse direction also by induction. Consider i = 0. If j = 0 and s |= η0,0f then it
must be the case that L(s) = f . This means that (s, 0, 0) ∈ X . Suppose j > 0 and s |= η0,jf . If L(s) = f
then once again (s, 0, j) ∈ X . If L(s) = f˜ then it must be the case that there is some s′ such that s → s′
and s′ |= η0,j−1f . Thus by induction hypothesis (s
′, 0, j − 1) ∈ X and therefore by Lemma 4, (s, 0, j) ∈ X .
Consider i > 0 and s |= ηi,jf . If L(s) = f then it is definitely the case that there is s
′ such that s → s′
and s′ |= ηi−1,j−1f . By induction hypothesis, (s
′, i − 1, j − 1) ∈ X , and that implies (by Lemma 4) that
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(s, i, j) ∈ X . On the other hand, if L(s) = f˜ then we can conclude that there is s′ such that s → s′ and
s′ |= ηi,j−1f . By induction hypothesis this means that (s
′, i, j − 1) ∈ X , and by this we can conclude that
(s, i, j) ∈ X because of Lemma 4.
We are now ready to characterize [[EGFf ]] in terms of the fixpoint X of F . This is the formal content
of Proposition 8. But before presenting that proposition, we need a technical definition.
Definition 8. σ(X) = {s | ∀i∃j.(s, i, j) ∈ X}
Proposition 8. Suppose X is the fixpoint of F . Then s ∈ σ(X) if and only if s |= EGFf
Proof. (⇐) Suppose s |= EGFf . Then there is a path pi = s0, s1, s2, . . . starting from s, such that for
infinitely many k, L(sk) = f . Define ji to be the least k such that L(sk) = f and there are i + 1 states
before sk on pi that are also labeled f . It is clear that s |= η
i,ji
f and therefore by Proposition 7, (s, i, ji) ∈ X .
Hence s ∈ σ(X).
(⇒) Suppose s ∈ σ(X). By definition, for every i, there is some j such that (s, i, j) ∈ X . Hence, by
Proposition 7, s |= ηi,jf . Construct a tree with root s, containing edges appearing in all shortest paths that
witness s satisfying ηi,jf . A few observations about this tree are in order. First, the tree is finite branching;
an immediate consequence of the Kripke structure being finite branching. Second, all leaves are labeled f
since the tree is constructed using the shortest witnesses. Third, if s′ is an internal node in the tree then
every path from s′ in the tree will reach a state labeled f . Finally, this tree has infinitely many vertices. By
Ko¨nig’s Lemma, there must be an infinite path in the tree. Let us call this infinite path pi. We claim that
this infinite path witnesses EGFf . Consider any state s′ on path pi. Since s′ is an internal node in the tree,
it must be the case that on every path from s′ in the tree we encounter a state labeled f . In particular on
the path pi, we encounter a state labeled f beyond s′. Thus pi has infinitely many states labeled f .
7.2.2 Learning Fixpoints
We are now ready to present our general framework for verifying ω-regular properties using learning. We
make the following assumptions about the system K being verified.
1. The system K can be simulated from any state.
2. There is a convenient symbolic representation for sets consisting of triples (s, i, j), where s is a state
and i, j are natural numbers. This means that the representation is closed under complementation
and decision procedures are available for membership in a set, containment of one set in another, and
emptiness of a set.
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3. Given the representation of a set Y of triples (s, i, j) and a state s it is possible to check if s ∈ σ(Y )
4. Given a representation of a set Y of triples (s, i, j) it is possible to compute the representation of F(Y )
5. There is an active learning algorithm for concepts encoded in the symbolic representation.
Based on these assumptions, we show how learning can be used to verify ω-regular properties. The
central idea is to use the learning algorithm to learn the fixpoint X of F . After we learn the fixpoint, based
on Propositions 4 and 8, we can reliably answer whether or not the system satisfies the specification. Thus
to verify ω-regular properties using learning, we need to implement the membership and equivalence oracles
that the learning algorithm needs.
Proposition 7 suggests a method to answer membership queries about whether (s, i, j) belongs to the
fixpoint X of F . To check if (s, i, j) belongs to X , we will simulate the system for j steps starting from state
s and check if on some path, we encounter i + 1 states labeled f . Further, given a representation for a set
Y , we can also answer whether Y is in fact equal to X . Since F has a unique fixpoint, all we need to do
is check if F(Y ) = Y . If F(Y ) 6= Y then the equivalence query must provide a counterexample. In other
words, we need to produce an element in the symmetric difference of Y and X . Similar to the case of safety
properties (described in Section 5.4), this can be done as follows for the different possible cases.
• F(Y ) \ Y 6= ∅. Let l = (s, i, j) be some element in this set. If l = (s, 0, 0) then l ∈ X , because the only
way we can have any (s, 0, 0) in F(Y ) is if L(s) = f . In this case, l is in X and hence in X ⊕ Y . If
l = (s, 0, j) and L(s) = f then once again l ∈ X and hence in X ⊕ Y . If l = (s, i, j) for some j 6= 0,
we can check if l ∈ X using the membership query. If the answer is yes, then l is also in X ⊕ Y and
we are done. Otherwise, l ∈ F(Y ) because of the existence of some triple (s′, i′, j′) ∈ Y which satisfies
the conditions F2 or F3. (s′, i′, j′) cannot be in X otherwise (s, i, j) would have to be in X . Hence
(s′, i′, j′) ∈ X ⊕ Y .
• F(Y ) ( Y . From standard fixpoint theory, since X happens to also be the least fixpoint under F ,
it must be the intersection of all prefixpoints of F (a set Z is a prefixpoint if it shrinks under the
function F , i.e. F(Z) ⊆ Z). Now, Y is clearly a prefixpoint. Applying F to both sides of the equation
F(Y ) ( Y and using monotonicity of F , we get F(F(Y )) ( F(Y ). Thus, F(Y ) is also a prefixpoint.
Let l be some string in the set Y \ F(Y ). Since l is outside the intersection of two prefixpoints, it is
not in the least fixpoint X . Hence, l is in X ⊕ Y .
Once we have learned the fixpoint X , we can verify if the initial states of the Kripke structure satisfy
EGFf using Proposition 8. By Proposition 4, this provides an answer to the verification problem. The
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Figure 7.1: Verification procedure for ω-regular properties
overall procedure is summarized in Figure 7.1. This procedure yields a complete verification method when
the fixpoint X of F can be symbolically represented in the chosen representation. This is the content of the
following theorem.
Theorem 5. If the fixpoint X of F can be represented using the chosen symbolic data structure and a learning
algorithm using membership and equivalence queries is available for this data structure, the verification
procedure is guaranteed to terminate and correctly infer whether the system satisfies the specification.
The theorem follows from observations made in this section.
7.3 Infinite State Systems using Regular Languages
In Section 7.2.2, we presented a general set of conditions under which we can use a learning based approach
to verify systems with respect to ω-regular properties. In this section, we demonstrate this can be achieved
within the context of using regular languages to represent sets of states. As mentioned before, we use a
variant of Angluin’s L∗ [12] algorithm.
We assume that the states of the system can be encoded as strings over some finite alphabet ρk. The
transition relation is given as a transducer T k which takes an input string corresponding to some state s
and outputs a string for the state related to s. The transition relation is assumed to be total. The set of
initial states is given by a regular set Ik and the set of states with a label a is given as regular sets Ska . Let
K be the Kripke structure defined by the above sets.
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7.3.1 Construction of the Product Kripke Structure
Let M be the Bu¨chi automaton specifying the bad behaviors that must not be exhibited by the system. Since
ω-regular languages are powerful enough to express fairness constraints, we assume that such constraints,
if any, are already embodied in the Bu¨chi automaton. We now show how to construct the product Kripke
structure M × K. We extend the alphabet ρk to ρM×K with new symbols bsm , one for each state sm in
M . A state (sm, sk) in M ×K is encoded as a string with the first letter as bsm and the remaining part
of the string as the original string encoding sk. Initial states in IM×K are given by concatenating a letter
bs0 for s0 ∈ S
m
0 and a string in I
k. The set of states Sf˜ (resp. Sf ) labelled with f˜ (resp. f) is given by a
DFA which looks at the first letter of the input string and accepts if this is bsm for some s
m 6∈ F m (resp.
sm ∈ F m). The transducer T M×K representing the transition relation for M ×K is a bit more tedious but
can be constructed using standard automata operations.
Henceforth, we restrict our attention to the Kripke structure M ×K. For ease of notation, we drop the
superscript M ×K in T , I , ρ and so on.
7.3.2 Symbolic Representation for the Fixpoint X
As discussed in Section 7.2.2, we now need to learn the fixpoint X of the function F . In general, X is a subset
of ρ∗×N×N. To encode X as a regular set we use the alphabet ρX given by (ρ∪{⊥})×{0, 1}×{0, 1}. This
is the alphabet that will be used by the learning algorithm. Here, ⊥ is a new “filler” symbol. An element
(s, i, j) is encoded as string over ρX such that projecting the symbols on the first component gives us s (the
⊥ symbols are ignored); and projecting on the second and third components gives i and j respectively in
binary notation. Alternatively, the numbers can also be represented in unary.
7.3.3 Membership and Equivalence queries
As discussed before, membership queries for X can be answered using Proposition 7. For answering equiv-
alence queries, we need a symbolic way to calculate F(X). Apart from the standard operations on regular
set we define the following.
Definition 9. Given Y a set of strings in the alphabet of ρX , define
Inci(Y ) = {(s, i, j) | (s, i− 1, j) ∈ Y }
Incj(Y ) = {(s, i, j) | (s, i, j − 1) ∈ Y }
Given a DFA for Y , the DFA for Inci(Y ) and Incj(Y ) can be constructed using a method similar to the
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one described in Section 6.5.1 for checking safety properties of systems in regular model checking framework.
The only difference is that we now have three components in the alphabet instead of two.
Checking hypothesis for upward closure in j. A property that we will find useful in answering
equivalence queries is that by definition of F , its fixpoint X is upward closed in the j component, i.e., if
(s, i, j) in X then for all j′ > j, (s, i, j′) is also in X . A set Y is upward closed in the j component if
and only if Incj(Y ) ⊆ Y . If Y is not upward closed then let (s, i, j) be the string in Incj(Y ) \ Y . Clearly,
(s, i, j) 6∈ Y . Now we use membership query to check if (s, i, j) ∈ X . If (s, i, j) is indeed in X then (s, i, j) is
in the symmetric difference X ⊕ Y . Otherwise (s, i, j − 1) is also not in X (since X has the upward closed
property). In this case (s, i, j − 1) ∈ X ⊕ Y .
Symbolic computation of F1. A finite automaton for F1(Y ) is obtained by taking the DFA for f and
taking its cross product with a DFA that accepts 0 for the i component and another DFA which accepts any
j.
Symbolic computation of F2. If we always first check for upward closure in j, we can assume that we
would need to compute F2 only for sets which are upward closed. Let T−1(Y ) be the inverse of T lifted to
the triples (s, i, j) so that it simply copies the second and the third components. It can be seen that if Y is
upward closed then F2(Y ) = Sf˜ ∩ Inc
j(T−1(Y )).
Symbolic computation of F3. For F3, T−1(Y ) gives the set of states which have a successor in Y . It is
easy to see that F3(Y ) = Sf ∩ Inc
i(Incj(T−1(Y ))).
Using the fixpoint check. From the previous paragraphs, we have a symbolic method to compute
F(Y ) = F1(Y ) ∪ F2(Y ) ∪ F3(Y ). Now, the equivalence oracle simply needs to check if Y = F(Y ). We also
need a method of extracting strings in the symmetric difference of Y and the fixpoint in case Y is not the
fixpoint. It can be seen that the approach outlined in Section 7.2.2 can be applied to regular sets.
7.3.4 Checking for s0 ∈ σ(X).
Proposition 9. σ(X) = Proj 1(Proj 1,2(X)). Here, Proj 1 is the projection to the first component and Proj 1,2
the projection to the first and second components.
Sketch. Recall that σ(X) = {s | ∀i∃j.(s, i, j) ∈ X}. Equivalently, σ(X) = {s | ¬(∃i¬(∃j.(s, i, j) ∈ X))}.
The claim follows from the fact that ∃ can be eliminated using projection and the ¬ operator corresponds
to taking the complement.
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Given a regular representation of X we can calculate σ(X) using standard regular set operations. Then
the system is correct if and only if I ∩ σ(X) = ∅.
The verification algorithm is summarized in Figure 7.2.
7.3.5 Complexity Analysis
Let m be the length of the longest string returned by the teacher in a negative answer to an equivalence query,
n be the number of states of the minimal automaton representing the fixpoint X , k be the size of the alphabet
of the learned language and t be the number of states of the automaton representing the transducer for the
transition relation. By Proposition 1, the language inference algorithm makes O(kn2 +n logm) membership
queries and O(n) equivalence queries. The worst case for the equivalence query for a hypothesis Y occurs
when we look for a string in the difference of Y and F(Y ). The size of DFA representing Y is bounded by
n. Looking at F , it can be seen that the DFA representing the difference of Y and F(Y ) would be O(nt).
Thus the length of the longest string returned by an equivalence query is m = O(nt).
The cost of answering membership queries dominates the total runtime cost of the algorithm. Using
m = O(nt), the number of membership queries is O(kn2 +n lognt). For efficiency, given a query for (s, i, j),
we build a DFA Dj for F
j+1(∅) where F j+1 denotes the composition of F j + 1 times with itself. Once Dj
has been built, all queries with the same value of j can be answered by checking if the queried element is
accepted by Dj . Thus the cost of the membership queries is equal to the number of membership queries
and the cost of building the DFAs. The cost for Dj is (O(t))
j which leads to the total cost of membership
queries of O(tO(nt) + kn2 + n log nt) (using maximum value of j to be m = O(nt)).
7.4 Comparison with Related Work
Verification of ω-regular properties for infinite state systems has also been addressed in [25] and [113]. In
a similar line of work, Abdulla et al. [1] present a “two-dimensional” modal logic called LTL(MSO) for
verification of liveness properties. The above approaches rely on loop detection for checking liveness and
assume that the transition relation is length preserving. Recently, Bouajjani et al. [26] have analyzed liveness
properties of non-length preserving systems using a notion of simulation between states.
Our learning based technique for verifying ω-regular specifications enjoys several advantages. First, we
do not need the transition relation to be restricted to be length-preserving as has been assumed in some
other approaches such as [67, 1]. In fact, our general framework can potentially be used to verify systems
symbolically represented using polyhedra or ellipsoids, not just regular languages, provided appropriate
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algorithm learner
begin
Regular inference algorithm
end
algorithm isMember
Input: (s, i, j)
Output: is (s, i, j) ∈ X?
begin
From s simulate system for j steps
Does any path in above encounter
at least i + 1 states labelled f?
If yes return true
else return false
end
algorithm Equivalence Check
Input: Hypothesis Y
Output: For fixpoint X, is Y = X?
If not, then some string in Y ⊕X
begin
If Incj(Y ) \ Y 6= ∅ {upward closure check}
let (s, i, j) ∈ Incj(Y ) \ Y
if isMember((s, i, j))
return (no, (s, i, j))
else
return (no, (s, i, j − 1))
else if F(Y ) \ Y 6= ∅ {fixpoint check}
let (s, i, j) ∈ F(Y ) \ Y
Find (s′, i′, j′) which causes (s, i, j) to be in F(Y )
if isMember((s, i, j))
return (no, (s, i, j))
else
return (no, (s′, i′, j′)
else if F(Y ) ( Y
return (no, l ∈ (Y \ F(Y )))
else {found fixpoint}
if I ∩ Proj 1(Proj 1,2(X)) 6= ∅
print “System incorrect”
else
print “System correct”
end
Figure 7.2: Verifying ω-regular properties for regular set based systems
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learning algorithms can be plugged in. Second, our algorithm for checking containment of the system’s
trace language in the specification automata’s language, is not based on discovering loops where final states
of the automata are visited infinitely often (as is the case in [67]). Thus, our algorithm will successfully
identify faulty systems, even when there is no ultimately periodic execution that witnesses the violation. This
is important because for general infinite state systems, it is often the case that there is no such ultimately
periodic execution witnessing the violation of a liveness property. Finally, since we use a variant of Angluin’s
L* algorithm, we are guaranteed to not only learn the smallest automaton representing the fixpoint, but are
also guaranteed to only make polynomially many calls to the membership and equivalence oracles.
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Chapter 8
Verification of CTL properties with
Fairness Constraints
Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [39] is a temporal logic in which one can express properties about the
branching, non-deterministic behavior of the system. Properties about information flow in the system,
which cannot be expressed in a specification language that reasons only about individual computations,
can be written in CTL. For these reasons, CTL is very often used to describe the correctness requirements
of a system. Note that the expressive powers of CTL and ω-regular are incomparable; there exists some
properties that can be expressed only in CTL and vice versa.
In this chapter, we present a learning based model checking algorithm for infinite state systems with
respect to CTL properties. The algorithm presented here is the first CTL model checker (based on learning
or otherwise) for infinite state systems with fairness constraints; the CTL model checker for infinite state
systems in [32] did not account for fairness constraints. Finally, there is precise characterization of the class
of systems for which this model checking algorithm is complete; for every subformula, if the set of states
satisfying it form a regular language, then the algorithm presented here is guaranteed to terminate with the
right answer.
In order to apply the learning based verification method to CTL, we need to overcome two fundamental
challenges. To better understand these problems, let us recall the case of verifying invariants. As outlined
before, the learning based method to verify invariants calls an algorithm that attempts to learn the set of
reachable states, and then checks whether the invariant is violated in any of the states in the learnt set. To
guarantee soundness, the model checker has to check if the set returned by the learning algorithm is indeed
the set of reachable states, without actually computing the set of reachable states again. This turns out to
be a difficult problem because while it is easy to check if a set is closed with respect to the transition relation
(and hence contains all reachable states), there is no easy way to check if it is the smallest such set. Instead,
the learning based method checks whether the learnt set contains all reachable states and does not violate
the invariant, or whether a specific unsafe state in the learnt set is reachable. These approximate tests turn
out to be feasible, and sufficient for the purposes of verifying the invariant. Thus, in the case of invariant
verification, the learning based model checker does not ever know whether it has actually computed the set
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of reachable states, but only knows whether it has discovered a proof of correctness or a proof of violation.
To extend the learning approach to verify CTL, the following approach suggests itself immediately.
Similar to the classical model checking algorithm for CTL [39], progressively compute the set of states
satisfying each of the subformulas, starting from simple atomic propositions; the only difference being that
we learn the sets instead of computing them iteratively. However, this approach runs into the problem that
unlike safety properties and ω-regular properties, CTL properties are nested fixpoints, where the set of states
satisfying inner subformulas is used in the computation of the set of states satisfying outer subformulas.
Hence, we will need a test that checks whether the learning algorithm has learnt the exact set of states
satisfying a particular subformula (and not some over or under-approximation). Once again, while it is easy
to check if a set is a fixpoint, it is unclear how to check if it is the least fixpoint or the greatest fixpoint. We
overcome this central problem by presenting a new characterization of CTL operators in terms of functions
with unique fixpoints. The output of a learning algorithm trying to discover these unique fixpoints can then
be easily checked, and this allows us to get a learning based model checking algorithm for CTL.
The next challenge is to adequately take into account the fairness constraints that might be associated
with the system being verified. In the case of finite state systems, this is handled using the observation that
it is sufficient to only consider fair computations that are ultimately periodic and looping, i.e., computations
that repeatedly execute a sequence of steps that loop to a state. However, this observation does not extend to
infinite state systems. In order to soundly verify an infinite state system with respect to fairness constraints,
we need to also consider fair computations that are truly infinite, and are not looping. We generalize ideas
that we developed for the verification of ω-regular properties in Chapter 7 to account for fairness.
We instantiate our technique to systems in which states are encoded as strings and use a regular inference
algorithm to learn the CTL fixpoints. We prove that if the fixpoints have a regular representation, our
procedure will always terminate with the correct answer.
8.1 Learning to Verify CTL Properties
Recall (from Section 2.3) that the classical model checking algorithm for CTL proceeds by inductively
determining the set of all states that satisfy each of the subformulas. For each subformula, the algorithm
to determine the set of states satisfying it is determined based on the outermost logic operator. Given a
suitable representation for sets of states, ¬f and f1 ∨ f2 correspond to performing the boolean operations
of complementation and union on the sets of states satisfying f, f1 and f2. In the case of EX , it involves
computing predecessors: EX(Z) = {s | ∃s→ s′ and s′ ∈ Z}.
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The most interesting cases are those of EU and EG, which are handled by computing fixpoints. To
illustrate the challenges in developing a model checking algorithm for infinite-state systems, let us consider
a formula E[true U f ] which is also sometimes written as EFf . The set of states satisfying EFf consists
of the states which can reach a state labeled by f . Thus, EFf can be found by starting with a set Z0
consisting of states satisfying f and in the ith iteration adding the states that can reach a state satisfying
f in i-steps. Clearly this method of computing the set of state satisfying EFf may not terminate for a
system with infinitely many states. As mentioned before, our idea is to learn this set instead of performing
this iterative computation. In order to do this, we have to answer membership and equivalence queries for
the set of states satisfying EFf . We do have a weak test for equivalence; if the set hypothesized for EFf
changes under backward reachability then it is certainly not the right set. However, even if it does not
change under backward reachability, it may be just an overapproximation of EFf (in the case of EGf this
can be an underapproximation). For membership queries the situation is even more difficult; it is unclear
how we can answer whether a state s satisfies EFf without solving the original verification problem. As
before, the solution is to learn a set with more information from which EFf can be computed and which
allows answering membership and equivalence queries. In the case of EFf , one simple way to achieve this
is to learn a set X of (s, i) pairs where (s, i) ∈ X means that the state s can reach some state labeled f in
i steps. Now, a membership check (s, i) ∈ X involves checking if in i steps a computation from s can reach
X , which is an easier problem. Moreover, it can be shown that there is a unique set that is a fixpoint for
the function Γ(Z) = {(s, j) | ∃s → s′ and (s′, j − 1) ∈ Z} ∪ {(s, 1) | s |= f}. This allows us to answer the
equivalence query for EFf exactly.
Using the ideas informally presented above, we can develop a learning based algorithm for CTL, in the
absence of fairness constraints. This is formally presented next. After this, we consider the case of model
checking in the presence of fairness constraints.
8.1.1 CTL Formulas without Fairness
First, let us consider the problem of model checking a Kripke structure that does not have any fairness
constraints. As we saw before, ¬, ∨, EX can be handled in a fairly straightforward manner. From [39],
we know that E[f1Uf2] is the least fixpoint of the function FE[f1Uf2] : 2
S 7→ 2S given by FE[f1Uf2](Z) =
[[f2]] ∪ ([[f1]] ∩ EX Z) or equivalently:
FE[f1Uf2](Z) = {s | s ∈ [[f1]] and ∃s
′.s→ s′ and s′ ∈ Z} ∪ [[f2]]
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Here, [[f ]] denotes the set of states satisfying the subformula f . Further, EGf is the greatest fixpoint of the
function FEGf (Z) : 2S 7→ 2S given by FEGf (Z) = [[f ]] ∩ EX Z or equivalently:
FEGf (Z) = {s | ∃s
′.s→ s′ and s′ ∈ Z} ∩ [[f ]]
As discussed before, we want to derive new functions which will allow us to use learning techniques.
Let N be the set of natural numbers, and ΓE[f1Uf2 ] : 2
S×N 7→ 2S×N and ΓEGf : 2S×N 7→ 2S×N be two
functions defined as follows.
Definition 10.
ΓE[f1Uf2](Z) = {(s, i + 1) | s ∈ [[f1]] and ∃s
′.s→ s′ s.t. (s′, i) ∈ Z} ∪ [[f2]]× {1}
Definition 11.
ΓEGf (Z) = {(s, i + 1) | s ∈ [[f ]] and ∃s′.s→ s′ s.t. (s′, i) ∈ Z} ∪ [[f ]]× {1}
Intuitively, ΓE[f1Uf2 ] (resp. ΓEGf ) keeps an additional counter i with each state, with the counter value
of 1 associated with all states in [[f2]] (resp. [[f ]]). Both functions do a similar backward transition step as
FE[f1Uf2] and FEGf except that at each step the value of the counter is incremented by one.
Proposition 10. ΓE[f1Uf2] and ΓEGf are monotonic and ∪-continuous.
Proof sketch. The proof proceeds along similar lines as the proof of Proposition 5.
Monotonicity of ΓE[f1Uf2] and ΓEGf is immediate from the definition.
We first prove ∪-continuity of ΓE[f1Uf2]. We have to show that Z0 ⊆ Z1 ⊆ Z2 ⊆ . . . implies:
∪iΓE[f1Uf2 ](Zi) = ΓE[f1Uf2](∪iZi)
We prove this equality by showing containment of each set in the other one as follows:
• ∪iΓE[f1Uf2](Zi) ⊆ ΓE[f1Uf2](∪iZi).
Clearly, for any j, Zj ⊆ ∪iZi. By monotonicity, ΓE[f1Uf2 ](Zj) ⊆ ΓE[f1Uf2 ](∪iZi). Taking union over
all j, we get:
∪jΓE[f1Uf2](Zj) ⊆ ∪jΓE[f1Uf2](∪iZi)
i.e., ∪jΓE[f1Uf2](Zj) ⊆ ΓE[f1Uf2 ](∪iZi)
i.e., ∪iΓE[f1Uf2](Zi) ⊆ ΓE[f1Uf2 ](∪iZi)
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• ∪iΓE[f1Uf2](Zi) ⊇ ΓE[f1Uf2](∪iZi).
Consider some (s, k) ∈ ΓE[f1Uf2](∪iZi) with k ≥ 1. From the definition of ΓE[f1Uf2], (s, k) is either
in [[f2]] × {1} or there exists some s′ such that s → s′ and (s′, k − 1) ∈ ∪iZi. In the former case,
(s, k) would be in ΓE[f1Uf2](Zi) for all i and hence it will be in ∪iΓE[f1Uf2 ](Zi). In the latter case,
(s′, k− 1) must be in some Zj . But then, (s, k) must be in ΓE[f1Uf2](Zj) and hence in ∪iΓE[f1Uf2](Zi).
We have demonstrated that (s, k) ∈ ΓE[f1Uf2 ](∪iZi) → (s, k) ∈ ∪iΓE[f1Uf2 ](Zi) which shows that
∪iΓE[f1Uf2](Zi) ⊇ ΓE[f1Uf2](∪iZi).
The proof of ∪-continuity of ΓEGf proceeds along exactly the same lines.
Instead of trying to learn the least (greatest) fixpoint of FE[f1Uf2](FEGf ), we can learn ΓE[f1Uf2] (ΓEGf )
and then retrieve the desired fixpoint of FE[f1Uf2](FEGf ). The first challenge is to answer equivalence
queries. For this, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 11. ΓE[f1Uf2] and ΓEGf have unique fixpoints.
Proof sketch. Since ΓE[f1Uf2] is a monotonic operator on sets of states, it has fixpoints. Let Z and Z
′ be
two fixpoints for ΓE[f1Uf2]. Let Z≤i be the set {(s, j) | (s, j) ∈ Z and j ≤ i}. We will prove by induction on
i that for all i, Z≤i and Z
′
≤i are equal. The base case for i = 1 is trivial since for all fixpoints of ΓE[f1Uf2 ],
the set of states with counter value of i as 1 has to be [[f2]]. Assume that the inductive hypothesis holds
up to some j > 1. We need to show that (s, j + 1) ∈ Z≤j+1 ⇔ (s, j + 1) ∈ Z ′≤j+1. If (s, j + 1) ∈ Z then
(s, j + 1) ∈ ΓE[f1Uf2 ](Z). This implies s ∈ [[f1]] and there is some (s
′, j) ∈ Z or (s′, j) ∈ Z≤j such that
s → s′. By the inductive hypothesis, (s′, j) ∈ Z ′≤j or (s
′, j) ∈ Z ′. But then, (s, j + 1) ∈ ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′) or
(s, j + 1) ∈ Z ′ or (s, j + 1) ∈ Z ′≤j+1. Similarly, if (s, j + 1) ∈ Z
′
≤j+1 then (s, j + 1) ∈ Z≤j+1. This establishes
Z≤j+1 = Z
′
≤j+1. Since Z
′ = ∪j≥1Z ′≤j and Z≤j = Z
′
≤j for all j, we can conclude that Z = Z
′.
The proof for ΓEGf goes through in the same manner.
The above proposition helps us answer equivalence queries as follows. The query asks whether a proposed
hypothetical set Z ′ is the same as the fixpoint Z of Γ (Γ could be ΓE[f1Uf2] or ΓEGf ). Since the fixpoint of
Γ is unique, this can be correctly answered by checking if Z ′ itself is a fixpoint, i.e. comparing Z ′ with the
image Γ(Z ′). It is important to note that in general the fixpoints encountered in CTL verification are not
unique; it is due to our construction of Γ that the fixpoint is unique.
The next challenge is to answer a membership query asking if (s, i) is in the fixpoint of ΓE[f1Uf2] or
ΓEGf . The following proposition shows that in order to check if some pair (s, i) is in the fixpoint of ΓE[f1Uf2]
(ΓEGf ) we only need to check the i-fold composition Γ
i
E[f1Uf2 ]
(∅) (ΓiEGf (∅)).
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Proposition 12.
1. Let Z be the fixpoint of ΓE[f1Uf2]. Then, for all i > 0, (s, i) ∈ Γ
i
E[f1Uf2]
(∅) if and only if (s, i) ∈ Z
2. Let Z be the fixpoint of ΓEGf . Then, for all i > 0, (s, i) ∈ ΓiEGf (∅) if and only if (s, i) ∈ Z
Proof sketch.
1. To show that (s, i) ∈ Γi
E[f1Uf2]
(∅) implies (s, i) ∈ Z we observe that ΓE[f1Uf2] is ∪-continuous. This
gives us Z = ∪iΓiE[f1Uf2](∅).
We prove by induction on i that (s, i) ∈ Z implies (s, i) ∈ Γi
E[f1Uf2]
(∅). Base case for i = 1 is trivial.
Assume the inductive hypothesis up to j. If (s, j + 1) ∈ Z then since Z is a fixpoint, (s, j + 1) ∈
ΓE[f1Uf2](Z). But then s ∈ [[f1]] and there must be some (s
′, j) ∈ Z such that s→ s′. By the inductive
hypothesis, (s′, j) ∈ Γj
E[f1Uf2]
(∅) which easily leads us to (s, j + 1) ∈ Γj+1
E[f1Uf2]
(∅).
2. The proof follows the same steps as the case for ΓE[f1Uf2 ].
For the equivalence query, if Z is the unique fixpoint that we are seeking and Z ′ is the hypothesis proposed
by the learner, in case Z ′ 6= Z, the learner typically also needs an element in the symmetric difference Z ′⊕Z
to make progress. We can obtain such an element using the method in Chapter 5 which is summarized for
ΓE[f1Uf2 ](Z
′) (ΓEGf (Z
′) can be done in a similar manner) as follows for the different cases possible.
• ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′) \ Z ′ 6= ∅. Let l = (s, i) ∈ ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′) \ Z ′. If l = (s, 1) then l ∈ Z, because the only
way we can have any (s, 1) in ΓE[f1Uf2 ](Z
′) is if (s, 1) ∈ ΓE[f1Uf2](∅). In this case, l is in Z and hence
in Z ′ ⊕ Z. If l = (s, i) for some i > 1, we can check if l ∈ Z using the membership query. If yes, then
l is also in Z ′ ⊕ Z and we are done. Otherwise, l ∈ ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′) because of the existence of some
pair (s′, i− 1) ∈ Z ′. Clearly (s′, i− 1) cannot be in Z otherwise (s, i) would have to be in Z. Hence
(s′, i− 1) ∈ Z ′ ⊕ Z.
• ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′) ( Z ′. From standard fixpoint theory, since Z happens to also be the least fixpoint
of ΓE[f1Uf2], it must be the intersection of all prefixpoints of ΓE[f1Uf2] (a set Y is a prefixpoint if it
shrinks under the function F , i.e. F(Y ) ⊆ Y ). Now, Z ′ is clearly a prefixpoint. Applying ΓE[f1Uf2] to
both sides of the equation ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′) ( Z ′ and using monotonicity of ΓE[f1Uf2], we get
ΓE[f1Uf2](ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′)) ( ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′)
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Thus, ΓE[f1Uf2 ](Z
′) is also a prefixpoint. Let l be some string in the set Z ′ \ ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′). Since l is
outside the intersection of two prefixpoints, it is not in the least fixpoint Z. Hence, l is in Z ′ ⊕ Z.
Finally, once the learning procedure is done, we need to retrieve the set of states satisfying E[f1 U f2]
(resp. EGf) from fixpoint of ΓE[f1Uf2 ] (resp. ΓEGf ). The following proposition addresses this.
Proposition 13.
1. Suppose Z be the fixpoint of ΓE[f1Uf2]. Then, [[E[f1 U f2]]] = {s | ∃i s.t. (s, i) ∈ Z}
2. Suppose Z is the fixpoint of ΓEGf . Then, [[EGf ]] = {s | ∀i > 0 (s, i) ∈ Z}.
Proof sketch.
1. First, we show that if (s, i) ∈ Z then s ∈ [[E[f1 U f2]]]. We use induction on i. Base case for i = 1 is
trivial. Next, if (s, j + 1) ∈ Z then (s, j + 1) ∈ ΓE[f1Uf2](Z). But then s ∈ [[f1]] and there must exist
some (s′, j) ∈ Z such that s→ s′. The inductive hypothesis for j gives s′ ∈ [[E[f1 U f2]]]. This means
that there is a path from s′ to a state satisfying f2 such that all states in the path satisfy f1. Since,
s→ s′ and s satisfies f2, this path can be extended to start from s. Hence, s ∈ [[E[f1 U f2]]]. For the
other direction, we show that if s ∈ [[E[f1 U f2]]] then for some i ∈ N, (s, i) ∈ Z. If a state s satisfies
E[f1 U f2] then there exists a path from s to a state in f2 such that all the states in this path satisfy
f1. If the length of the path is i, it can be seen that (s, i) will get included in Γ
i
E[f1Uf2]
(∅). Hence,
(s, i) ∈ Z.
2. First, we show that if for all i > 0, (s, i) ∈ Z then s ∈ [[EGf ]]. Construct a tree with root s, containing
edges appearing in all shortest paths such that all states in this path satisfy f . A few observations
about this tree are in order. First, the tree is finite branching; an immediate consequence of the Kripke
structure being finite branching. Second, all nodes of the tree satisfy f . Finally, this tree has infinitely
many vertices because (s, i) ∈ Z for all i > 0. By Ko¨nig’s Lemma, there must be an infinite path in
the tree. Clearly, this infinite path witnesses EGf .
For the other direction, we need to show that if s ∈ Z then for all i > 0, (s, i) ∈ Z. If a state s satisfies
EGf then there exists an infinite path from s such that all the states in this path satisfy f . If si is
the ith state on this path (counting s as s1), it can be seen that (s, i) will get included in Γ
i
EGf (∅).
Hence, for all i > 0, (s, i) ∈ Z.
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Example 2. We illustrate the verification procedure using the system described in Figure 2.1. Suppose we
want to verify the CTL property AG(i1 + i2 ≤ o) which says that in all states reachable from the initial
states, the number of items consumed is always less than the number of items generated. This can be
written as ¬EF (¬(i1 + i2 ≤ o)) or ¬E[true U (i1 + i2 > o)]. Since there is only a single control state
q0, we can represent the global state of the system by a four-tuple giving the values of the data variables,
x = (b, o, i1, i2). Then, we have to calculate the least fixpoint of the function
F(Z) = {(b, o, i1, i2) | i1 + i2 > o} ∪ {x | x→ x′ and x′ ∈ Z}
This is transformed into another function
Γ(Z) = {(b, o, i1, i2, 1) | i1 + i2 > o} ∪ {(x, j + 1) | x→ x′ and (x′, j) ∈ Z}
Once the fixpoint for Γ is learnt, we can project away the fifth component of the states of the fixpoint
to get the states satisfying EF (i1 + i2 > o). We complement this set and then check if all the initial states
are included in the complement. If the answer is yes, then the system verifies the property otherwise it does
not.
8.1.2 CTL with Fairness Constraints
We are now ready to consider the problem of model checking a Kripke structure that has fairness constraints
Φ. Evaluating CTL formulas with fairness constraints is known to be harder than the case where there are
no fairness constraints. As shown in [39], the problem can be reduced to the following. Let fair denote the
set of all states s such that there is a fair computation starting from s. It can be shown that EX(f) under
fairness conditions is equivalent to EX(f ∧ fair ) without fairness conditions. Similarly, E[f U g] under
fairness conditions is equivalent to E[f U g∧ fair ] without fairness conditions. The set fair can be shown to
be the states satisfying EGtrue under the fairness constraint. Therefore, if we can evaluate a formula EGf
under fairness constraints, we can compute all other CTL formulas using the method in Section 8.1.1.
Let us now look at the learning problem for EGf under a fairness constraint Φ. As described in Sec-
tion 2.3, EGf means that there exists a path beginning with the current state on which f holds globally and
states in Φ are encountered infinitely often on this path. The set of such states Z is the largest set with the
following properties: a) all of the states in Z satisfy f , b) for all states s ∈ Z, there is a sequence of states
of length one or greater to a state in Z which is also in Φ such that all states on the path satisfy f . This set
can be written as the greatest fixpoint of a function F(Z) = f ∧EX E[f U (Z ∧Φ)] but we cannot directly
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use the procedure outlined in the Section 8.1.1 because each application of the function requires evaluating
an EU formula which itself needs a fixpoint computation. However, we can adapt a fixpoint characterization
we developed in Chapter 7 to EGf .
Definition 12. Let ΓfairEGf : 2
S×N×N be a function defined by ΓfairEGf (Z) = (Γ1(Z)∪Γ2(Z)∪Γ3(Z))∩([[f ]]×N×N)
as follows.
Γ1(Z) = {(s, 0, j) | s ∈ Φ and j ∈ N}
Γ2(Z) = {(s, i, j) | s 6∈ Φ and ∃s′. s→ s′ and ∃j′ < j. (s′, i, j′) ∈ Z}
Γ3(Z) = {(s, i, j) | s ∈ Φ and ∃s′. s→ s′ and ∃j′ < j. (s′, i− 1, j′) ∈ Z}
Intuitively, we associate two counters with each state. Let ZEGf be the fixpoint of Γ
fair
EGf . A triple (s, i, j) in
ZEG means that there exists a path of length j starting from s which encounters at least i+1 states labeled
with Φ and all states in this path satisfy f . Since this can be checked in finite time, we have a method of
answering membership queries.
Proposition 14. ΓfairEGf has a unique fixpoint (ZEGf ). Further, the set of states satisfying EGf is given by
{s | ∀i.∃j.(s, i, j) ∈ ZEGf}
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as in Proposition 6.
The uniqueness of the fixpoint allows equivalence queries to be answered as before. The proposition also
gives us a way to compute EGf from ZEG.
To recapitulate, we have developed fixpoint characterizations for all CTL operators with or without
fairness such that each such fixpoint can be computed using a learning procedure. This allows us to model
check any CTL formula by starting from the innermost sub-expressions and finally checking to see if all
initial states are in the states for the outermost expression.
The overall verification procedure is depicted in Figure 8.1.
8.2 Representing States with Regular Sets
In the previous section, we presented a general set of conditions under which we can use a learning based
approach to verify CTL properties of systems. In this section, we give details of how this can be achieved
within the context of using regular languages to represent sets of states.
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Figure 8.1: Verification procedure for CTL
We assume that the states of the system can be encoded as strings over some finite alphabet ρ. We further
assume that the enabled and action pairs of the events the program can be used to create a transducer
representing the transition relation of the Kripke structure. Recall that the transducer is a finite state
machine which accepts a pair of strings (s1, s2) if the state corresponding to s1 can transition to the state
corresponding to s2. We assume that the set of initial states; the set of states with labeled with a atomic
proposition; and the fairness constraint Φ are all given as regular sets.
8.2.1 Representation of States with Counter
In general, a set Z of pairs (s, i) is a subset of ρ∗ × N. To encode Z as a regular set we use the alphabet Σ
given by (ρ ∪ {⊥})× {0, 1}. This is the alphabet that will be used by the learning algorithm. Here ⊥ is a
new “filler” symbol. An element (s, i) is encoded as string over Σ such that projecting the symbols on the
first component gives us s (the ⊥ symbols are ignored); and projecting on the second component gives i in
binary notation. A similar encoding can be used to represent sets of triples (s, i, j).
8.2.2 Symbolic Computation of Operators
The various operations required for verification can be done efficiently using regular sets. Standard proce-
dures are available for complementation and union of regular sets represented by finite automata. Let Tinv
represent a transducer whose relation is the inverse of the Kripke relation. Given a DFA MZ representing a
set of states Z, the set of states EX(Z) can be found using the construction in Section 6.1.1 as Tinv (MZ).
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Next, we discuss how to compute the image of a regular set of states under the function ΓE[f1Uf2] (the case
for ΓEGf and Γ
fair
EGf can be handled similarly).
Definition 13. Given Z a set of strings in the alphabet of Σ, define
Inc(Z) = {(s, i) | (s, i− 1) ∈ Z}
Dec(Z) = {(s, i) | (s, i + 1) ∈ Z}
A transducer for computing Inc(Z) can be constructed using a method similar to the one described in
Section 6.5.1 for checking safety properties of systems in regular model checking framework. The transducer
construction for Dec(Z) is similar.
Given a DFA MZ representing a set of states Z, ΓE[f1Uf2](Z) is found by computing TInc(Tinv (MZ)),
intersecting the resulting regular set with the regular set [[f1]]×N and finally applying union with the regular
set [[f2]]× {1}.
Let Proj 1 denote the projection to the first component, Proj 2 to the second component and Proj 1,2 to
the first and second component (when there are more than two components). These projections can be done
on regular sets using homomorphisms. For example, Proj 1 can be done by a homomorphism h : Σ 7→ ρ
∗
which takes each letter in Σ and maps it to a letter in ρ which corresponds to the state component.
Finally, given a regular set Z we need a way to calculate the following.
• {s | ∃i s.t. (s, i) ∈ Z} (needed for EU subformulas): This can be calculated as Proj 1(Z).
• {s | ∀i > 0 (s, i) ∈ Z} (needed for EG subformulas without fairness): This is the complement of the
set {s | ∃i.(s, i) 6∈ Dec(Z)}. Thus, the desired set is Proj 1(Dec(Z)).
• {s | ∀i.∃j.(s, i, j) ∈ Z} (needed for EG subformulas with fairness): This can be written as
{s | ¬(∃i¬(∃j.(s, i, j) ∈ Z))}
or equivalently, Proj 1(Proj 1,2(Z)).
Figure 8.2 outlines the procedure that can be used to compute an EU CTL subformula. The procedure
for EG subformulas is similar.
8.2.3 Soundness and Completeness
The learning based verification procedure is always sound since it computes all CTL subformulas exactly.
Further, we have the following completeness result.
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Theorem 6. Given a CTL property to verify, assume that the following conditions hold:
1. Given a Kripke structure K, for every subformula of the form E[f1Uf2] or EGf , the fixpoints of
ΓE[f1Uf2] and ΓEGf have a regular representation
2. Given a fair Kripke structure K, for every subformula of the form E[f1Uf2] or EGf , the fixpoints of
ΓE[f1Uf2] and Γ
fair
EGf have a regular representation
Then the learning-based verification procedure will always terminate and correctly infer whether the system
satisfies the given CTL property.
Remark 1. Note that the set of states for the subformulas for other CTL operators ¬, ∨ and EX always
have regular representation since they can be obtained using standard automata operations.
8.3 Complexity Analysis
The main cost of the verification procedure is learning the fixpoints. Let f be the number of CTL subformulas
requiring fixpoint computations. We now analyze the cost of the learning procedure. This analysis is similar
to the one done in Section 7.3.5 for ω-regular specifications.
Let m be the length of the longest string returned by the teacher in a negative answer to an equivalence
query, n be the number of states of the minimal automaton representing a fixpoint, k be the size of the
alphabet of the learned language and t be the number of states of the automaton representing the transducer
for the function Γ whose fixpoint is being learned. By Proposition 1, the language inference algorithm makes
O(kn2 + n log m) membership queries and O(n) equivalence queries. The worst case for the equivalence
query for a hypothesis Y occurs when we look for a string in the difference of Y and Γ(Y ). The size of DFA
representing Y is bounded by n. Looking at Γ(Y ), it can be seen that the DFA representing the difference
of Y and Γ(Y ) would be O(nt). Thus the length of the longest string returned by an equivalence query is
m = O(nt).
The cost of answering membership queries dominates the total runtime cost of the procedure. Using
m = O(nt), the number of membership queries is O(kn2 + n lognt). The cost of the membership queries is
equal to the number of membership queries and the cost of building the DFA Dj representing Γ
j(∅). The
cost for Dj is (O(t))
j which leads to the total cost of membership queries of O(tO(nt) +kn2 +n log nt) (using
maximum value of j to be m = O(nt)).
Hence, the overall running time is O((tO(nt) + kn2 + n log nt)f).
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algorithm learner
begin
Regular inference algorithm
end
algorithm isMember
Input: (s, i)
Output: is (s, i) in fixpoint?
begin
Compute Zi = Γ
i
E[f1Uf2]
(∅) if not done already
Is (s, i) ∈ Zi?
If yes return true
else return false
end
algorithm Equivalence Check
Input: Hypothesis Z ′
Output: For fixpoint Z, is Z ′ = Z?
If not, then some string in Z ′ ⊕ Z
begin
If ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′) \ Z′ 6= ∅ {fixpoint check}
let (s, i) ∈ ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′) \ Z′
Find (s′, i′) which causes (s, i) to be in ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′)
if isMember((s, i))
return (no, (s, i))
else
return (no, (s′, i′)
else if ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′) ( Z′
return (no, l ∈ (Z ′ \ ΓE[f1Uf2](Z
′)))
else {found fixpoint}
CTL subformula = Proj 1(Z
′)
end
Figure 8.2: Learning to verify E[p1 U p2] with regular sets
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8.4 Comparison with Related Work
Most previous approaches for verification of infinite state systems have either focused on safety properties
or on linear time logic properties. To our knowledge, the only other major work that has addressed CTL
properties (using techniques different from learning) is that of Bultan et al. [32] where a combination of
widening and finite iteration are used for conservative approximations. The notable differences between
their work and our work are as follows. First, we also are able to handle fairness constraints which are
needed for liveness properties. Second, we never return a “do not know” answer which a conservative
analysis can return. Finally, as pointed out before, the main advantage of the learning-based verification
procedure is that as long as the fixpoints corresponding to the subformulas of the CTL formula are regular,
the verification procedure is guaranteed to terminate.
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Chapter 9
Implementation and Results
The learning based verification techniques presented in the previous chapters have been implemented in a
tool suite called Lever which is available for download from [91]. In this chapter, we discuss the details of
the implementation of the tool suite and present some examples that we have analyzed. We also compare
the performance of Lever with other tools that are available. The results indicate that no tool is a
clear winner for all of the examples and every tool outperforms the rest on some of the examples. We
conclude the chapter with a case study of verification of a module called read-copy-update which is used as
a synchronization method in the Linux kernel.
9.1 Overview of Lever
The Lever suite currently provides the following main tools:
1. Tool for verifying safety properties of FIFO automata through either passive or active learning.
2. Tool for verifying ω-regular and CTL properties of integer systems. These systems include programs
with positive integer variables and parameterized systems in which we only need to keep track of the
number of processes in any state.
The primary motivation for using two different tools rather than a single one is to allow domain specific
optimizations for FIFO automata and integer and parameterized systems and to enable using an automata
library that is better suited for encoding the states in each system. The tool for FIFO automata uses the
BRICS automata package [102] in which the states and transitions are kept explicitly. On the other hand, for
integer and parameterized systems, we use MONA [83] since it provides a very efficient library for automata
based on representing the transition relation as Binary Decision Diagrams. The preferred programming
language of choice was Java and this is the one that was used for FIFO automata. However, for integer and
parameterized systems, we used C++, since MONA is implemented in C which can be easily interfaced with
C++ but has limited interfacing capabilities with Java (using the Java Native Interface). Figure 9.1 shows
the high level architecture for the both tools.
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Figure 9.1: High level architecture of tools in Lever
The parser front end takes the input program consisting of variable declarations, transition guards and
actions, initial states, the states labeled with the atomic propositions and the property to be verified. The
verification engine sets up either the membership and equivalence oracles for active learning or a generator
of positive and negative samples for passive learning. The regular inference algorithm uses the oracles or the
samples to learn the regular set which is provided back to the verification engine. The verification engine
analyzes the learnt set and uses this to either learn another fixpoint in case of nested CTL formulas or verify
whether the desired property holds.
9.1.1 Representation of States
For FIFO systems, instead of learning the reachable states directly, we learn a set of annotated traces as
described in Chapters 4 and 5. Recall that the set of annotated traces is a language over the alphabet
consisting of labels of the transitions in the FIFO automata and some additional symbols which allow the
reachable states to be computed for any regular set of annotated traces.
For integer and parameterized systems, a vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) in N
n is encoded as a string s over
an alphabet Σ = {0, 1}n. For a letter a in Σ, let a|i stand for the i-th component in a. Let the string
s be a1a2 . . . am. Then the i-th component xi of the vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is represented in binary by
a
|i
1 a
|i
2 . . . a
|i
m. In other words, xi = Σj=1...ma
|i
j 2
j−1. This representation is essentially the same as Boigelot’s
Number Decision Diagrams (NDD) [21] (in NDD, for base 2, the alphabet is {0, 1} and for a string b1b2 . . . bnm
denoting a vector x ∈ Nn, the component xi is given in binary by bibi+m . . . bi+n(m−1)). It is known that
any Presburger set can be encoded as an automata in this representation. The additional counters used in
the verification of ω-regular or CTL properties are encoded by adding integer variables which are initialized
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to zero and incremented according to the procedures mentioned in Chapters 7 and 8. For efficiency,
we first calculate the set of reachable states and restrict all intermediate states calculated during fixpoint
computations to be reachable.
As mentioned before, for integer and parameterized systems, we use the automata library from MONA [83].
MONA keeps the states of the automata explicitly but the transition relation is encoded as a multi-terminal
shared BDD [29]. This allows a compact representation of the automata even when the alphabet is of large
size. The transducer representing the transition relation is also encoded as an automaton in MONA with a
set of new variables added to represent the values taken by system variables after application of a transition.
9.2 Regular Inference Algorithm
Recall from Chapter 4 that the passive learning algorithm uses a variant of RPNI (Regular Positive and
Negative Inference). One important optimization in the algorithm is to record the changes done during a
merge of states in an automaton and roll back these changes if the merge is not accepted. This obviates
the need to make a copy of the entire automaton to be used if the merge on the original automaton is not
accepted. Since most merges are rejected, this improves the performance significantly.
For active learning, we use a modified version of the regular inference algorithm described in [82]. As
mentioned in Section 2.5.3, one major change in the original algorithm is to use the idea of analyzing
counterexamples in a binary-search manner as described in Rivest et al. [114].
9.2.1 Scalability Issues
In the active learning algorithm, the run-time cost is linear in the alphabet size of the language being learned.
However, a problem is that the alphabet size itself grows exponentially in the number of variables in the
system. We now discuss some of the techniques we use to manage this cost.
In Section 2.5.3 we described the details of the learning algorithm used for regular sets. We recall that
when the learner introduces a new state in its hypothesis, it has to make membership queries to find the
transition function from the new state. Let the access string for the new state being formed be s. For
each symbol b, to find the destination for b-transition out of s, we have to sift sb down the classification
tree. This requires membership queries for strings in s.b.E. We first compute a DFA Dk representing
Γ(∅) ∪ Γ2(∅) ∪ . . . ∪ Γk(∅) (where Γ is the function whose fixpoint is being computed) up to a sufficient
depth k such that all the membership queries for s.Σ.E can be answered by looking up acceptance in Dk.
A naive implementation would now need O(|Σ|) membership queries; since |Σ| is exponential in the number
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of variables, this is an extremely high cost. To mitigate this, we can use a symbolic learning algorithm that
symbolically sifts s.Σ for the entire alphabet at one go, rather than individually sifting sb for each b ∈ Σ.
We present its details next.
Let the automaton Dk have states QA and transition function δA, and let qs ∈ QA be the state of Dk
reached on reading s. Consider b1 and b2 such that δA(qs, b1) = δA(qs, b2). From this, we know that for every
d ∈ E, δA(qs, b1.d) = δA(qs, b2.d). Since Dk was chosen to be such that all membership queries for strings
in s.Σ.E can be faithfully answered by Dk, it follows that for every d ∈ E, s.b1.d belongs to the concept iff
s.b2.d belongs to the concept. Thus, the strings s.b1 and s.b2 will sift in the same way in the classification.
One important consequence of this observation is that one need not sift all strings in s.Σ; we only need to
sift strings that go to different states in Dk, which can be significantly less than that number of symbols in
Σ. Furthermore, if the transition relation of all our DFAs are represented using ordered BDDs, then all this
computation can be done implicitly and efficiently.
9.3 Input Syntax
For FIFO automata, the input program declares the number of channels and the alphabet used for the
messages (the alphabet is restricted to be a value from 0 to some fixed number). This is followed by an
enumeration of the control states. Next, a list of transitions is given; each transition specifies the start control
state and the destination control state along with the action to be taken on the transition. Figure 9.2 shows
an abstraction of the Alternating Bit Protocol expressed in this syntax.
The input syntax for integer and parameterized programs is similar to that used by FAST [54]. The
easiest way to understand the syntax is via an example listed in Figure 9.3. This example demonstrates a
simplified version of the producer consumer problem. It has three variable size, spaceLeft, produced
which correspond to the size of a buffer, the space left in the buffer and items produced so far respectively.
The domain of each variable is the set of natural numbers. There is only one control state in the system
called normal. The transition prod has a guard which checks to see if space is available in the buffer and
if so, adds an item while decrementing spaceLeft. On the other hand, the transition cons, checks to see
if there are items in the buffer and if so, decrements produced while incrementing spaceLeft. The region
init specifies the initial states of the system. In this case, we are interested in checking a safety property so
we also specify a set of bad states. Constraints on states, guards and actions are all expressed in Presburger
arithmetic.
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// Alternating Bit Protocol
numChannels = 2; // number of channels in the FIFO automaton
maxLetter = 1; // value of the maximum letter in the FIFO alphabet
// Control States
{
// sij denotes sender’s ith state and receiver’s jth
// The first state is the initial state
s00; s10; s01; s11;
}
// Transitions
{
// Sender’s transitions
s00 -> (0!0) s00;
s00 -> (1?1) s00;
s00 -> (1?0) s10;
s10 -> (0!1) s10;
s10 -> (1?0) s10;
s10 -> (1?1) s00;
s01 -> (0!0) s01;
s01 -> (1?1) s01;
s01 -> (1?0) s11;
s11 -> (0!1) s11;
s11 -> (1?0) s11;
s11 -> (1?1) s01;
// Receiver’s transitions
s00 -> (1!1) s00;
s00 -> (0?1) s00;
s00 -> (0?0) s01;
s01 -> (1!0) s01;
s01 -> (0?0) s01;
s01 -> (0?1) s00;
s10 -> (1!1) s10;
s10 -> (0?1) s10;
s10 -> (0?0) s11;
s11 -> (1!0) s11;
s11 -> (0?0) s11;
s11 -> (0?1) s10;
}
Figure 9.2: Example input file for Lever for FIFO automata
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model producer_consumer {
var size, spaceLeft, produced;
states normal;
transition prod := {
from := normal;
to := normal;
guard := spaceLeft >= 1;
action := produced’ = produced + 1, spaceLeft’= spaceLeft - 1;
};
transition cons := {
from := normal;
to := normal;
guard := produced >= 1;
action := produced’ = produced - 1, spaceLeft’ = spaceLeft + 1;
};
}
strategy s1 {
Region init := {state=normal && size = spaceLeft && produced = 0};
Transitions t := {prod, cons};
Region bad := {!(spaceLeft + produced = size)};
}
Figure 9.3: Example input file for Lever for integer systems
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9.3.1 Experiments and Results for FIFO automata
We have used Lever to analyze some canonical FIFO automata verification problems described below.
[Producer Consumer] A simple producer consumer problem with one FIFO channel. The producer
can either be in an “idle” or in a “send” state in which it transmits either 0 or 1 to the FIFO channel.
[Data with parity] A simple data communication protocol in which the sender sends data and a
parity bit for the number of 1’s sent. The receiver uses the parity bit as a simple check for data
integrity.
[Resource arbitrator] In this example, two senders wish to broadcast over a shared channel and use
a resource manager to arbitrate which one is allowed to use it at any time.
[Alternating bit protocol (ABP)] This consists of a sender and receiver communicating over a
data and an acknowledgment channel. We consider a non-lossy version of ABP.
[Sliding window protocol] This is similar to ABP except that the sender can keep multiple data
messages in flight. We use a window size of 2 and maximum sequence number also of 2.
“Producer Consumer,” “Alternating bit protocol” and “Sliding window protocol” are fairly well-known in
the FIFO research community, see for example [120]. For the other two systems, a detailed description is
given below.
Data with parity
The system consists of a sender and a receiver whose automata are shown in Figure 9.4. The sender attaches
a “parity” bit if the number of 1’s is not even which is verified by the receiver. The FIFO system is simply a
cross product of the two automata with the bad states being any state in which the receiver is at the control
state qb.
Resource arbitrator
The system consists of two senders which share a channel c0 for broadcasting data. In order to ensure that
only one sender transmits at a time, there is a resource manager to which a request has to be sent for the use
of channel c0. The resource managers grants the request to one sender and waits for that sender to indicate
that it is done before listening for more requests. For simplicity, we assume that the first sender transmits
a pattern (01)∗ on c0 while the second sender transmits 2
∗. The safety property we want to verify that in
any control state, the channel c0 does not have transmissions from the two senders mixed up, i.e., for any
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θ0(c0!1)
θ1(c0!1) θ2(c0!parity)
θ3(c0!end)
θ4(c0!end)
Sender
qb
θ5(c0?1)
θ6(c0?1) θ7(c0?parity)
θ8(c0?end)
θ8(c0?end)
θ9(c0?end)
Receiver
Figure 9.4: FIFO automata for data transmission with parity
θ0(c1!req) θ1(c1?ack)
θ2(c1!done)
θ3(c0!0)
θ4(c0!1)
Sender 1
θ5(c2!req) θ6(c2?ack)
θ7(c2!done)
θ8(c0!2)Sender 2
θ9(c1?req) θ10(c1!ack)
θ11(c1?done)
θ12(c2?req)θ13(c2!ack)
θ14(c2?done)
Resource manager
Figure 9.5: FIFO automata for resource arbitrator
control state, contents of c0 other than ((01)
∗|2∗)∗ is considered “unsafe”. Figure 9.5 shows the description
of the senders and the resource manager; the automaton to be analyzed is the cross product of all these
three automata. It can be seen that the annotated trace language AL(F ) for this automaton is regular.
Results
We compare the running times (T ) using the verification procedures using active learning and passive learning
(columns Sizepassive and Tpassive). All executions were done on a 1594 MHz notebook computer with 512 MB
of RAM using Java virtual machine version 1.4.1 from Sun Microsystems. We also report the time taken
(Trmc) by the regular model checking tool [106] on the same examples. It can be seen the running time of
Lever is slightly better than the regular model checking tool.
In most of the examples, the active learning approach is faster. However, in certain cases it is possible
that the passive approach outperforms the active one. For instance, for the FIFO automata for Data Parity
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Tactive Tpassive Trmc
Producer Consumer 0.3 0.4 3.3
Data Parity 305.0 0.5 12.7
Resource Arbiter 0.5 0.7 33.2
Alternating Bit 2.0 4.1 24.7
Sliding Window 54.0 81.2 78.4
Table 9.1: Running time in seconds for safety property verification of FIFO automata
given in Figure 9.4, the time taken by the active learning approach is much higher. The intuitive reason why
the passive learning approach is able to find the answer quickly in this case is that the characteristic sample
needed for the reachable state happens to be quite small and is found using relatively a small number of
traces executed by the system. On the other hand, due to the cross product of two FIFO automata involved
in the system, the number of transitions that are enabled at any state is large. Most of these transitions can
be executed independently of each other and reach the same state regardless of order. The active learning
approach has to reconstruct each possible order causing it to slow down.
9.4 Experiments and Results for Integer and Parameterized
systems
For integer and parameterized systems, we analyze cache coherence protocols such as Dragon, Firefly, Illi-
nois, MESI, MOESI, Berkeley, Futurebus and Synapse; mutual exclusion protocols such as peterson, lamport,
ticket and bakery; broadcast protocols such as consistency, and producer-consumer; petri nets such as lastin-
firstserved protocol, Esparza-Finkel-Mayr Counter Machine, RTP and manufacturing; and counter machines
such as lift and barber. A number of these examples are taken from the FAST [54] web site. We also analyze
an example called noaccel for which the reachability set is regular but on which the acceleration methods
employed in tools such as FAST cannot be applied because the transition relation does not satisfy the con-
ditions needed for acceleration. Another system called flatcounter is derived from an example given in [90]
which illustrates a counter machine for which the reachable set is regular but the machine is not flat. It is
known that the acceleration method does not terminate for systems which are not flat. Note that for most
of these examples, the safety property of interest holds; but this is not very surprising since these examples
are well-studied in the literature. All these examples are available for download along with the Lever tool.
We analyze three different properties:
1. A simple safety property which says that the property p holds invariantly.
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2. A CTL property AG(EFp) which asserts that it is always true in all states that it possible to get to
a state in future which satisfies p. This is often used to assert properties such as proper termination.
Note that this is a branching time property that cannot be expressed in linear time logics.
3. Another CTL property AG(req → AF resp). This illustrates the application to a liveness property
which also requires fairness constraints. The fairness constraints were manually added to the examples
taken from the literature but due to the significant work involved, this was done only for some of the
more well known examples. Hence, AG(req → AF resp) was not analyzed for all the examples. This
property along with the fairness constraints can also be expressed as an ω-regular specification.
In order to evaluate the performance of our tool, we compare our Lever tool with three other tools
popular for verifying safety properties of infinite state systems: FAST [54], BRAIN [115] and ALV [10].
FAST uses acceleration techniques to compute the effect of infinite iteration of certain loops. BRAIN does
a backward search from the “unsafe states” and uses Hilbert’s bases for symbolic representation of integer
sets. Finally, ALV uses widening and can also employ acceleration techniques. In the case of Lever, we
explore two options: one in which learning uses the bound on the space as witness (see Section 6.2.1) and
the other in which the witness is the number of steps taken to reach a state (see Section 6.2.2). The former
option is labeled as “Lever (space)” while the latter is labeled as “Lever (steps)”. For the ALV tool, the
default backward search strategy was used and the computation of loop closures was turned on using the
option ’-L’.
9.4.1 Discussion
The running time for analyzing safety properties using Lever, FAST, BRAIN and ALV shown in Table 9.2.
All analysis was done on Intel Xeon based Linux machine running at 1.70GHz with 1GB memory. For some
examples, the analysis could not be completed either because the tool did not terminate in two hours, or it
exhausted available memory, or (in the case of ALV) it reported that it cannot provide an answer. For these
cases, the table shows an entry of ↑.
The comparison of running times between Lever, FAST, BRAIN and ALV is summarized in Figure 9.6.
The y-axis shows the logarithm (base 10) of the time in milliseconds to analyze the given examples. For
cases where a tool is unable to give an answer, we assign a value of 1010 milliseconds as the time taken.
It is interesting to note that since Lever only relies on regularity of the set being learnt, it is able
to analyze the example noaccel trivially, while FAST is unable to make any headway since the transition
relation does not lend itself to acceleration based methods. Similarly, for the system flatcounter, Lever
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Lever(space) Lever(steps) FAST BRAIN ALV
noaccel 0.03 0.04 ↑ 0.004 0.03
synapse 0.1 0.11 0.22 0.004 0.06
flatcounter 0.15 ↑ ↑ 0.004 0.05
efm 0.17 0.26 0.59 0.01 0.2
berkeley 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.004 0.07
mesi 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.004 0.09
manufacturing 0.82 0.94 2.42 10.97 ↑
moesi 0.5 1.23 0.42 0.004 0.28
rtp 0.52 1.02 1.6 0.02 3.37
barber 0.55 1.78 1.39 0.06 0.64
ticket2i 0.59 3.81 0.68 ↑ ↑
lamport 0.74 1.42 1.78 0.05 6.8
consistency 0.93 6.07 142.81 0.06 571.47
dragon 0.96 1.26 1.07 0.01 0.66
firefly 1.2 0.85 0.65 0.01 0.11
peterson 1.37 2.82 3.4 0.25 441.71
illinois 1.6 1.24 0.71 0.01 0.17
lift 2.73 7.45 4.12 ↑ 0.4
bakery2 2.74 6.22 ↑ 0.01 0.09
producer-consumer 3.5 20.99 0.32 ↑ 0.04
kanban 3.95 9.61 7.08 ↑ ↑
readwrit 5.05 9.76 7.07 0.06 1104.65
dekker 12.17 54.19 14.41 21.29 ↑
ticket3i 12.62 118.46 2.78 ↑ ↑
futurbus 14.49 11.18 1.58 0.03 2.32
centralserver 17.09 6.73 14.18 0.05 18.48
csm 85.93 167.36 31.29 0.21 1428.52
lastinfirstserved 126.35 13.91 1.44 0.01 0.45
multipoll 4400 1513 11.2 287.88 ↑
train ↑ ↑ 5.98 0.02 0.27
fms ↑ ↑ 112.5 410.92 ↑
swimmingpool ↑ ↑ 116.41 0.01 ↑
Table 9.2: Running times in seconds for safety properties for integer programs
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Figure 9.6: Comparison between Lever and other tools for safety properties
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9
Example AG(EFp)
dragon 2.70
firefly 1.82
illinois 3.81
mesi 1.63
moesi 1.84
prod/consumer 6.99
synapse 0.56
bakery2 17.00
barber 1.01
berkeley 0.61
consistency 5.04
efm 0.19
futurbus 20.95
lamport 2.62
lastinfirstserved 132.72
lift 6.93
manufacturing 3.41
noaccel 0.09
peterson w 2.35
rtp 15.34
ticket2i 12.13
Table 9.3: Running times in seconds for Lever for CTL formula AG(EFp)
successfully analyses with witness using bounded space; however FAST is unable to terminate as the system
is not flat.
The overall comparison of the performance of the various tools is mixed. There are some examples for
which one tool is better than all the others and there are other examples in which some tools are unable
to give an answer while others are successful. In some cases, Lever is unable to terminate in two hours.
However, the important observation is that the performance of Lever is comparable to the other tools and
for some examples it is significantly better. Another significant advantage of using Lever is that, given
enough time and memory, the learning based technique gives is guaranteed to terminate as long as the set
being learned is regular.
Tables 9.3 and 9.4 report the running times for the CTL formulas AG(EFp) and AG(req → AF resp)
respectively. Comparison with other tools could not done for these formulas, since most of them are restricted
to analysis of safety properties.
9.5 Case Study
We now present a case study for the application of learning techniques for verification. The system we analyze
is an abstract model derived from a module in the Linux kernel. Linux is a popular open source operating
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Example AG(req→ AF resp)
bakery2 29.28
barber 3.40
consistency 2.36
lamport 5.24
lift 9.78
ticket2i 45.92
Table 9.4: Running times in seconds for CTL formula AG(req→ AF resp) with fairness constraint
system originally developed by Linus Trovaldis and has been used extensively for desktop, embedded and
enterprise environments.
The module we analyze in Linux is the read-copy-update (RCU) mechanism designed as a scalable reader-
writer synchronization mechanism for data structures that are accessed concurrently on multiple CPU sys-
tems. The RCU work is part of the Linux Scalability Effort [93] which aims to scale Linux to systems with
large processor counts and IO configurations. A major challenge in multi processor systems is to design
efficient mechanisms for mutual exclusion for critical sections of code. The traditional methods for mutual
exclusion use spin locks, semaphores, reader-writer locks and so on. However, with the advent of faster
CPUs and the fact that memory interconnects are not advancing as rapidly, the relative cost of acquiring
locks is increasing. Therefore, a large effort has been put into looking at alternatives to conventional locking
methods. Read-copy-update [14, 96, 97] is one such alternative which is designed for the case where most of
the accesses are by readers (who do not modify data) and only occasional accesses by writers (who modify
data). Such scenarios are quite common in modern operating systems, for example, looking up routing tables
for IP network layer and accessing file structures.
RCU is a two-phase update method, where readers can access the data without any conventional locks,
but writers have to use a special callback scheme to update the data. Writers update all the global references
to the changed data with a new copy and use the callback scheme to free the old copy after all the CPUs
have lost local references to it by going through a quiescent state (like a context switch). To explain the
RCU mechanism, let us take a concrete example of list updates from [98]. Suppose that there are two CPUs
accessing a list which is initially of three elements as shown in Figure 9.7. CPU 0 is updating element B
while CPU 0 is doing a lock-free read traversal.
Now, suppose that CPU 0 needs to make change to element B. It cannot modify B in place because CPU
1 may be reading it at that time. Therefore, CPU 0 makes a copy into a new element B’, modifies B’ and
changes A’s pointer to B’. This does not interfere with CPU 1 which still has the old element B. Next CPU
0 waits for every CPU to go through a quiescent state (a state where the CPU gives up any references to
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Figure 9.7: List initial state
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Figure 9.8: List deferred deletion
shared data structures) and then deletes B. Since, CPU 1 has gone through a quiescent state, it cannot have
any stale reference to B. At this time, CPU 0 proceeds to free B and the final list is shown in Figure 9.10.
9.5.1 RCU in Linux kernel
We analyzed the RCU implementation in Linux kernel version 2.6.12.5 (obtained from http://www.kernel.
org). The RCU application programming interface is shown in Figure 9.11. The functions rcu read lock
and rcu read unlock are used by the readers and are extremely light weight. In fact, for non-preemptive
kernel they do not generate any code at all; they are used only in preemptive kernels because the current
implementation uses a context switch as a quiescent state which is valid only if there is no preemption. The
function call rcu is used by the writer to schedule a call back to update the change that it needs after every
CPU has gone through a quiescent state. The call rcu function uses its struct rcu head argument to
remember the call back function. The function synchronize rcu blocks until all CPUs have gone through a
quiescent state. There are similar functions rcu read lock bh, rcu read unlock bh and call rcu bh which
are dedicated to kernel bottom half handling but since the overall algorithm is the same, we do not discuss
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Figure 9.9: List after quiescent period
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Figure 9.10: List after deletion
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struct rcu_head {
struct rcu_head *next;
void (*func)(struct rcu_head *head);
};
extern void call_rcu(struct rcu_head *head,
void (*func)(struct rcu_head *head));
extern void synchronize_rcu(void);
void rcu_read_lock(void);
void rcu_read_unlock(void);
Figure 9.11: RCU API in Linux Kernel
them separately.
The overall flow of the RCU mechanism proceeds as follows:
1. Readers access data between calls to rcu read lock and rcu read unlock but as we saw this is light
weight.
2. Writers do not modify data in place; they make a copy and schedule a call back function to do the
update via call rcu. The calls get queued in a per CPU queue.
3. If a CPU has pending updates, it informs all other CPUs of the beginning of a quiescent period (a time
interval during which each CPU passes through a quiescent state).
4. Each CPU keeps track of the times it goes through a quiescent state with counters. As each CPU
learns of a new quiescent period it takes a snapshot of it quiescent-state counters.
5. Each CPU periodically checks if the its current quiescent-state counter has exceeded the snapshot. If
yes, it clears a bit in a global bit mask to record the fact that it has passed through a quiescent state
for the current quiescent period.
6. Once the bit mask changes to all zeroes, the CPU that happens to do this also records the fact that
the current quiescent period has ended, and restarts another one if needed.
7. As each CPU learns that a quiescent period has ended it invokes any callbacks that were waiting for
that quiescent period.
In the actual implementation, there are three variables which are shared across all CPUs:
• curr which numbers the current quiescent period,
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• completed which records the number of the quiescent period that was last completed and
• cpubitmask which is a bit mask of all the CPUs.
In addition to the above variables, there are per CPU variables:
• batch which records the number of the quiescent period that this CPU is waiting for to schedule
callbacks.
• quiescbatch which stores the number of the current quiescent period that this CPU is aware of;
passed quiesc records whether the CPU has passed a quiescent state in the current period; and
qpending records whether the the quiescent period is already completed for this CPU or not. In our
model, we abstract away from the details of the updates to these variables and assume that for each
CPU the cpubitmask is updated when it passes through a quiescent state.
• nxtlist, currlist and donelist. These respectively keep track of the new callbacks to be queued,
the callbacks that are waiting for the current quiescent period to end and the callbacks that are ready
to be invoked. In our model, instead of a separate queue for each of these lists we keep a single integer
variable called list. We abstract away from the details of the queue management and let list store
3 if there are pending elements in the nxtlist, 2 if there are pending elements in the currlist, 1 if
there are pending elements in the donelist and 0 if there is nothing pending. This is valid because
we only analyze the run of the RCU mechanism for a single update for each CPU and each callback
passes through nxtlist, currlist and donelist sequentially.
We abstract away from the exact details of the function calls and present the RCU implementation as an
integer transition system. In this system, all the above variables are represented as unbounded natural
numbers with one copy per CPU for the case of CPU private variables. The full model is available along
with the distribution of the Lever tool from [91].
9.5.2 Results
We analyze a run of the RCU mechanism for a system with two CPUs with a single update occurring at each
CPU. This implies that each CPU has pending updates each of which will require all CPUs to go through
a quiescent period. Thus, initially, the list variable for each CPU is 3. First, we analyze a safety property
which asserts that it is not possible for the callbacks for all CPUs to be invoked (all the list variables
being 0) and the cpubitmask not being 0 (some CPU has not gone through a quiscent state). The Lever
tool successfully analyzes that the model satisfies this safety property in 5 minutes and 7 seconds. We also
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analyze a CTL property stating that from all states, it is possible to go to a state in which all the updates
are done (value of list for each CPU is 0). Lever takes 12 minutes and 38 seconds to report that the
property holds for the model. All tests were performed on an Intel Xeon based Linux machine running at
1.70GHz with 1GB memory.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
The central thesis of this dissertation is that learning algorithms can be effectively used for verification of
models of software systems. In previous chapters, we described an application of this technique for verifying
properties of various classes of infinite state systems. We first showed how passive learning can be used to
verify safety properties of FIFO automata. Then, we developed a new annotation scheme for representing
the system executions and states reached with those executions. We also showed that the framework of
active learning can also be used for verification of safety properties. Next, we applied the learning to verify
approach to systems expressible in the regular model checking framework and in particular, parameterized
systems and integer systems. We demonstrated verification of safety properties of such systems using learning
with witnesses consisting of a bounded number of steps and witnesses using bounded space.
We have also shown that learning to verify approach can be used not only for safety properties but
also for liveness properties. Both, linear time properties using ω-regular specifications and branching time
properties using CTL with fairness constraints can be analyzed.
The techniques mentioned above have been implemented and are available in the Lever tool suite. We
have analyzed various examples taken from the literature and compared the performance of the tool with
other tools available for analyzing infinite state systems. Although, there is no clear winner which performs
better than the others for all the examples, we note that the Lever tool suite performs better in a number
of cases. As stated earlier, the main advantage of the learning based approach is that given enough time and
space, it is guaranteed to find a solution if the set being learned is in fact regular. We have also presented
a case study for the application of the learning based verification technique to analyze the read-copy-update
mechanism used in the Linux kernel for reader-writer synchronization.
In recent years, there has been a trend towards model driven development of software systems; therefore,
verification of system models is likely to become increasingly important. The learning-to-verify approach is
a promising new method for automatic verification of such systems.
Since the application of learning techniques to verification is fairly new, there are a large number of
interesting directions to pursue. In this dissertation, we have focused on mostly infinite state systems arising
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as models of software systems. Another class of systems that the learning technique could be applied to is
the class of hardware systems. In hardware systems, the set of states are usually represented symbolically
to allow for a compact encoding. It has often been noted that even when the representation of the final
fixpoint needed for verification is not large, intermediate approximations to the fixpoint could still be very
complex. In such cases, the learning-based technique can potentially be better since it does not compute
the intermediate approximations.
Application of the learning based technique to hybrid systems is also very intriguing. In hybrid systems,
set of states are often represented using geometrical shapes such as polyhedra and ellipses. It would be
interesting to see if techniques for learning geometric shapes can be applied fruitfully for verification of such
systems. Another class of systems that could be analyzed is that of probabilistic systems.
In this dissertation, we used learning algorithms for regular sets and showed that the verification pro-
cedure is complete if the sets being learned are indeed regular. An interesting direction of research is to
investigate if there any useful sufficient condition that can be used to check if the sets to be learned for
a particular system are regular. If the check succeeds, then the user has the assurance that the learning
based technique will eventually terminate with the right answer. Of course, even if the check fails, it might
be still worthwhile to run the tool but the termination is no longer guaranteed. It is to be noted that we
cannot hope to develop sufficient as well as necessary conditions since the underlying problem is typically
undecidable.
We have so far used regular sets as the representation of choice for learning. It would be interesting to
investigate techniques for learning sets more expressive than regular sets. This could expand the class of
systems that can be successfully analyzed using the learning-to-verify method. Of special interest is learning
visibly pushdown languages [8] since these languages have been shown to useful for a number of program
analysis problems.
Another interesting challenge to pursue for future work is to apply the learning technique to actual
software code written in traditional programming languages like C, C++, Java itself. The technique of
abstraction is likely to be necessary for a viable verification procedure. Learning methods could be used to
learn abstractions of the system which either verify that the system is correct or produce counterexamples
which are then checked for validity. Similar to predicate abstraction techniques, spurious counterexamples
could be used to refine the abstraction that was hypothesized by the learner.
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